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

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The *Journal of Thought* is a quarterly publication devoted to encouraging scholars of diverse disciplines, nationalities, languages and cultures to examine the significant educational issues and problems from the perspective of their various disciplines. The Editors solicit material that treats the more comprehensive issues and problems confronting education throughout the world. Interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars is encouraged.

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The Scribe

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For Educational Psychology: A More Useful Role

Ever since Watson and Thorndike, experimental psychologists in education have treated their field as though it were a natural science. They have striven to be objective, impartial, and unmoved by moral considerations. They have sought to collect and classify data with a rigor leaving no room for disagreement, and they have tried to frame laws and theories strict enough to be handled in identical ways by all who understand them. They would have us believe that their endeavors can turn out technologies for education as effectively as the natural sciences generate technologies for industry and agriculture. Yet decades of work and millions of dollars have produced hardly a single achievement of any educational importance, and most of the technologies begotten by this work have become suspect or fallen into disuse.

For all this, experimental psychology remains profoundly and puzzlingly influential among educators. Why has it failed as research? Why has it been so influential? And what should the psychology of education be like?

I

Educational psychology has failed as experimental research because it is a travesty of a natural science. Culture, society, and education change far more swiftly than the natural world, and as a result, virtually all generalizations made about them are soon outmoded. Referring to the field of aptitude-treatment interactions, in which he had worked for two decades, psychologist Lee Cronbach confessed:

> It is as if we needed a gross of dry cells to power an engine and could only make one a month. The energy would leak out of the first cells

> before we had half the battery completed. So it is with the power of our generalizations.[1]

It is a travesty of science for other reasons. In their drive to generalize, psychologists have reduced highly complex mental processes to the simplest terms. Learning is all association, they say, or it's all conditioning, or it's all X, where X is whatever academic fashion dictates. But no matter how good the evidence for X may be, it is bound by its own built-in limitations to distort the experience of any unique person learning anything in the real world.[2]

Again, in their attempt to reproduce the tightly controlled laboratory conditions of the natural sciences, experimental psychologists ask their subjects to perform tasks of the sort that few people encounter in real life. Children are not expected to get bored, or respond for the love of it, or quit, although these responses might be more sensible than the ones required.

Yet again, except in certain longitudinal studies, most experimental treatments are too brief to yield substantial results. For example, the average treatment time reported in the *AERJ* for 1981 was just over an hour.[3]

Because they are fascinated by the natural science ideal, most educational psychologists are philosophically naive. Yet their endeavor is permeated through and through by philosophy. One can hardly pose a hypothesis, choose a method, single out a variable, or invent a technology without making assumptions about the human beings under study, or assumptions about knowledge and value, that have been probed by philosophers for centuries. Instead of reflecting on the implications of their notions, most psychologists churn out research that is conceptually confused, banal, or worse, lacking in logical inference.

Take an example from left-right brain research. The author describes how (he thinks) different parts of the brain process information:

> The processing depends little on what or how the teacher has presented, and greatly on the total previous stored experience in that particular brain. Thus the standard presentation, lecture, recitation, and discussion that take up much of the instructional time in classrooms cannot be expected to produce learning in any reliable way.[4]

Plausible as this claim may sound, it is, first of all, a classic nonsequitur. The author states a premise about "information processing" and draws a conclusion about "reliable learning." Yet how the mind processes information and how it uses that information in learning are quite different matters. Logically a statement about the one does not entail a conclusion about the other, even though admittedly they are related. Second, what is meant by "producing learning in any reliable way"? What kind of learning is implied here? How is it "produced"? What makes it "reliable"?

"Learning," we know, is a favorite research topic of educational psychologists (though no longer of general psychologists). When defined, it usually is reduced to something that can be controlled. Ignored are the many *senses* of learning, of which here are some examples: (1) *Habitual*: He learned to raise his hand when he wanted to ask a question. (2) *Activational*: She learned how to swim. (3) *Factual*: He learned the provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. (4) *Conceptual*: She learned why, to what extent, and under what conditions foreign aid should be granted. (5) *Reflective*: He learned to be skeptical of partisan political statements. (6) *Committal*: She dedicated herself to learning and what it means to learn.

Take as a model "Learning (about) the Poverty Program." Here are some senses in which learning may be understood: (1) He memorized the provisions of the Poverty Program. (2) She learned how to memorize such provisions—skill at memorizing. (3) He learned why the Program was enacted, who supported it, and who did not. (4) He learned how to analyze such programs, estimate their worth, doubt their value. (5) She learned to make the Program something personal, i.e., accept responsibility for speaking for or against it. (6) He learned to place the Program in the context of history and contemporary life. (7) She learned (by extrapolation) to accept responsibility for, or empathize with, people in need.

Since no psychological "theory" of learning encompasses more than one or two of its many meanings, educational psychologists, in my view, should abandon all hope of proving something scientific about this peculiarly human phenomenon.

Take another case of conceptual confusion, from the field of test validation.[5] In wide use today is a test for critical thinking, composed by two eminent psychologists. It fails because neither the tasks nor the test results differ significantly from those for tests of general intelligence or from high school examinations designed to measure assimilation of course content. Worse, the authors do not seem to know the difference between the truth or falsity of propositions and the validity or invalidity of inferences. Thus, in one exercise the test taker is told, "Examine each inference . . . and make a decision as to its degree of truth or falsity"—as if truth and falsity were matters of degree and the result of logical inference. Again, the test ignores a crucial distinction between questions that are self-contained and questions that require the use of information not in the questions themselves. For example, in one section the test taker is asked to judge whether each of a series of arguments is strong or weak. The questions are said to be self-contained, for the directions state, "Judge each argument separately on its own merit; try not to let your personal attitude . . . influence your evaluation." Yet both the questions and the arguments answering them are political and social. One question asks, "Should the US government take over all

the main industries in the country, employ all who want to work, and offer products at cost price?" The so-called "merits" of these arguments clearly depend on one's political views. Arguments that appear strong to a conservative will appear weak to a liberal and vice versa. I myself would advise any test taker to show what critical thinking really is by attacking such questions rather than by trying to answer them. I also would advise those psychologists who have monopolized the field of educational testing either to study some philosophy or to let people in the humanities take over.

Cognitive scientists, it is true, are more likely to be philosophically aware than behaviorists or psychometrists. Philosophers, after all, cooperated with cognitive scientists in the creation of a research tradition based on the assumption that the computer is an adequate model of human thought. Nevertheless, most cognitive scientists still know too little philosophy, and the computer is a poor model for its purpose. Hence cognitive-scientific approaches to human learning are open to many philosophic objections.

For example, cognitive scientists assume that all our knowledge is coded in quasi-linguistic representations in the brain. In fact, knowledge depends on a background of many practices, such as those involving motor skills (e.g., singing, painting, swimming) that cannot be reduced to propositions. Hence thought, knowledge, and action depend on non-linguistic practices that cannot be simulated by computer programs.[6]

Again, there is no proof that (a) cognitive structures in the minds of students are ordered in the same way as corresponding structures in a computer, or that (b) a computer performing a certain task can be structured internally in the same fashion as a student who performs it. Internal mechanisms may indeed produce the same information in computer and student alike, but these mechanisms still may be structured quite differently. Suppose a group of students, all with the same mechanisms of psychological processing, master a physics test. Not all of them will order the material in the same way. Some may order it historically, others by topic, others in relation to math or chemistry, others according to general principles, and still others in quite novel fashion. The structure created depends on the interests and background of the individual student. What is true of students vis à vis one another is true of students vis à vis computers. Similar performances do not necessitate similar internal structures.[7]

II

With such a poor track record, then, how have psychologists, especially experimentalists, come to exercise such a powerful influence on educational practice? They have done so, despite William James's admonition, by promising to provide educators and others with the information allegedly needed to "improve" schooling. In the name of science they have desig-

nated certain instructional techniques as "effective" or the opposite. Intentionally or not, they have cast their findings in forms (e.g., the input-output model) that are suitable for those wishing to manipulate (rather than guide) the educational process. Education thus is seen by many would-be manipulators—psychologists and others—as a production process requiring, above all, the use of highly developed instructional technology. Teachers become agents who work *on* students in order to produce measurable results on tests.

This interest in the control of education lies behind the use of prepackaged curricular materials backed by standardized psychometric tests. These materials prescribe the form that teaching and learning are to take, often down to the very words that teachers and students must use. In this way, power in education passes from teachers and parents to program designers who draw on psychological research and its putative meaning for curriculum content and construction. Having lost control of subject matter, teachers try to bolster their competence with prescribed methods centered on instructional management. Subject matter is reduced to bits of information that can be put into a multiple-choice test whose results fit a normal curve. Those in the lowest levels of the curve are treated as "deviant" and in need of "special education."[8]

In such ways as these psychology facilitates the increasing control of education by experts with specialized technical interests—interests not necessarily relevant to the solution of problems of schooling in a richly multicultural society.

III

What, then, should the psychology of education be like? For the time being, it must include some control-oriented research, for in our society there are situations that can be treated only by manipulation, (e.g., the need of different sectors of the economy for appropriately educated people), and coercion, (e.g., student violence). We need hard data and a knowledge of causal connections in order to predict the consequences of alternative educational policies, if only to choose those most likely to minimize waste. Human beings still must be studied by some psychologists as material for administrative action.

Next, psychologists should put most of their efforts into more benign and relevant forms of research. I am thinking of *case studies*, whether of individual teachers[9] or of single classrooms and schools.[10] I think also of *multisite qualitative research*, which coordinates case studies in a number of settings in order to permit broader conclusions.[11] Then, there is *operational research*, which starts with an idea for handling some particular situation and ends with a clear statement of what was done and why it succeeeded.[12]

All such studies yield data and conclusions that admittedly are limited and tentative, and must be balanced by the judgment of the individual teacher. In their fallibility, however, they reflect the complexity and variability of human affairs, where scientific demonstration rarely is possible.

Most of all, psychology needs an approach in which researchers regard those they study, not as objects of inquiry, but as collaborators in a process leading to a better understanding of education and how to educate. The aim of this research is not to serve the interest of control but to discover through discussion and reflection the best forms that a morally worthwhile education can take.[13] Such an approach respects the dignity of teachers and students as individuals, all different and all capable of responsible, independent action. Its chief audience would be the public rather than the authorities. Psychologists, in short, would not be simply technical experts but morally concerned professionals whose research would be guided by ethical and policy considerations.

Finally, psychologists would do well to draw on literature. Writers are (as Ezra Pound said) the "antennae" of the race, and in the areas of personality, human relations, and the emotions they are its greatest, unsung psychologists. Through their insights and their power to vivify experience they provide the reader with an interpretation of education that is more searching and compelling than any researcher's analysis. The writer delves into the fathomless depths of the psyche and depicts human relations and manners with an acuteness few researchers can match. Literature is replete with riveting portrayals of teaching, learning, classroom interactions, identity crises, and other matters made gray and banal by researchers who love to quantify.[14]

By examining literature, by using forms of research that are oriented more to understanding than control, and by collaborating on a more personal basis with those they study, educational psychologists can make their discipline a forum for humane conversation rather than an abortive hard science that produces almost nothing of educational importance.

Notes

[1] Lee J. Cronbach, "Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," *American Psychologist* 30:2(February 1975), 123. Cronbach continued: "Taking stock today, I think most of us judge theoretical progress to have been disappointing. Many of us are uneasy with the intellectual style of psychology."

[2] "A Conversation with Alric Neisser," *Psychology Today* 17:5(May 1983), 62.

[3] Elliott W. Eisner, "Anastasia Might Still Be Alive, But the Monarchy is Dead," *Educational Researcher*, 12:5(May 1983), 14.

[4] Leslie A. Hart, "The New 'Brain' Concept of Learning," *Phi Delta Kappan* 59:6(February 1978), 393–396. Quoted by D. C. Phillips, "What Do the Researcher and the Practitioner Have to Offer Each Other?" *Educational Researcher* 9:11(December 1980), 18.

[5] See John E. McPeck, *Critical Thinking and Education* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), ch. 6.

[6] Hubert Dreyfuss, "Dasein's Revenge: Methodological Solipsism as an Unsuccessful Escape Strategy in Psychology," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3:1(March 1980), 78–79; and John Searle, "The Background of Meaning," in *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics*, ed. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch (Boston: Dordrecht; London: Reidel, 1980), pp. 272 ff.

[7] Cf. D. C. Phillips, "On Describing a Student's Cognitive Structure," *Educational Psychologist* 18:2(Summer, 1983), 59–74.

[8] The tragedy is that once locked into special education programs, children seldom escape. Their parents expect less of them, and eventually they come to expect less of themselves. Children who score only a few quixotic points below a "norm" may be isolated and stigmatized for years to come.

[9] E.g., Hugh Munby, "A Qualitative Approach to the Study of a Teacher's Beliefs," *Journal of Research in Science Teaching* 21:1(January 1984), 27–38.

[10] E.g., Hugh Mehan, *Learning Lessons: Social Organization in the Classroom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[11] Robert E. Herriott and William A. Firestone, "Multisite Qualitative Policy Research: Optimizing Description and Generalizability," *Educational Researcher* 12:2(February 1983), 14–19.

[12] E.g., Michael A. and Lisa Wallach, *Teaching All Children to Read* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

[13] See Robert N. Bellah, "Social Science as Practical Reason," *Hastings Center Report* 12:5(October 1982), 32–39.

[14] I think in particular of *Masters: Portraits of Great Teachers*, ed. Joseph Epstein (New York: Basic Books, 1981), in which some distinguished students recall the influence of their former professors. For a professor's tribute to his students, I know of nothing more moving than Wallace Fowlie's *Aubade: A Teacher's Notebook* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1983).

Margins of Precision—Introduction

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Advancing the Perspective of the Foundations

The successful effort by educational foundations professors to expand the scope of teacher evaluation criteria being developed in Tennessee leads to two conclusions: (1) the need for professors to bring to bear their perspectives on policy matters, and (2) the need for much stronger emphases on foundations in teacher preparation programs.

The case for professorial involvement in policy formation is straightforward. Only persons involved in the development of educational policies forge those policies; bystanders have little influence. Participation in and of itself doesn't mean efforts will end positively, as was the case here in Tennessee. The work of our colleagues demonstrates that one has to be part of the game to have any hope of influencing the outcome. Our colleagues identified a concern, i.e., the fact that broader competencies associated with the well-rounded teacher were not sufficiently addressed in the evaluative criteria developed under the new career teacher/career administrator program. They identified key persons and organizations to which concerns could be expressed. They did so, and they influenced the character of the evaluative criteria. Had the same professors merely debated the issue amongst themselves, nothing would have changed. Because they entered the political process and contributed the balanced view appropriate to their calling, they were successful. The moral is clear: policy making is a process of give-and-take, and there is no influencing the process from the sidelines.

More sobering are teacher reactions to some of the competencies reported by Dr. French. Assessments of those reactions are at best conjectures since the "appropriate" and "inappropriate" categories do not reveal shadings of opinion. It is interesting, however, to note reactions that have the widest discrepancy, i.e., 60 percent viewed as "appropriate" and 40 percent

viewed as "inappropriate." Such was the divergence of response to the following competencies for classroom teachers: "Is able to relate educational decisions to the questions of value and purpose"; "Indicates a sensitivity to the different expectations and purposes various groups have for schooling"; and "Demonstrates an awareness of the nature and tradition of sexism in the schools."

To those in the foundations of education, the high percentage of teachers who do not see these as competencies appropriate to teaching is shocking. These reactions underscore concerns that some teachers are engaged in what has been called "mindless behavior." Yet, even at a university it is easy to become so embroiled in day-to-day routines that it is difficult to recall the broader purposes of university education, the traditions and ideals of the academy. Classroom teachers are not alone in facing pressures that leave little energy for broader questions of purpose. If one is truly dedicated to the foundations, one will wonder how there can be any "inappropriate" reactions to any of the indicators listed in Dr. French's article. This does not mean they are all equally important, but they all suggest some sense of perspective, of thoughtful analysis, and of an understanding of the broader culture within which teaching takes place.

One can only commend our colleagues for struggling to advance the perspective of the foundations. The struggle to maintain a strong foundations component in the teacher education process is not over. To conclude otherwise is to acquiesce to a limited view of teaching, one that does not acknowledge the ethical and social contexts of our calling.

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Margins of Precision—Essay

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Social Foundations Professors and the Tennessee Better Schools Program: An Attempt to Influence Educational Policy

In February 1984, a special session of the Tennessee Legislature passed both a comprehensive educational reform bill and provisions for increased taxes to support it. This legislation is one state's response to the national debate over directions public education should take in the near future. These debates are hammering out proposed resolutions, not only to pedagogical problems in the classrooms, but to far broader social, political, and economic issues. These broader issues and their proposed resolutions define the possibilities of using educational controversies for political gain, but they also provide challenging opportunities to strengthen American public education for decades to come.

A major impetus for the educational controversy in Tennessee was the January 1983 announcement of the Better Schools Program by Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander. The Better Schools Program, so it is being

argued, will improve the quality of education in Tennessee by focusing attention on the following ten realms: 1) basic reading and arithmetic skills, 2) basic computer skills by the ninth grade, 3) compulsory kindergarten attendance, 4) more rigorous requirements for credits in high school mathematics and science, 5) residential summer programs for gifted juniors and seniors, 6) high school vocational education tied more closely to jobs of the 1980s, 7) alternative schools for disruptive students, 8) adult job training programs managed by the State Board of Regents, 9) centers for excellence on university campus, and 10) career advancement opportunities for public school educators.

The tenth area, better known as the Master Teacher and Master Principal Program, has been described as the heart of the Better Schools Program. Expectedly, this aspect of the plan has been the most fiercely contended. Governor Alexander argued that

> the Master Teacher Program is an incentive pay system that will make teaching a fully professional career, draw our best young people into it, keep our best teachers in it, challenge our best teachers to do even better, and inspire excellence in our classrooms by rewarding excellence in our teachers.

On the other hand, critics of the Master Teacher Program, including the Tennessee Education Association, have objected to a number of its features, especially the proposals for merit pay and the criteria suggested for evaluating public school teachers. The evaluative criteria have become controversial for more than one reason. Some public school teachers object to the subjective manner by which the criteria could be applied to the evaluation of their professional performance. They fear that career advancement and salary increments may well depend, at least in part, on political considerations. Others are afraid of an impersonal, technical approach by outside evaluations. Educational foundations professors have long recognized the potential of such criteria for dictating the content of teacher preparation and evaluation programs. Evaluative criteria can define educational objectives, curricular content, teaching and learning methods, and student evaluation process. In this general process, interpretative, normative and critical perspectives on education can be easily lost.

Most of the teacher evaluation criteria tentatively identified have been directed toward the classroom activities of the teacher, such as planning learning activities, managing student behavior, and transmitting subject-matter information. The original evaluation model itself was based on positivistic empirical assumptions that good teaching can be objectively recognized, that it can be defined in observable, behavioral terms, and that it can, therefore, be measured, modeled, and molded. The Tennessee Master

Teacher Program, accordingly, states teaching competencies in the form of behavioral objectives, with indicators to be observed by the evaluators, even though the evaluative criteria themselves are not phrased in a rigorous, behavioristic style.

In addition, it has been assumed by some, including a consultant on evaluative criteria to the Tennessee Department of Education, that no criterion should be included in the evaluation instrument unless research has already demonstrated that the behavior specified increases teacher effectiveness in the classroom. Classroom effectiveness is largely tied to skills which impart that knowledge to students, raising their scores on standardized achievement tests. The support for such limited criteria argues that disputes over teacher evaluations could be easily adjudicated by presumably impartial, objective research findings and the clearly measurable performance of students in demonstrated accumulation of information. This argument underlies the accountability movement in education without raising questions regarding the implied roles of teaching and the aims of education.

On the other hand, the critical tasks of educational foundations call for a review of the epistemological and pedagogical presuppositions regarding generalizations on teacher effectiveness criteria drawn only from discrete, isolated research settings and averaged test scores. There is also the deeper concern that the measurement of teacher competencies by student performance on standardized achievement tests may easily ignore the paramount importance of teaching and learning activities which enhance individual creativity, imagination, ingenious problem solving, and intellectual and artistic invention.

Therefore, the sense of urgency created by some proponents of the Better Schools Program in the spring of 1983 prompted the Tennessee Educational Foundations Association (TEFA) to invite Beecher Clapp, Tennessee's Deputy Commissioner of Education, to discuss developments in the Master Teacher Program with its members at their annual April meeting. Clapp accepted the invitation and, upon meeting with the TEFA membership, fortuitously encouraged the Association to communicate its concerns about the narrow scope of the proposed evaluative criteria for the Master Teacher Program directly to the Commissioner. Later discussion by members of the Association revealed an interest in influencing the direction of the Master Teacher Program, in spite of the fact that the members were not unanimous in their assessment of the merits of the Better Schools Program *per se*, much less agreed upon the wisdom of attempting to state evaluative, interpretive and critical competencies in behavioral language and measurable terms.

In the minds of some Tennessee educational foundations scholars, opposition from the Tennessee Education Association (TEA) to the Better Schools Program enhanced the possibility of input by the TEFA into the

Master Teacher Program. In large measure, the Better Schools Program proposal failed to clear Tennessee legislative channels in the spring of 1983 because the TEA leadership exercised its political influence. This delay in the passage of the Better Schools Program provided the opportunity for the TEFA to hold an additional, special meeting in October 1983 for further consideration of the evaluative criteria. Individual members of the Association were encouraged to develop lists of proposed intellectual and qualitative competencies and their possible indicators for discussion at the meeting.

At the fall meeting of the TEFA, members discussed their interests with two individuals who were closely associated with the Better Schools Program, Dr. Susan Rosenholtz, Assistant Professor of Education and Sociology at George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University and a consultant to the Tennessee State Department of Education regarding the evaluative crieria, and Dr. Russell French, Professor of Education on leave from The University of Tennessee and Executive Director of the Better Schools Program. These discussions clarified problems which the Association faced in broadening the teaching effectiveness criteria for the Master Teacher Program and the course of action the Association was advised to pursue if it was to affect the Better Schools Program. At this juncture, it became obvious that a proposal from the TEFA would have to be presented to the Interim Commission established by Governor Alexander to give oversight to the development and refinement of the Master Teacher Program, including the evaluative criteria. The responsibilities of identifying evaluation domains, teacher competencies, and performance indicators were clearly set before the Association's membership.

Members of the TEFA decided to continue with their original intent of making an impact on the Better Schools Program, although it appeared that the major working assumptions of some influential people militated against the inclusion of less behaviorally specific criteria. That is to say, the association membership realized that if there was inflexibility on the point that all criteria must be related to teacher effectiveness in a narrow sense, then there was little reason to be optimistic about the acceptance of additional, more comprehensive criteria.

Two weeks after the October meeting of the Association, a subcommittee of the TEFA (consisting of the authors of this article), working with the suggestions of its other members, met at George Peabody College in Nashville to refine a few competency statements to be presented to the Interim Commission. Since the purpose of the proposal from the Association was to illustrate the need for a broad professional perspective by a master educator, as opposed to a master instructor, compromise and cooperation overshadowed individual and disciplinary preferences. The subcommittee accommodated the Interim Commission by using the prescribed format for

the evaluative criteria and by suggesting possible verification techniques. The subcommittee also relied heavily on the standards developed by the American Educational Studies Association and endorsed by other learned societies representing the various educational foundations areas.

When the TEFA subcommittee presented its proposal to the Interim Commission, some of the assumptions guiding the Commission in its selection of criteria were gently challenged. Nevertheless, the proposal was accepted by the Commission as a whole and referred to its subcommittee on evaluative criteria. Similarly, the evaluative criteria subcommittee accepted the proposal and directed the Executive Director of the Better Schools Program to conduct an initial field testing of the evaluative criteria submitted by the TEFA. The proposed competencies and their indicators which were field tested are as follows:

1. Demonstrates an awareness of a relationship between daily classroom activities and the major aims of schooling in American society
   a. Is able to relate educational decisions to questions of value and purpose
   b. Indicates a sensitivity to the different expectations and purposes various groups have for schooling
   c. Constructs classroom activities aimed at a variety of major goals for schooling: basic skills, good citizenship, social development, aesthetic appreciation and independent thinking
   d. Articulates various conceptions of the educated person
2. Shows respect for the cultural heritage of students and their families
   a. Supports students' individual identities and encourages the critical development of their own points of view
   b. Does not attempt to impose values of personal choice on students
   c. Demonstrates an understanding of the nature of social class and ethnic bias
   d. Demonstrates an awareness of the nature and tradition of sexism in schools
3. Encourages students to develop their own values
   a. Fosters inquiry and discovery methods of learning
   b. Helps students to appraise and appreciate other cultures as well as their own
   c. Uses a variety of subject content to help students better understand various ways of being human
4. Demonstrates the ability to make professional decisions based on community needs, public evidence, and logical reasoning
   a. Can articulate sound and relevant reasons for the selection of curricular materials
   b. Provides rationale for classroom evaluative practices and disciplinary actions

c. Provides leadership in reflecting critically about the aims of education and school objectives

As of this writing, the criteria proposed by the TEFA have been field tested on two occasions. In the preliminary test with a small sample of teachers, the feedback was largely positive. Consequently, the criteria were judged worthy of a second field test involving a larger sample of teachers from across the State of Tennessee. The results of this second testing may be found in Director French's article which follows.

Recent developments indicate a slight shift in attitude toward criteria that are beyond the scope of a narrow, technically effective classroom instructor. Some recent consultants to the Tennessee State Department of Education who in the past have clearly advocated competency-based instruction and behavioral learning objectives are now advising against highly detailed, narrowly defined criteria for evaluating teacher effectiveness. Nevertheless, predictions concerning any aspect of the Master Teacher Program are still risky. Some or possibly even all of the criteria proposed by the TEFA may survive the rigorous scrutiny and testing which all evaluative items are undergoing. Perhaps the intellectual skills of criticism, interpretation, and evaluation highly valued within educational foundations studies will be merged with other more practical and more readily observable teaching competencies. Some may be allowed to stand as distinct categories.

Undoubtedly, educational reform movements in other states differ somewhat from the one found in Tennessee. Frequently, however, those responsible for defining excellence in teaching will be indifferent to or antagonistic toward the understandings that social foundations professors consider important. We do not know what the ultimate success of the TEFA effort will be, but we are convinced that educational foundations professors are well advised to attempt to affect policy directly on evaluation models for teachers. We are certain that few, if any, persons outside the field of educational foundations will champion our concerns or represent them well.

Margins of Precision—Response to the Essay

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Social Foundations Professors and the Tennessee Better Schools Program: What Happened to the Attempt to Influence Educational Policy

The concerns of the Tennessee Educational Foundations Association (TEFA) outlined in the preceding article were not without foundation. In the current national accountability movement, both legislators and the general public tend to look for improvement in test scores without regard to broader educational outcomes or societal issues which might be addressed in the classroom. Educational research of the last twenty years has produced just enough knowledge of the linkages between teacher behaviors and student outcomes to allow many to think that we know more about teaching and learning than we really do. (There are still many areas which have not been researched, and the research which has been done needs replication at many educational levels under a variety of conditions.) In selecting teachers for 1) the upper rungs of a career ladder and 2) incentive pay, the selection and application of evaluation criteria are critical issues. Desire for objectivity, quantification and a scientific approach in evaluating teachers can lead to a behavioristic specification of and search for trivia in classroom performance. Further, teacher classroom behaviors are much easier to identify and measure than are the teacher's attitudes and thought processes, the arena in which educational foundations programs and professors toil, often without the support of either colleagues or clients.

TEFA exercised great restraint and thoughtfulness in its attempt to influence changes in career teacher evaluation criteria. While the Association might have "gone public" in its reactions to the initial draft of criteria, it did not. Although the Association's subcommittee was not enamored of the

behavioral format used to state competencies and indicators, members did not reject the design. Rather, TEFA chose to enter into dialogue with those who had responsibility for development of evaluation systems: the Commissioner of Education, Program Director, consultants, and the Interim Certification Commission. The TEFA subcommittee provided recommendations for additional competencies written in the format already established. As a result of this reasoned approach, the Interim Certification Commission unanimously agreed to send the competencies and indicators proposed by TEFA to teachers in the field for validation.

Classroom teachers across the state were asked to rate the "new" competencies as appropriate or inappropriate and suggest modifications in late October and early November. While some may question the value of the practitioner's input in the validation process, they should remember that value to those affected and perceived job relatedness are two factors which should be given weight, especially when research findings and/or other support data are limited.

Teacher responses have now been tabulated. Although more than 6,000 teachers responded to the first draft of competencies in August and September, only 656 responded to the proposed revisions, a number which is disappointing, but probably to be expected in view of work loads and other pressures during October and November.

Table 1 displays the numerical responses to each TEFA proposed competency and indicator statement. Classroom teachers did not give high priority to knowledge and skill in relating classroom duties to major aims of schooling. Only one statement in this competency set (classroom activities aimed at a variety of goals) received support from more than 67 percent of the respondents. Teacher behaviors which demonstrate respect for the cultural heritage of students received support from more than 74 percent of the respondents with one exception. Regard for sexism was considered appropriate for inclusion by only 61 percent of the respondents. More than 85 percent of the respondents valued teacher performance which encouraged students to develop their own values except for teacher use of content to help students understand humanness. This behavior was either not understood or not supported by 37 percent of the respondents. Teachers did value their own and their colleagues' ability to make professional decisions based on community inputs and logical reasoning, but again their support for reflecting on what they are doing in relationship to broad aims of education received lesser support.

Teacher numerical responses to the TEFA proposed competencies may have reflected perceived lack of precision in concept or wording in some cases. Some of the respondents' comments about individual statements suggest this type of problem. However, many comments reflected concerns

TABLE 1: TEACHER REACTIONS TO PROPOSED COMPETENCIES FOR EVALUATION

Competency/Indicator	Appropriate	Inappropriate
1. Demonstrates an awareness of a relationship between daily classroom duties and the major aims of schooling in America.	251 (67%)	121 (33%)
a. Is able to relate educational decisions to questions of value and purpose.	330 (60%)	219 (40%)
b. Indicates a sensitivity to the different expectations and purposes various groups have for schooling	336 (60%)	227 (40%)
c. Constructs classroom activities aimed at a variety of major goals for schooling: basic skills, good citizenship, social development, aesthetic appreciation and independent thinking.	447 (82%)	107 (18%)
d. Articulates various conceptions of the educated person.	215 (39%)	343 (61%)
2. Shows respect for the cultural heritage of students and their families.	259 (85%)	45(15%)
a. Supports students' individual identities and encourages the critical development of their own points of view.	425 (78%)	120 (22%)
b. Does not attempt to impose values of personal choice on students.	413 (74%)	142 (26%)
c. Demonstrates an awareness of the nature of social class and ethnic bias.	427 (75%)	139 (25%)
d. Demonstrates an awareness of the nature and tradition of sexism in the schools	402 (61%)	254 (39%)
3. Encourages students to develop their own values.	311 (86%)	50 (14%)
a. Fosters inquiry and discovery methods of learning.	479 (88%)	67 (12%)
b. Helps students to appraise and appreciate other cultures as well as their own.	465 (87%)	71 (13%)
c. Uses a variety of subject content to help students better understand various ways of being human.	334 (63%)	194 (37%)
4. Demonstrates the ability to make professional decisions based on community needs, public evidence, and logical reasoning.	235 (84%)	44 (16%)
a. Can articulate sound reasons for the selection of curricular materials.	425 (82%)	94 (18%)
b. Provides rationale for classroom evaluative practices and disciplinary actions.	461 (88%)	62 (12%)
c. Provides leadership in reflecting critically about the aims of education and school objectives.	371 (72%)	143 (28%)

that proposed competencies and indicators were 1) too broad, 2) unmeasurable, 3) subject to the personal bias or values of an evaluator and 4) too idealistic.

Teacher responses and comments will be passed on to the Interim Certification Commission at its February 1984 meeting. Further, competencies and indicators receiving a high percentage of positive responses (more than 70 percent) will be carefully considered and compared with recent revisions in the competency structure already approved by the Commission for field testing at its December 1983 meeting (before these results were available). It appears that a few of TEFA's concerns already may have been addressed.

Since there has yet been no opportunity for review of the data reported here by the TEFA subcommittee, it is clear that further dialogue between this group and those charged with the development of the evaluation system will need to take place. TEFA has introduced some concerns which must be considered.

What disposition of the TEFA proposals finally will be made remains to be seen. However, several points of importance resulting from the events to date should be clear to all of us who are concerned about education in the United States and the educational reform movement now sweeping the country:

1. Professional groups such as TEFA must attempt to influence the shaping of evaluation and accountability structures if they truly believe in what they are teaching and doing.
2. A reasoned and reasonable approach still has (or again has) a place in influencing changes. There are alternatives to the strategy of intimidation and revolution so popular in the sixties and early seventies.
3. There are, as we expected, differences in perceptions of what constitutes important teacher knowledge, skills, and behavior. Those in higher education and the public schools to not always agree, nor do colleagues in either of those settings always agree with each other.
4. While differences in perceptions of what teachers need to know and do may always exist, it is important to find common ground when engineering evaluation systems, reward structures and professional improvement programs. A point at which to begin the search may be the concept of job-relatedness. Classroom teachers tend to give low priority to those items or behaviors which to them do not appear to be immediately and specifically related to the situations and challenges they face daily.
5. While teachers may give low priority to broad foundational knowl-

edge and skill for evaluation purposes, they do not actually suggest that they are without value, purpose or benefit. Perhaps there are those things which should be taught and learned, but not evaluated (because they cannot be).

Research Forum

Qualitative Inquiry: An Introduction

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Qualitative research in education has come into vogue. It seems that, as the song used to say, "everybody's doing it, doing it, doing it." Yet onlookers, especially students, may not know clearly what is being done and why.

For that reason, the "Research Forum" of the *Journal of Thought* has been made available to explore the topic. The aim of the Forum, announced in its first publication, is to help "think through and answer our most pressing problems. Some pieces appearing under this heading will be methodological in nature—they will contribute to discussions about the processes of inquiry itself."[1]

Within that ambit, the aim of the present essays is to explain the nature and use of qualitative research methods in education. We have asked several scholars who work in areas and use methods commonly thought to be "qualitative" to describe the methods and results specific to their interests and styles of inquiry. In this issue we present essays in the areas of philosophy of education, curriculum criticism, and ethnographic inquiry. Explanations of the qualitative characteristics and methods of other areas of inquiry—for example, history or sociology, especially as they are used in education—may be carried in forthcoming issues.

We have asked each of the essayists to address the following concerns:

1. What is the meaning of "qualitative?" In what respects and manner is your method and/or area of inquiry qualitative?
2. Are there qualitative "schools" within the area? That is, sort out the

qualitative activities within the area; define the qualitative similarities and differences within the area.

3. Elaborate the qualitative method and show its use through examples. While the aim is not to present a cookbook method, the introduction to qualitative methodology within the area should be explicit enough to enable students to become familiar with it and to build on it.

4. Though the essays are not intended to be a review of the literature about qualitative research and methods, but rather an introduction to what those methods are and how they apply in educational settings, the essays should provide citations to work that has been done so that students may build on them.

5. Suggest a reading list (which may double as a reference list). It should contain citations to qualitative methodology pertinent to the area being covered and specific examples where that method is employed.

The four essays in the present issue follow these guidelines faithfully. James Giarelli and J. J. Chambliss explain, from the perspective of philosophy of education, the evolution of the concern with qualitativeness and the role of philosophy of education in qualitative inquiry. Dorene Ross's "Introduction to Curriculum Criticism" explains how the techniques of social anthropology and aesthetic criticism are combined to describe, interpret, and evaluate curricula. Nobuo Shimahara traces the connection of ethnography to anthropology and explains the assumptions, strategies, and methodological orientation of anthroethnography. At first it may appear that Peter Woods's "Educational Ethnography in Britain" duplicates Shimahara's discussion, but that would be shortsighted. Woods's essay is unique in its comparative perspective and its focus on the findings of ethnographic studies as a way to demonstrate ethnographic, and qualitative, concerns and methods.

From here on we will let the essayists give their own details. But it should be useful to ask about the ways in which different qualitative areas and methods may be similar. Are there similar "qualitative" concerns no matter where they may be found or what method is employed? Some things stand out in the essays at hand.

One of those things is *context*. Shimahara says that human behavior—experience—is shaped in context and that events cannot be understood adequately if isolated from their contexts. He believes that such isolation, called "context stripping," is a key feature of science. Giarelli and Chambliss interpret inquiry to be a questioning or searching with an intent or an object in mind, or within some limits. That is, inquiry is bounded; it cannot be abstracted or approached in general.

The contexts of inquiry are not to be contrived or constructed or modified; they are *natural* and must be taken as they are. Qualitative researchers focus

on *natural settings*. Nothing is predefined or taken for granted. Shimahara, representing the general view, says that ethnography, for example, is the study of events as they "evolve in natural settings," or "contexts in process."

Moreover, experience is to be taken and studied as a *whole*, or holistically. One must attend to all features of experience. The philosophers, Giarelli and Chambliss, remind us that perceptual fields are experienced as wholes. So they say that the researcher must cultivate sensitivity to situations (experience) as a whole and to the qualities that regulate them. Ross, the curriculum theorist, agrees that the focus of research must be on the subtle qualities and underlying complexities of the experience being studied. To make the point with another word, the aim of qualitative research is to understand the *unity* of experience.

Methods of inquiry for carrying out these aims must be appropriate to the aims. It might be expected that the philosophers would remind us of Aristotle's dictum that each "science" has its appropriate methods which can be found only in its distinctive subject matter. Qualitative researchers take the point seriously. This is not to say that different researchers will not borrow or share features of method. Each of the essayists, and particularly those who build on anthropological and ethnographic bases, describe methods that are similar in some respects and even acknowledge that their inquiries might benefit from other perspectives and research approaches.

The point is that qualitative researchers will employ methods and strategies that are consistent with the aims we have generalized here. They will not superimpose a general method on experience, but will be sensitive to the effects of methods on inquiry. (For this reason, ethnographers, for example, are careful to employ *non-interventionist* methods.) The point often is made by a constrast with science and the methods of science, which intervene in experience, and structure and report experience quantitatively. Both Giarelli and Chambliss and Shimahara believe that some interests in experience cannot be measured quantitatively. For the former, philosophers, it is the "possibilities" in experience, the questions that can be formulated for inquiry, that are important. For the latter, an ethnographer, social-cultural *patterns* of experience, or *relationships* among events, are the matters of importance, not the quantification of human events.

Though these ideas stand out, one still might wonder what the term "Qualitative" means. It was not a requirement that the essayists define the term directly and at the outset of their discussions. To do so might have prevented the discussions from even taking place. A philosopher has observed:

> It is part of the popular mythology that we cannot have fruitful . . . discussions unless we first define our terms. It is a common belief that

> we ought to start with definitions. This point of view is . . . misleading. The object of . . . analysis is to *arrive* at something like a definition; therefore, in principle, it cannot start with one. . . . The search for clarity and precision of thought is an important venture. To suppose that it can get started only by agreement on definitions is to prevent it from starting at all.[2]

But now that we have the discussion in the essays, we can draw them together and *conclude* that "qualitative" implies a direct concern with experience as it is "lived" or "felt" or "undergone." (In contrast, "quantitative" research, often taken to be the opposite idea, is indirect and abstracts and treats experiences as similar, adding or multiplying them together, or "quantifying" them.) Thus, Giarelli and Chambliss anchor their discussion of qualitative thinking in "feeling and appreciation" and call it "aesthetic" activity. (This sense of qualitative also prompts Ross's use of aesthetic criticism.) Qualitative research, then, has the aim of understanding experience as nearly as possible as its participants feel it or live it.

In fact, this idea may be the "test" for qualitative research, whether it be a philosophical discussion, an ethnographic report, a literary account, or an historical study. Ross says that qualitative descriptions "should transport the reader to the scene, convey the pervasive qualities or characteristics of the phenomenon, and evoke the feeling and nature of the educational experience." Shimahara agrees and quotes from Harry Wolcott to make the point:

> The test of ethnography is whether it enables one to anticipate and interpret what goes on in a society or social group as appropriately as one of its members. To the extent that the account provided here achieves this objective, the reader should feel that if he were suddenly to find himself in an encounter with staff members, pupils, or parents at the school described, or if he were to attend a meeting with other principals from the school district, he would understand how he might act if he were in the role of the principal. Conversely, if he were to assume the role of some other person in an encounter with the principal, he should feel he would know how the principal might act toward him.[3]

There is another commonality in qualitative research. It is the idea of *judging* or *appraising*. We do not mean that the aim of such research is to approve or disapprove of the behavior that is studied. The aim, rather, is to know or understand it better. But philosophers, Giarelli and Chambliss say, depend on "aesthetic judgments" of where difficulties lie in experience and "on qualitative thinking to bring these difficulties into the form of questions and problems that can be researched." It is more the point here that judging

is an *appraisal* of the qualitative situation, the parts and whole, and an indication of the potentialities that can be sought from the actualities. Ross also sees a role for appraisal in qualitative inquiry. The function of criticism is to *describe* the essential qualities of phenomena; to *interpret* the meanings and relationships among those qualities; and to give a reasoned *judgment* about the *significance* and *value* of those things. Written appraisals, she says, should indicate whether the aims of the curriculum are met and, indeed, whether the aims are desirable or worthwhile according to some external criteria.

Admittedly, some qualitative researchers might shun judgment. Ross acknowledges that social anthropologists generally might avoid evaluation. But we make the point about judgment or appraisal because it may give a clue to why qualitative research is becoming more popular. That is because practitioners, who always have the obligation *to do something* in the situations they are in, have been given little direct help from quantitative research. Certainly quantitative research generates abundant information and relationships. But what does it tell the teacher to do? Because that can be determined only in a qualitative context—a real, direct, specific, explicit, and problematic context—the quantitative researcher is, or should be, mute. The teacher wonders how such researchers can claim to know more and more, and more minutely, and not be able to indicate the significance or use of that knowledge.

An illustration should help to make the point. A person with historical sense, or at least an historian's inquisitiveness, might find significance in what has happened to the idea of research in education in the past fifty years. A full study of the subject would be worthwhile, but because of space and time, we will do "instant" history here. Presume that one wants to know what "research" in education entails and how it is done. He might consult the *Encyclopedia of Educational Research*[4] to get the idea. And if he wants to know how the concept and practice may have changed in those years, he has the resource of five editions of the *Encyclopedia* that have been published since 1941.

In the 1941 edition of the *Encyclopedia*, there is no discussion of "research" (in general) or "research methods." But from the heading, "Research and Philosophy," the reader is advised to "see 'Philosophy and Science.' " In other words, what was significant about educational research in 1941 is the relationship between philosophy and science. One is told that the successes in the scientific investigation of education should not cause one to overlook the essential role that is played in educational research by other factors. Data is significant, the discussion says, but only as it is interpreted in light of accepted standards and assumptions. In concrete situations, it is not enough to know that "this will produce that"; we must decide whether or not we want "that." Our aim, the article says, is as much a

determiner of our course of action as are facts or data. In other words, until a "should" question is settled by a philosopher, the scientist has no "problem" to deal with.

The second edition (1950) dropped the discussion of philosophy and science altogether. An article on the "Science of Education" was added, but it did not mention the theme taken to be important here. In the third edition (1960), "Philosophy of Educational Science" is but a brief discussion under the larger heading "Philosophy of Education." It begins by saying that "the philosophical study of educational science is now in an incipient stage," as if in ignorance of the insight given twenty years earlier! The third edition includes an article for the first time on "Research Methods." It is an extensive discussion, giving a definition and characterizations of research methods and tracing the development of educational research in three historical periods since 1900. In the last period, since 1925, there is a review of four criticisms of the way educational research was going at the time: too little attention is given to the individual; education is more complex than single-variable studies show; too little attention is given to the "less tangible aspects" of education; and educational research is conducted with inadequate theory, for "scientific research needs a philosophical and historical orientation," that is, an attention to "goodness," "worth," and the "value" of facts.

That is, these criticisms return the discussion of research in education to the relation between philosophy and science and to the concerns that qualitative researchers now address. Presumably in response to the criticisms, the 1960 article goes on to note that "refinements" have been made in educational research methodology, and two illustrations are given. But it is suggestive of the trend, and of the human tendency to overlook criticism, that the refinements that are discussed are in data gathering techniques, research design, and statistical analysis—refinements in method, rather than attention to the scope of research.

The 1969 *Encyclopedia* divides the discussion into "Research Methods" and "Research in Education." The former is in fact a discussion of research approaches and methodologies. The latter is a discussion of the tactics and techniques of science and its use in educational research. The reader is now told that it is *not* the purpose of science to improve the world (i.e., education), though it may in fact do so. Science is not engineering; its task, rather, is to explain. More, scientific research aims not to describe singular things but rather to seek laws or generalizations; general statements of regularity are of the essence of science. That science has its use or worth within a context of values now has been eliminated deliberately from the discussion of educational research.

The 1982 edition of the *Encyclopedia* is so extensive that it is published in four volumes. Yet in all that space, and in spite of its growing popularity,

there is no discussion whatsoever of qualitative inquiry or research in education. (There is an article on "Qualitative Curriculum Evaluation.") Neither is there any longer a general discussion of research "methods." Instead, that discussion has been further "refined" into even more special, and thus more abstract, methodological concerns such as "measurement," "experimental methods," "regression analysis," "factor analysis," and "statistical methods." Someone may think that qualitative research could be tracked through "ethnography," "historiography," "sociology of education," and "philosophy of education," which the *Encyclopedia* does contain, but the novice reader cannot be expected to know that those are representatives of qualitative methodology or even learn from the articles necessarily how the approaches are representatives of qualitative concern.

The only discussion in the 1982 edition that returns the reader to the concerns voiced forty years ago (1941), and repeatedly but ever more faintly since that time, can be found under the heading of "Philosophy of Science in Education" (that is, the relation between philosophy and science as they are used in education). There the point is made that the role of philosophy of science in educational research depends on, among other things, whether one accepts a "conventional" or "enlightened" view of educational research. This distinction turns on whether or not the problems of *research* are more important than the problems of *education*. It is safe to say that qualitative researchers will keep their eyes on the latter. The article repeats what was said in 1941, that "meaning depends on a context of inquiry," and claims that, today, "the justification of scientific utility is as important an issue as the verification of scientific claims." It ends with the observation, not recent by any means, that "educational research, if it is to be enlightened, probably needs to pay closer attention to philosophy of education. . . . Empirical researchers who know these ideas [that philosophy poses] will find apt directions for their inquiries."

The point of this tracing of the idea of "research" in education is to show that the present concerns of qualitative researchers long have been part of the educational discussion. But as attention has been turned more and more to methodology, particularly to refinements in logic and quantitative methodology, those concerns have been crowded out. It should be little wonder that so much educational research is of such little help to the teacher today. Much of it does not aspire to be helpful. But the issues posed forty years ago still are with us. Research is not abstract. It exists in a context—we are inclined to say a "problematic" context—and its aim is to provide a unified sense or feel of that context, not a piecemeal enumeration of it. It is in this sense that qualitative inquiry is an *appraisal* or judgment; its function is to interpret, or appraise, behavior in relation to contextual circumstances, one circumstance of which are human aims and purposes. And it is because this theme has

become urgent again that we believe that qualitative research is becoming ever more popular.

The reader would be mistaken if he thought that we or any of the essayists intend to counterpose "qualitative" and "quantitative" forms of research. The error may be due to a manner of speaking. Contrasts between qualitative and quantitative forms of research, and criticism of scientific research in education, may lead someone to believe that one mode and method of research is right and the others not useful. The words in fact are defined in one sense as contraries in dictionaries and encyclopedias. But that is *not* our view. Our point, rather, is that educational research today requires a more comprehensive perspective in which the considerations that qualitative researchers raise, and the questions about worth and intent posed by philosophy, are as much a part of the discussion as are measurement or analysis.

In other words, the perspective of educational research needs to be broadened. Furthermore, such a perspective should make room for different modes of qualitative and quantitative inquiry. Woods, for example, acknowledges that "ethnography in itself is not a complete program, nor is it a perfect one. . . . [It should] seek alliance with other related methodologies." A colleague makes our point astutely when he says, "The more genuine the problem, the more likely many or all of the modes of inquiry will be required to deal with it. The less genuine the problem—the more abstract and intellectual it is—the more likely the focus will be on a single mode."[5]

In our view, such a perspective is at hand in John Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.[6] A detailed review of that book is not called for here, but we may note the respects in which it provides a comprehensive theory for research. Dewey believes that all inquiry arises out of actual, or qualitative, life and that the function of inquiry is to develop responses in the conduct of life. We are assisted in that formulation not by methods or rules that have been handed over abstractly from other experience (though these should be taken into account), but by forms of inquiry that are developed within experience itself with the aim of understanding it more clearly and responding to it more intelligently. Thus, the function of inquiry or research is to develop *judgments* or *appraisals*, for understanding and practice, which mediate between a given experience and one's intent or aim. This is to say that the larger function of inquiry is to "reconstruct" qualitative life.

One cannot say prior to experience what forms of inquiry will be more useful than others. That will depend on the assistance they give in formulating or organizing experience. Thus, one does not find Dewey counterposing qualitative and quantitative inquiry. Nor does he set science apart from qualitative life or history from the present. Rather, each of these perspectives and approaches, or "phases" of research, has potential for clarifying experience and setting it on a course. Unlike the qualitative, which has

"pretty direct existential application," scientific inquiry seeks significance and meaning through the "systematic relations of coherence and consistence [of one thing] with . . . another."[7] In other words, it is the function of science to construct an "idea" of things, and it is helped in this task by quantification, logical form, and the like. This is why we say that science is "abstract," for all ideas are "abstracts" from experience. But the aim always is to get back to experience, to the qualitative—Dewey speaks repeatedly of "requalifying" experience through inquiry. The point to be grasped is that inquiry or research is helped in its course by numerous tactics and techniques, by scientific procedure and logical analysis, quantification and mathematical discourse, historical narration and description, the use of propositions and terms, and different kinds of judgment, to give names to just a few of the resources at hand. Through these devices experience is reconstructed and unified with the aim of directing it toward anticipated experiences. Qualitative life is *re*-qualified.

Dewey's discussion in *Logic* is complex and requires more attention than we give it here. We cite it simply to make the point that qualitative inquiry or research, which often is thought to be in competition with quantitative research and with science, is in need of a comprehensive theory that will unify various modes of qualitative research and that will unite qualitative and quantitative approaches to research. For there is a sense, which our discussion is trying to make plain, in which all research is qualitative. A student in one of our classes has said that "all inquiry gets its impetus from quality."[8] She has learned our lesson well! We are tempted to say that all research is qualitative *at least in origin and outcome*, but even that could be misleading. The fact is that at every step or phase of its conduct, research has connections with the qualitative situation that set it in motion. The researcher, though he may be conducting a recondite phase of research at the time, should be mindful of these connections and the qualitative concerns that the writers set forth in the present essays.

It is because of this need for a broadened conception of research and qualitative inquiry that it is unfortunate that there is not room in the present journal to treat the full range of methodologies and issues implied in our sense of the qualitative. Other research approaches—such as sociological method, history and biography,[9] applied phenomenology, and perhaps even the use of literary criticism in education—could broaden and deepen an understanding of the qualitative and demonstrate additional approaches to it. If the present essays are successful in helping readers to understand qualitative inquiry, we might be able in subsequent issues to explicate these other approaches.

Finally, we hope the present essays and discussion of qualitative inquiry and research are helpful especially to students. Their doctoral research is the

place where they develop attitudes and habits of research. We hope they view the "qualitative" as life itself (call it "practical" life) and qualitative (and quantitative) research methods as approaches to understanding and directing that life. Further, we want them to integrate qualitative and quantitative approaches to research in education. Even a study (say a "dissertation") whose primary object may be a quantitative formulation has a qualitative context out of which it grows and to which its conclusions must be put. The "statement of the problem" in such a study, to be made clearly, calls on philosophy, and the chapter in which conclusions are suggested to be important (for further research or for practice) is philosophical in its axiological import. And one may see a "review of literature" in any study as an historical account of what has been tried in reference to the problem at hand. And so on. Though these points are made too simply, they are suggestive of our belief that all research, no matter what methods are employed, is qualitative in origin and should retain a qualitative perspective. If the present essays, and those that may be forthcoming, make these points clear and urgent, they will have been successful.

Notes

[1] *Journal of Thought*, 18:4 (Winter, 1983), pp. 37–38.

[2] Thomas F. Green, *The Activities of Teaching* (McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 15–16.

[3] Harry Wolcott, *The Man in the Principal's Office* (Holt, 1973), p. xi.

[4] Sponsored by the American Educational Research Association, and published by Macmillan and Free Press.

[5] Robert L. Curran, Professor Emeritus, Foundations of Education, University of Florida.

[6] John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (Holt, 1938).

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[8] Linda Kramer, doctoral student, University of Florida.

[9] One place to begin for history is J. H. Hexter's "The Rhetoric of History," in his *Doing History* (Indiana University Press, 1971), Chapter 2. For biography, see Geraldine Joncich Clifford, "The Life Story: Biographic Study," in John Hardin Best (ed.), *Historical Inquiry in Education: A Research Agenda* (American Educational Research Association, 1983), Chapter 3.

Philosophy of Education As Qualitative Inquiry

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1. Philosophic and Scientific Activity

For much of this century philosophers have tried to emulate scientists. They have thought of their task either as a mimicking of scientific methods and procedures or a servicing of scientific conceptual needs. These tendencies have waned in recent years because of disenchantment over the consequences of scientific thinking for human life and the shaky intellectual grounds on which science alleges to stand. The consequence has been a rethinking of philosophy and its task.[1]

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a movement developed based on the conviction that education itself was to be studied as a science. Philosophy of education as a distinct discipline emerged as part of that movement. Three conceptions of philosophy of education stand out in that early period.[2] The first argued that education could become a science if it too, like the natural sciences, were treated as an inductive science.[3] The second took the position that human reason aims to complete the work of which natural science is not capable, and that reason finds the justification for the conclusions of the sciences.[4] The work of philosophy is to make known the "invisible whole" from which come the fragmentary experiences of the sciences. The third conception opposed both these tendencies and held instead that the natural place for educational ideas to arise is in educational contexts and that the role of science is to test the meanings of those ideas. Hence, philosophy of education suggests possibilities to be explored further in science.[5]

The appeal of science has endured. In the 1920s and 30s, for example, an effort was made to equate research in philosophy with the scientific method in its broadest sense.[6] Philosophical research was thought to entail the same procedures used by the scientist: identification of problems, generation of hypotheses, collection of evidence, and generalization of findings. It was understood, however, that the philosopher's "data" were different, that no reliable instruments of measurement of a distinctly philosophical nature were available, and that philosophical problems were not always open to empirical investigation.

This procedure in effect identifies philosophical research with the activity of "reflective thinking."[7] Reflective thinking entails the same basic procedures and activities used by the scientist, but acknowledges the differences between the problems, methods, and goals of the philosopher and the scientist. But if reflective thinking is common to all inquiry, it cannot be a distinctive method of philosophical research.

If philosophy is not part of a paradigm of scientific inquiry, what is it? Is there a place for philosophy to stand, apart from, yet related to, science? Is there a way for philosophy to inform science without being merely speculative? Is there a place for rigorous thinking between feeling and fact? The purpose of this essay is to describe the role that philosophy can play.

The modern separation of philosophy and science has come about in a history that would be instructive but is too long to tell here. We may, however, refer briefly to Aristotle, who has fundamental insights into the story.[8] For Aristotle, there was no hard and fast distinction between the philosopher, who possesses "wisdom," and the scientist, who possesses "knowledge." He does not subordinate one activity to the other, but takes each, in its own way, to be essential to shaping a human being who would be knowledgeable-and-wise, scientist-and-philosopher. He further insists that each science has its own methods, which can be found only in its distinct subject matter. Thus, no science is superior to another; each has its own legitimate work to do. Aristotle's view is not "scientism"; science itself, or any one of the sciences, is not a supreme standard for all other activities. And reason does not stand apart from experience; it works, rather, in the midst of experience, shaping the materials of experience into knowledge. Aristotle shows that the role of rigorous thinking is not to arbitrate between feeling and fact, but to mold feeling and fact into knowledge determined by the subject matter in which thinking goes on.

II. Philosophy as Qualitative Thinking

The story is told that as she lay dying, Gertrude Stein, the sponsor of avant-garde culture, turned to her friend Alice B. Toklas and asked, "What is the answer?" Alice did not reply. Then with her last words Stein asked, "In that case, what is the question?" This anecdote sets the stage for thinking about the elements from which a view of qualitative inquiry can be constructed. Our emphasis is on philosophy as qualitative inquiry and on the modes of qualitative inquiry in philosophy of education. To this end, our perspective on qualitative inquiry will distinguish among philosophy, science, and art as modes of inquiry and action.

For our purposes, there are two salient points in the Stein anecdote. The first is that before inquiry there is always query, or a question, and, secondly, before query there is aesthetic activity, or feeling and apprecia-

tion, which we call "qualitative thinking." Thus, one may make a rough distinction among science, philosophy, and art. Where it is the artist's aim to say and represent the world, and the scientist's task to calculate and test what has been said or represented, it is the philosopher's task to ask the unasked question.[9]

What does it mean to say that inquiry presupposes a query or question and that question-making and asking are aesthetic? To begin, all questions arise from within a perceptual field, a whole, a context, or a situation. Inquiry is the exploration of questions (or queries) that arise and take particular shape *in* a situation. The same may be said for "research," which word comes from the Latin *re-circere*, "to go around again." Research is going *around*, exploring, looking *within* a situation, context, or field. Inquiry, then, is not simply questioning or searching. It is questioning and searching with an intent, with some limits, or with an object in mind.

Perceptual fields are experienced as a whole. Thinking begins in the feeling of an unanalyzed, undetermined qualitative whole. One has a feeling for the dominating quality in the lived world, in the situation as a whole; one notices it but cannot formulate it as a distinction. Thought begins in the "given" of unmediated quality. John Dewey writes:

> In truth, "given" in this connection signifies only that the quality immediately exists, or is brutely there. In this capacity, it forms that to which all objects of thought refer, although, as we have noticed, it is never part of the manifest subject-matter of thought. In itself, it is the big, buzzing, blooming confusion of which James wrote. This expresses not only the state of a baby's experience but the first stage and background of all thinking on any subject. There is, however, no inarticulate quality which is merely buzzing and blooming. It buzzes to some effect; it blooms toward some fruitage. That is, the quality, although dumb, has as a part of its complex quality a movement or transition in some direction. It can, therefore, be intellectually symbolized and converted into an object of thought. This is done by statement of limits and of direction of transition between them. . . . Putting the nature of the limits briefly and without any attempt to justify the statement here, the subject represents the persuasive quality as means or condition and the predicate represents it as outcome or end.[10]

Living in a world of habit, thinking is routine, calculative, or representational, and felt quality is elusive. But when a tension or problem arises, the perception of quality becomes intense. Something is wrong, but one does not know how to formulate it. It cannot be put into a question. One does not know how to say it, much less measure it or think representationally about it. But without a formulated question, there can be no inquiry.

"Thought" is the saying of a problem, and "qualitative thought" is the formulation of a problem in reference to the qualitative elements of the situation as a whole. For Dewey, this kind of thought is "regulated by qualitative considerations" such that "the selective determinations and relations of objects in thought is controlled by reference to a situation" where "the underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every distinction and relation."[11] Qualitative thought sets up the conditions for thinking by mediating between unanalyzed wholes and analyzed parts. It makes the phases of experience and inquiry hang together by defining the parts in reference to the pervasive quality of the situation as a whole. Thus, qualitative thought brings rigor to inquiry in that it "circumscribes it externally and integrates it internally."[12] While it does not aim at producing direct knowledge or action, qualitative thought provides for the integration of questions and context out of which worthwhile inquiry grows.[13]

The implication is that there are dimensions of experience for which quantitative measures have no utility. To attempt to "quantify" those dimensions of experience is to violate their nature. Such is the case with *possibilities* in experience, as distinct from that which has been actualized in experience. For the teacher, Dewey says, the "*quality* of activity and of consequence is more important . . . than any quantitative element. . . . Even if it be true that everything which exists can be measured—if only we knew how—that which does *not* exist cannot be measured."[14] Dewey is interested in the possibilities of experience and argues that they are not only different from, but more important than, what has been actualized:

> A progressive school is primarily concerned with growth . . . with *transforming* existing capacities and experiences; what already exists by way of native endowment and past achievement is subordinate to what it may become. Possibilities are more important than what already exists, and knowledge of the latter counts only in its bearing upon possibilities.[15]

Following these views, we believe that the special task of philosophy is the formulation of questions for reflective thought. The philosopher, as a qualitative thinker, tries to cultivate a sensitivity to the situation as a whole and to the qualities that regulate it. In this view, philosophy honors the unanalyzed and pre-cognitive as its origins, but avoids mere speculation by regulating thought in the light of perceived qualities toward worthwhile questions. Philosophy thus also honors science in its aims by making present and possible the questions that scientific inquiry pursues and avoids scientism by insisting upon qualitative determination of the objects of inquiry. For the philosopher, the issue always is, "What is the *problem*?" which in turn depends on a prior question, "What is this *all* about?"

III. Aims of Qualitative Thinking

Living in the space between feeling and fact, speculation and science, and related to but distinct from both art and science, what does philosophy as qualitative thought hope to accomplish? Not certain knowledge, for its concern is meanings rather than truths. Philosophy does not aim at making the world, for its concern is not action, but qualities. Rather, philosophy serves an educational role. It mediates between immediate experience and experiment and promotes the intelligent development of value. It does this through a concern with clarity, context, and consciousness, among other things.

Clarity

One aim of philosophy is clarity, which means linguistic and logical accuracy and precision, and also focus, which is the quality that enables the deepening of thought. Focus enables the transition from an unanalyzed whole to analyzed part. Focus without a perception of the whole leads to triviality (only trees, no forest), while a mere feeling for the whole without focus generates no queries and thus no inquiry and knowledge.

Context

Context is the building up, enriching, and synthesizing of the perceived situation or whole itself. Modern scientific and quantitative methods generally are acknowledged as an intellectual advance over abstract rationality, which was able to put things right in general, but suffered greatly in the particular. Science practiced as technical or instrumental rationality, and hardened into positivist ideology, however, diminishes the significance of the existential condition in which problems arise, fragments and isolates inquiries, and mitigates against the development of valued and meaningful knowledge. The philosopher seeks to restore and awaken a sense of the qualitative whole from which inquiries develop and to which their results must return. A sense of context is a major determinant of a sense of question; that is, one may understand and be able to formulate a question or problem in one context or situation but not in another. One may be able to respond to a problem of literacy in the context of schooling by stressing the 3 Rs, but when education is seen as something that also goes on in places other than schools, the response of educating for literacy must go beyond such tutoring. By paying attention to existing contexts and helping to create new ones, the philosopher seeks to promote inquiries that are novel and pertinent.

Consciousness

The history of the idea of "consciousness" is long, and attempts at its definition are fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, the term may be used

here in a non-technical way for a heuristic purpose. Where clarity suggests focus within a field or situation, and context suggests the enriching and reinterpreting of the situation itself, consciousness suggests the grasping and awareness of the tensions created by problematic situations and the necessity for choice. Consciousness, rooted in context and intent on an object, enlivens the sense of possibility and enables the movement from habit to reflective thought. Promoting consciousness, philosophy seeks to keep inquiry from becoming mere method and to give experience a means for its own reconstruction.

Boyd H. Bode's discussion of a "fringe of consciousness"[16] enables one to see that, while clarity, context, and consciousness are distinct aims of qualitative thought, they must be understood to function together in actual thinking. By "fringe," Bode referred to that characteristic of objects in experience that is so elusive when one tries to describe and clarify it. Dwelling on the fringe of consciousness means that experience is "out of focus"; yet its significance *for* consciousness, for clarity, lies in its *possibility* for further consciousness. The aim is to secure a context in which what is suggestive and uncertain may become clarified and focused. When one succeeds in focusing the situation, then something will become "known" about it.

Thus, the importance of objects on the fringe of consciousness lies in the possibilities they have for future response and experience. The importance of clarifying them in consciousness lies in settling on some choice. Then one may try to unsettle it again by attempting to clarify something else whose possibilities dwell on the fringe of consciousness. Bode writes, "We may say of consciousness that its present moment is the darkest . . . that it is always the knower, and not the known, that it is born an owner and dies owned. . . ."[17] He means that the fleeting security of consciousness, together with a sense of continuing qualitative possibilities in reflective thought, demonstrate that efforts to find contexts of meaning will, of necessity, have consequences that require one to seek yet another context. In such manner, human experience undergoes qualitative changes. Any philosophy *of* experience, such as philosophy of education, must deal with those qualitative changes.

IV. Contemporary Approaches to Qualitative Thinking in Philosophy of Education

Though all philosophers of education may have clarity, context, and consciousness as their aims, one may distinguish among contemporary approaches to philosophy of education by the relative emphasis they give to these aims. We will use the terms "public," "professional," and "personalistic-phenomenological" to identify and distinguish the approaches.

The distinction among "public," "professional," and "personal" philosophy of education has been forwarded by Jonas Soltis.[18] We incorporate and have learned from Soltis's distinctions, but we use the terms here in different ways and for a different purpose.

Soltis is most interested in whether or not philosophy of education should "go public." For those we call public philosophers of education, this is not an issue. John Dewey expresses the sense clearly when he writes that philosophy *is* a civic enterprise whose aim is "to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day. Its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts."[19] Similarly, for Soltis a "personal" philosophy of education refers to a set of personal beliefs or a personal philosophy of life. Our use of the category "personalistic-phenomenological" intends to suggest not so much an individual or personal philosophy, but a philosophy *of* the individual or person. Whereas a "personal" philosophy of education refers to someone's beliefs, a "personalistic-phenomenological" philosophy tries to develop methods and ideas to explore and express the idea of personhood itself.

Public Philosophy of Education

Public philosophers of education see the context of educational problems to be social and cultural life. Education is a social and historical process which involves the dynamic interaction of many institutions and actors for the purpose of conserving, creating, and criticizing culture. Public philosophers of education focus on developing a context for understanding the process of education as a whole. Their methods are synthetic rather than analytic and aim to integrate and give synoptic meaning to knowledge from all perspectives (e.g., history, sociology, economics, anthropology, psychology, etc.), about all educative institutions (e.g., family, school, workplace, church, community, media, etc.), in order to construct a context or a vision of education in its widest cultural sense. Without such a context, efforts to resolve educational problems will be short-sighted and short-lived.

The literature on public philosophy of education is extensive; we shall point only to certain features. John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, first published in 1916, is a classic example. Dewey says his endeavor is "to detect and state the ideas implied in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the problems of the enterprise of education."[20] The critical writings in response to Dewey's work add to the literature of public philosophy of education. Perhaps the most ambitious response is Herman Harrell Horne's *The Democratic Philosophy of Education* (Macmillan, 1932), which was written as an Idealist's companion to Dewey's work. Frederick S. Breed's *Education and the New Realism* (Macmillan, 1932) criticizes Dewey's educational philosophy from the standpoint of a philosophy of Realism. On

the other hand, public philosophy of education in the Deweyan tradition includes Boyd H. Bode's *Modern Educational Theories* (Macmillan, 1927) and *Democracy as a Way of Life* (Macmillan, 1935) and John Child's *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (Century, 1931). Theodore Brameld has criticized the dominant educational philosophies of Progressivism, Essentialism, and Perennialism in his *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective* (Dryden, 1955) and developed an educational philosophy called "Reconstructionism," which is elaborated in *Toward A Reconstructed Philosophy of Education* (Dryden, 1956).

Consulting the 1942 and 1955 yearbooks of the National Society for the Study of Education,[21] one can make two observations: (1) A characteristic way of doing philosophy of education has been to take positions in philosophy and explore their meanings for philosophy of education. The positions taken in the 1942 yearbook were Experimentalism, Realism, Idealism, Catholicism, and Neo-Scholasticism, and the contributors were philosophers of education. The positions taken in the 1955 yearbook were Realism, Thomism, Christian Idealism, Experimentalism, Marxism, Existentialism, Linguistic Philosophy, Logical Empiricism, and Ontological Philosophy, while the contributors were from general philosophy. (2) Each contributor, whatever his point of view, wrote what is essentially a *public* philosophy of education. But, as we shall see, this approach has not continued in much of the writing about educational philosophy since the 1955 yearbook.

Indeed, along with the growing professionalization of academic disciplines in the second half of the twentieth century, philosophers of education have turned their attention away from public philosophy. As a result, most recent attempts to develop a broad and generic understanding of education in its public context have come from writers working largely outside the discipline of philosophy of education.[22] While it is hard to argue that their works are "philosophical" in a technical or professional sense, their intention to integrate specialized knowledge for the purpose of developing a context for understanding education in its widest cultural sense puts them in the tradition of public philosophy of education.

Most recently, there has been a renewed interest in public philosophy of education. Harry Broudy's *Truth and Credibility: The Citizen's Dilemma* (Longman's, 1981), Eva Brann's *Paradoxes of Education in a Republic* (Chicago, 1979), and R. Freeman Butts's *The Revival of Civic Learning* (PDK Educational Foundation, 1980) all seek to integrate ethical, political, and educational contexts and give evidence of the continuing need for public philosophy of education.

Personalistic-Phenomenological Philosophy of Education

Personalistic-phenomenological philosophy of education puts the individual and questions of being and becoming at the center of qualitative

inquiry. Certainly education is a social process and language is bewitching, but fundamentally an education worthy of its name involves the transformation of individual perception and consciousness. Thus, these philosophers of education have sought methods and sources which enable an exploration of individual life-worlds. Many of them use and refer to the arts and literature, since these always have been powerful modes of individual expression. Some of these philosophers use phenomenological methods which they believe will enable direct descriptions of the world as experienced, before it is analyzed and fragmented into social or logical categories. The purpose of such explorations of individual expression and experience is to heighten consciousness, and with it the sense of the possible; to dramatize freedom and choice. They argue that only with a consciousness and empowering of individual choice can authentic education occur—to develop personality and community.

"Contemporary education is filled with the stuff of tragedy."[23] This idea may be taken as the point of departure of a growing body of literature in philosophy of education in which personalistic-phenomenological concerns have addressed questions raised long ago by the ancient Greek tragic poets, nineteenth-century philosophers Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, and, more recently, twentieth-century writers such as Martin Buber, Edmund Husserl, and Jean-Paul Sartre.[24] Donald Vandenberg recently has given an historical account and review of the impact of existentialism and phenomenology on philosophy of education since mid-century;[25] we will mention only a few writings in order to give a sense of what has been done. The title of Huston Smith's *Condemned to Meaning* (Harper, 1965) is taken from the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty's impression of the human predicament. Maxine Greene's *Teacher as Stranger* (Wadsworth, 1973) describes the teacher's predicament—stranger to one's students, one's subject matter, and to the larger social world. Philo Pritzkau's *On Education for the Authentic* (International Textbook, 1970) attempts to show ways in which children's reality is expanded through learning that is personally significant. Donald Vandenberg's *Being and Education* (Prentice-Hall, 1971) discusses the need to recover being and children's desires to be someone. Victor Kestenbaum's *The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey* (Humanities, 1977) considers Dewey's concept of habit from the standpoint of genetic phenomenology. In these works and others, the limitations and possibilities of human beings in quest of meanings in a world filled with tragedy and characterized by "homelessness" are explored as philosophy of education.

Professional Philosophy of Education

Professional philosophy of education typically takes as its problems the linguistic and logical muddles arising out of the discourse of educational

theorists and practitioners. While not denying that education is a complex social and cultural process, these philosophers of education have assumed the less grand, but important, task of clarifying the ambiguous language and faulty logic which is at the root of many educational problems. Professional philosophers of education have developed linguistic and logical methods and techniques for the clarification of language. Their methods are analytic rather than synthetic, and because their context is educational discourse, their relevant units of analysis are words and concepts.

The literature in professional philosophy of education, like the other approaches, is extensive. General introductions may include Jonas Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts* (2d ed., Addison-Wesley, 1978); D. J. O'Connor, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957); and James McClellan, *Philosophy of Education* (Prentice-Hall, 1967). Professional literature also has developed around central educational concepts, for example: Thomas F. Green, *The Activities of Teaching* (McGraw-Hill, 1971); C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (eds.), *Concepts of Teaching* (Rand McNally, 1968); B. O. Smith and Robert H. Ennis (eds.), *Language and Concepts in Education* (Rand McNally, 1961); B. Paul Komisar and C. J. B. Macmillan (eds.), *Psychological Concepts in Education* (Rand McNally, 1967); Robert H. Ennis, *Logic in Teaching* (Prentice-Hall, 1969); Israel Scheffler, *Reason in Teaching* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976) and *The Language of Education* (Thomas, 1960); Jane R. Martin, *Explaining, Understanding, and Teaching* (McGraw-Hill, 1970); Donna H. Kerr, *Educational Policy* (McKay, 1976); Kenneth Strike, *Educational Policy and the Just Society* (Illinois, 1982); and Richard Pratte, *Ideology and Education* (McKay, 1977).

Professional philosophy of education largely has been an outgrowth of the Anglo-American analytic movement; thus another main source of literature has come from such philosophers of education as R. S. Peters, *The Philosophy of Education* (Oxford, 1973) and *Ethics and Education* (Allen and Unwin, 1966); R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, *Education and Reason* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); I. A. Snook, *Indoctrination and Education* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); and, in general, the series in the International Library of the Philosophy of Education, under the general editorship of R. S. Peters.

Other sources as well can give the idea of professional philosophy of education. Perhaps the best for understanding the scope, methods, and aims of professional philosophy of education are the periodic *Proceedings* of both the American and British Philosophy of Education Societies.

V. Qualitative Thinking: Unifying the Ways of Doing Philosophy

The categories discussed above do not suggest hard and fast distinctions

within the practice of philosophy of education. Rather, there is a steady and vital interplay of aims, methods, and problems among scholars working within each approach. Some philosophers exhibit all three approaches in their writings on education. To show these things, we turn, finally, to a brief discussion of two classic writers on philosophy of education—Plato and Rousseau.

Plato's way of doing philosophy clearly unifies the public, professional, and personalistic approaches. The investigations in which Socrates engages himself and others in attempting to find the meaning of such virtues as justice, courage, and friendship, and even virtue itself, involve public, professional, and personalistic dimensions of philosophy. In the dialogues *Protagoras* and *Meno*, for example, the question, "Can virtue be taught?" is pursued. In that pursuit, logical clarity is sought (professional), the ways in which young people are educated in a social context are examined (public), and the possibility of shaping the moral character of the participants in the dialogues is explored (personalistic). In trying to understand what Plato means by the claim that "virtue is knowledge," one must consider technical matters (what do "virtue" and "knowledge" *mean*?), and, yet, the answer is to be found in the public realm. At the same time, the quest is personal. Werner Jaeger neatly summarizes the point: "Socrates' politics are 'looking after one's soul.' Anyone who looks after his soul is thereby looking after 'the polis itself'."[26] The essential point for philosophy of education as qualitative inquiry is that such strivings constitute a quality of experience.

Another classic educational theory that joins professional, public, and personalistic philosophies is Rousseau's *Emile*.[27] In describing Emile's education, Rousseau portrays the limitations of existing social life while recognizing the inescapable fact that Emile is a social creature who must be educated to moral and rational maturity. Rousseau's professional philosophizing is shown dramatically more than it is argued discursively; in *Emile*, the "meanings" of the technical arguments in which philosophers engage are found in the life which Emile leads as he is educated. As the drama ends, Emile himself declares that he must work out his destiny in a social context whose moral conflicts are unsettled and yet remain very much with him. This is an "existential predicament": to be well educated is to learn that one is "homeless"—estranged from the world in which he has been educated. Emile finds that he is unable to bring the best kind of world into existence; his reason is unable to transcend experience when demonstrating better possibilities for experience. In terms of the distinctions between philosophy and science made earlier, Rousseau shows that philosophy's own limits are revealed as we learn the limits of our knowledge. What remains, or rather stands out, is the aim to gain a quality of experience in the face of the limitations of philosophy and science.

Modern philosophers who have demonstrated the kind of qualitative unity we seek are the Idealist, Josiah Royce; the Realist, George Santayana; and the Pragmatist, John Dewey. William James and Alfred North Whitehead are others who can be mentioned.

We hope the distinctions we have made will be helpful as a heuristic device. Although all philosophers of education are concerned with clarity, context, and consciousness, different emphases in the field have arisen in the last forty years, with professional philosophers of education stressing clarity, public philosophers of education concerned with context, and personalistic-phenomenological philosophers of education emphasizing consciousness. But perhaps more important than these different emphases is the understanding that all are examples of qualitative thinking. All take as their first task the identification of the fundamental problems of education, and, though they consider the field and the problems differently, they all depend on an aesthetic judgment of where the difficulty is and on qualitative thinking to bring these difficulties into the form of questions and problems that can be researched.

Notes

[1] See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, 1979) and *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minnesota, 1982); Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Harvard, 1981); and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, 1981).

[2] See J. J. Chambliss, *The Origins of American Philosophy of Education: Its Development as a Distinct Discipline, 1808–1913* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).

[3] An example is Thomas Tate's *The Philosophy of Education; or, The Principles and Practice of Teaching* (New York: Kellogg, 1885).

[4] Good examples are J. K. F. Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education*, trans. by Anna C. Brackett (Appleton, 1886), and Herman Harrell Horne, *The Philosophy of Education* (Macmillan, 1904).

[5] John Dewey's early writings on education may be consulted, in particular, *Lectures in the Philosophy of Education: 1889*, edited by Reginald D. Archambault (Random House, 1966). See also J. A. MacVannell, *Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of Education* (Macmillan, 1912).

[6] See James M. Giarelli and W. David Zimpfer, "What is Research in Philosophy of Education?" *Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science*, 15 (1980), pp. 52–64.

[7] John Dewey, *How We Think* (Heath, 1933).

[8] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 6, Chapter 2.

[9] This insight is Laura Mindek's, who is developing it in a doctoral dissertation, *Art as a Paradigm for Worldmaking: The Pragmatic-Phenomenological Perspective as a Synthesis of the Work of Dewey and Heidegger*, at Rutgers University. What we call "qualitative thinking," she calls "artful thought." We have used the more generic term to avoid a distracting discussion in this essay of the differences between philosophy and art.

[10] John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (Peter Smith, 1968), p. 107.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 97, 99.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[13] Again, we owe this idea to Mindek (see note 9).

[14] John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," in *Dewey on Education*, edited by Martin S. Dworkin (Teachers College, 1959), pp. 118–119.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[16] Boyd H. Bode, "The Definition of Consciousness," *Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (April 24, 1913).

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[18] See Jonas F. Soltis, "Philosophy of Education Since Mid-Century," *Teachers College Record*, 81 (Winter, 1979), pp. 127–129; "Introduction" to *Philosophy and Education*, edited by Jonas F. Soltis (80th NSSE Yearbook; Chicago, 1981), pp. 5–7; and "Perspectives on Philosophy of Education," *Journal of Thought*, 18 (Summer, 1983), pp. 14–21.

[19] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Holt, 1920), p. 26. There are differences among those who call themselves public philosophers. See, for example, Walter Lippman, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Little, Brown, 1955); William M. Sullivan, *Reconstructing Public Philosophy* (California, 1982); and R. J. Bishirjian (ed.), *A Public Philosophy Reader* (Arlington House, 1978).

[20] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (Macmillan, 1916), Preface.

[21] John S. Brubacher (ed.), *Philosophies of Education* (41st NSSE Yearbook; Chicago, 1942); John S. Brubacher (ed.), *Modern Philosophies and Education* (54th NSSE Yearbook; Chicago, 1955).

[22] See Charles E. Silberman, *Crisis in the Classroom* (Random House, 1970); Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (Harper and Row, 1970); Paul Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation* (Vintage, 1964); Solon Kimball and James E. McClellan, *Education and the New America* (Vintage, 1962); S. Bowles and H. Gintis, *Schooling and Capitalist America* (Basic, 1976); and Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Continuum, 1981).

[23] Kenneth Benne, "Education for Tragedy," *Educational Theory*, 1 (November-December, 1951), pp. 199–210, 217, 274–283.

[24] See the tragic poetry of Sophocles and Aeschylus; Soren Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*, *Sickness Unto Death*, and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*; Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and *Birth of Tragedy*; Jean-Paul Sartre's *Existentialism* and *Being and Nothingness*; Edmund Husserl's *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*; and Martin Buber's *I and Thou*.

[25] Donald Vandenberg, "Existential and Phenomenological Influences in Educational Philosophy," *Teachers College Record*, 81 (Winter, 1979), pp. 166–191.

[26] Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, translated by Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1943), Vol. II, p. 410, n. 32.

[27] See the translation by Allan Bloom, *Emile, or, On Education* (Basic, 1979).

An Introduction To Curriculum Criticism

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Curriculum criticism is a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of educational materials and settings. Criticism combines and adapts information collection and reporting techniques of social anthropology and aesthetic criticism in order to help others perceive and understand educational phenomena more fully. The function of the curriculum critic, like that of a literary or art critic, is to describe the essential qualities of phenomena studied, to interpret the meanings of and relationships among those qualities, and to provide reasoned judgments about the significance and value of the phenomenon.

This article provides an overview of curriculum criticism focusing on its roots, the methodological processes and issues, and the potential contribution of the approach. While curriculum criticism has been used to study both educational materials and settings, the majority of the literature focuses on methods and examples of criticisms of educational settings, perhaps because critics have assumed literary criticism can be adapted relatively easily to the criticism of published curriculum materials, and therefore have turned their attention to adapting criticism to the study of ongoing settings. Consequently, discussion of curriculum criticism in the article focuses mainly on its use in educational settings, although some mention is made of its use in the study of materials.

Roots of Curriculum Criticism

Criticism has its roots in two qualitative areas of inquiry—aesthetic criticism and social anthropology. The use of aesthetic criticism as a tool for curriculum analysis was first suggested by Mann, who proposed that the curriculum be viewed as a literary object.[1] He noted that the function of the literary critic is to disclose the choices made by the artist and the meaning of those choices. By examining curriculum in this way, Mann believed educators would gain insights not possible through the technical analysis of curriculum.[2]

Although Mann developed his ideas no further, others gradually began to explore them, with Eisner as the major spokesperson elaborating the pur-

poses and processes of curriculum criticism.[3] He stated that the principal aims of the critic are to look for patterns of key elements (or pervasive qualities) in educational settings, and to reveal and explain the meaning and complexity of the particular behaviors involved in teaching and learning in various contexts. In numerous publications, he stressed the importance of understanding the artistic elements of teaching. While educators have utilized traditional scientific methods to foster the growth of science in education, Eisner noted that the use of artistic traditions which might facilitate growth of the art of education has been neglected.

Curriculum critics have suggested the use of critical methods from a variety of different art forms (e.g., literary arts, dance, visual arts).[4] All stress three common critical traditions which provide a core of methods useful in analyzing curriculum. First, a critic discloses the meaning of an art object by revealing the key structural elements of the object and the choices made by the creator in designing the object. Second, the critic must translate a non-linguistic experience into verbal discourse. In most cases critics stress the use of evocative, descriptive language and the use of linguistic devices such as metaphor and characterization to accomplish this translation. Third, critics must make judgments about what is valuable in an art object. These judgments are based on the critic's knowledge of the art form (connoisseurship) and on publicly disclosed criteria or principles.

Curriculum criticism also has utilized methodological traditions from social anthropology. Criticism is an empirical effort that must be based on extensive observation. While aesthetic critics use observational methods when critiquing art forms such as theater and dance, the object of their observations is different in character from an educational setting. An artistic production lasts a short period of time, can usually be viewed repeatedly in its entirety and can be compared to other productions of the same dance or play. Educational settings are not similarly bounded in time. Experiences are not repetitive in the same sense, and comparison across settings is more complex.

Because criticism is a qualitative inquiry that focuses on context, meaning and the explanation of phenomena, critics logically drew on the disciplined methods of observation and interpretation associated with fieldwork in social anthropology. McCutcheon, then a student working with Eisner, provided a thorough explanation of the synthesis of methods from anthropology and aesthetic criticism into a methodology for conducting curriculum criticism.[5] Since that time methodological procedures and issues have been the focus of numerous authors.[6] A brief discussion of methods and issues follows.

Methods of Curriculum Criticism

Few differences exist among curriculum critics in describing the methods used or the products of the critical method. While criticisms may vary in emphasis, as will be discussed in the section on writing, no differing schools of thought or procedures exist. This apparent consensus may well be due to the newness of the field or to the relatively small number and similar educational background of the researchers writing about the approach.

Because this area of inquiry is so new, barely 14 years old, the methods are continually evolving. The following discussion of methods, therefore, cannot be considered exhaustive but rather suggestive of the ongoing work of curriculum critics as they attempt to establish this area of inquiry.

(1) Data Gathering Methods

Curriculum criticism is based upon the knowledge the researcher has gained about the phenomenon studied through the collection of a large quantity of empirical data. Critics have drawn on the various techniques associated with anthropological studies for disciplined and systematic methods of collecting data. These include observation, interviewing, and the collection of educational artifacts (e.g., tests, teachers' planbooks, children's books, memos, textbooks).

The majority of the data collected is obtained through direct observation of ongoing events in the educational setting and through interviews designed to gain information about the meaning of events to participants. As in ethnography, the data can be recorded in several ways (e.g. fieldnotes, on audio or video tape, in photographs or slides); however, the predominant method is the use of field notes.

In discussing the collection of data, critics stress several procedural principles also stressed in other qualitative methodologies. First, observation must be non-interventionist.[7] That is, the presence of the observer should change the setting as little as possible. Second, the observer should record any and every observable event that might contribute to an understanding of the phenomenon. While critics do not limit their observation to recording those events which can be quantified or measured, they also must be careful to record specific observable events rather than conclusions of motive or intent. As Barone stated, the exact words, actions and products of the participants form the core of evidence upon which criticism is based.[8] Such evidence must be accurate and complete to be of value. Third, although a critic might begin with a "foreshadowed" question, the observed phenomenon, not pre-specified hypotheses, determines the focus of observations and of the resultant criticism.[9] And last, the critic should remain aware of the possible perspectives of other critics. This awareness encourages the critic to

look at the phenomenon from multiple perspectives and to collect more data.[10] For example, Ross analyzed a kindergarten teacher's practices from a developmental perspective which did not support the teaching strategies used. In an attempt to understand the reasons behind the teacher's choices, she then analyzed the strategies using principles derived from a behaviorist perspective. By looking at the data from two differing educational perspectives, a broader understanding of the teacher's practices was obtained.[11]

One feature that distinguishes criticism from other qualitative methodologies is the role of connoisseurship in observation. Connoisseurship is the act of appreciation of subtle qualities of a setting and of relationships among qualities that enables one to make comparisons to other settings.[12] Just as a wine connoisseur can distinguish subtle, yet important, characteristics of wine that most people cannot perceive, the educational connoisseur attends to the subtle particulars of classrooms. This ability to perceive differences forms the basis for critical judgments about wines and educational settings.

While many ethnographers argue that researchers should not study familiar settings, the aesthetic critic stresses that previous experience and expertise with the studied art form is essential if one is to understand the work. Similarly, the educational critic believes that the researcher must draw on his or her background of educational knowledge and experience in order to make sense of what is happening, to determine what is unique about each setting, and to make valid critical judgments. As McCutcheon noted, familiarity with a wide range of educational settings, rather than blinding one to the characteristics of a particular setting, provides the basis for noting subtle differences and characteristics which might otherwise pass unnoticed.[13]

(2) Writing Criticisms: The Art of Disclosure

The development of the empirical base is guided by connoisseurship, the art of appreciation. The complementary skill of the critic, the ability to share perceptions, is described as the art of disclosure. Although disclosure could occur orally or through a media presentation, critics most commonly share perceptions through written criticisms, which include description, interpretation, and appraisal or judgment of the educational phenomenon. The lines between data collection, analysis, and writing are blurred. Although interpretation and appraisal are discussed separately from data collection, the reader should understand that in reality the processes are not discrete. In a cyclical fashion the researcher observes, interprets, and appraises, with each possible interpretation or appraisal guiding subsequent observations. Similarly, the separation of the three processes of description, interpretation, and appraisal is not as precise as the following explanation makes it seem.

Description. Through description, the critic recreates the experience of an educational setting for those who were not there. As Eisner explained, "The critic . . . aims at providing a rendering in linguistic terms of what it is that he or she has encountered so that others not possessing his level of connoisseurship can also enter into the work."[14] Description should transport the reader to the scene, convey the pervasive qualities or characteristics of the phenomenon, and evoke the feeling and nature of the educational experience. To accomplish this, critics stress the use of linguistic devices, such as metaphor, contrast, redundancy, and emphasis, frequently used in fiction and poetry but seldom used by educational researchers.[15] The use of these devices should create a description so vivid the reader can almost see it and hear it. The following example is illustrative:

> The classroom is almost a caricature of the society.
>
> The curriculum is served up like Big Macs, reading, math, language, even physical and affective education are all precooked, prepackaged, artificially flavored. . . .
>
> Teaching is orderly; learning is ordered. Page 47 always follows p. 46. . . .
>
> Each day is remarkably like the day before and the day after. The school year seems to have been made with 174 pieces of carbon paper. The same things are done at the same times in the same ways in the same books. Only the pages change.[16]

The description of the educational phenomenon serves as the basis for interpretation and appraisal. While not all critics believe descriptions should be written as evocatively as Donmoyer does,[17] they do agree that description must be complete enough to allow the reader to trace the line of reasoning used in forming interpretations and to identify possible mistakes in judgment. Thus, the description should be filled with concrete data from a variety of sources and yet must also be written in a style that captures and communicates the nature of the educational experience.

Interpretation. All phenomenological methodologies are concerned with understanding the meaning of events to those involved and to others. Interpretation is the explanation of such meanings. In curriculum criticism, interpretation involves the search for the meaning of educational activities and interactions to all participants and to the critic.

McCutcheon described three types of interpretations used by curriculum critics: (1) the construction of patterns through the analysis and resynthesis of constituent parts; (2) the interpretation of the social meaning of events; and (3) the analysis of relationships between educational events and external factors.[18] Briefly, each type of interpretation will be described.

All behavior is culturally patterned.[19] A pattern can be defined as a

characteristic way of behaving which may be conscious or unconscious to the actor. Patterns reveal the relationships among discrete events and thus increase understanding of each event. For example, Kyle analyzed the curriculum of a fifth-grade classroom to reveal patterns in administrative decisions which influenced the teacher's curriculum decisions.[20] She reported that administrative decisions about such things as required and supplemental curriculum materials, requirements for student promotion, the adherence to a highly specified daily schedule, and the standardization of the rate of student progress limited the teacher's curriculum choices and her ability to adapt the curriculum to individual students. Thus, patterns of administrative decisions helped to explain or give meaning to the patterns of the teacher's curriculum decisions and the resultant learning opportunities for children. As Kyle's study demonstrates, identifying patterns within an educational setting and the interrelationships among those patterns can increase understanding of educational events.

The second type of interpretation involves developing an understanding of the social meaning of events or the meaning of behavior within the setting. Developing this understanding involves the presentation of a "thick" description which reveals the underlying structure of a social event. Ryle differentiated between "thick" and "thin" descriptions of behavior. In his example, Ryle noted that the "thin" descriptions of the physical behavior of "rapidly contracting the eyelids of [the] right eye" remained unchanged whether the act was a friendly wink, a twitch, a conspiratorial signal or a parody of a twitch.[21] A "thick" description would indicate the meaning of the behavior. It is this "thick" description of a behavior, the clarification of meaning, which is sought in an interpretation of the social meaning of classroom events.

The final form of interpretation is the analysis of the relationship between educational events and external considerations. For example, theory from education and the social sciences, history, current social or political events, and established educational practices may provide a framework that promotes a better understanding of a particular educational setting.[22] The texts chosen by a school system, theories about learning and socialization, legislative mandates, educational budgets and public opinion are all examples of external factors which influence a curriculum. McCutcheon's criticism revealed a teacher who, because of parental pressure and administrative policies, incorporated experiences into his curriculum that he did not endorse.[23] In this case understanding the role of external forces was important in explaining a curriculum which included conflicting elements that might otherwise have seemed incomprehensible.

Appraisal. Evaluation, generally avoided by the social anthropologist but considered essential by the aesthetic critic, is a judgment of significance or

quality grounded in reason and based on knowledge of the pervasive characteristics of the educational phenomenon. Critics use two types of appraisal, one intrinsic, one extrinsic.[24] In intrinsic appraisal the stated aims of the teacher (principal, textbook, author, etc.) are accepted as valid and the critic judges whether these aims were met. For example, Cornbleth assessed a variety of published social studies curricula to determine whether the aims of an inquiry approach were met.[25] She found that each included some elements important to an inquiry approach but omitted others of considerable importance. Thus, her appraisal raised questions about whether social studies curricula achieve their stated aim of fostering inquiry skills.

Extrinsic appraisal is an evaluation of aims. Are the aims desirable or worthwhile? For example, McCutcheon appraised the educational significance of a science lesson:

> We might wonder about the academic content of the lesson (Is it worthwhile?). Isn't it likely that fourth graders know the relative size and position of planets already? Indeed, during the discussion preceeding the activity, it seemed they already had a great deal of sophisticated information about the solar system. Chris, for example, anticipated the rotation demonstration. A more complex assignment seems possible, one . . . [which] would expand their knowledge about the solar system.[26]

Extrinsic appraisal compares the aims of the teacher to external criteria. The criteria used must be appropriate to the particular situation, and the critic must share the criteria with the reader.[27] In the above example, the criterion is the researcher's knowledge of the children and their abilities. Other possible criteria include educational, social, and political theory and researcher knowledge of classrooms and children in general. For example, Ross questioned the effectiveness of a teacher's practices, using Piaget's theory of learning as the criterion.[28] Apple and King appraised a kindergarten curriculum through reference to social and economic theory.[29] They described the features of the curriculum which provided social control and economic adjustment suitable for the purposes of the American political and economic system.

Differing Points of Emphasis in Writing. All criticism is based on the three processes of description, interpretation and appraisal. However, critics use different points of emphasis or methods of organization in order to communicate an understanding of the educational phenomenon they studied. Critics discuss three different categories of points of emphasis. One set of critics varies emphasis by focusing primarily on one of the three writing processes. McCutcheon provided examples from art criticism of critics who are known primarily for their description, interpretation or appraisal.[30]

A second set of critics provides varying emphasis in their criticisms through the use of literary devices. For example, Barone and Kelly discussed the use of theme in criticism.[31] Theme provides the central controlling idea for a piece of criticism. Barone noted that a theme may be grand (derived from a pervasive societal theme) or particularistic (derived from the pervasive qualities of the particular setting). The criticism by Apple and King is an example of a criticism with a grand theme. In this case, the critics appraised the features of a kindergarten curriculum by referring to theoretical principles inherent in the American social and economic system.[32] Kyle's criticism which reported the relationship between administrative decisions and a teacher's curriculum decisions is an example of a criticism with a particularistic theme.[33]

Point of view is another literary device which might be used in criticism. Point of view is the manner in which the criticism is communicated. The point of view one chooses influences what will and will not be revealed in a criticism. For example, the student perspective is a point of view that is frequently neglected in educational writings. Other literary devices which might be used include plot, characterization, and landscape, i.e., the physical and human surroundings.[34]

Willis discussed a third category of point of emphasis. He stated that criticism can have an aesthetic, personal, or political dimension.[35] The aesthetic dimension focuses on the integrity of the form of the pieces of the curriculum and the intended or possible functions of the curriculum. McCutcheon's criticism provides an example of a criticism which emphasizes the aesthetic dimension. In this criticism, McCutcheon focuses on communicating the general feeling of a fourth-grade classroom, showing how the various aspects of classroom life contribute to the ambience.[36]

The personal dimension focuses on individual insights and perceptions of meaning. For example, Milner wrote a criticism of a special education curriculum that centers primarily on the author's perspective.[37] Apple and King's criticism, cited above, is an example of a criticism focusing on the political dimension or the relationship between the encountered event and the collective socio-political meanings and action.[38]

In their methodological writings, critics discuss these three differing categories of points of emphasis. In writing criticisms, however, the categories are not distinct. Many criticisms include all or more of the elements mentioned in each categorization system above. However, each has a different principal point of emphasis or combination of points of emphasis. Thus, these three categorizations do not indicate different schools of thought among critics but rather suggest the multiple considerations of critics in organizing and writing criticism to convey the meaning of educational phenomena.

Evaluation: Judging the Quality of Criticism

As in other forms of qualitative inquiry, the issue of evaluation is frequently raised. Evaluation of criticism perhaps is a more plaguing concern than evaluation of other qualitative studies because critics not only interpret, they appraise. And critics use literary devices associated with fiction and poetry. How does the reader know that the critic has not just told a good story, created a pleasant piece of fiction?

Logically, critics view criteria common to the evaluation of other qualitative studies as also appropriate to the evaluation of criticism.[39] Those criteria which are particularly stressed by critics will be briefly discussed.

First, description, interpretations, and appraisals should be supported by continued reference to pieces of evidence.[40] This inclusion of facts enables the reader to evaluate interpretations and appraisals personally. In judging the adequacy of interpretations, the quality of evidence presented is as important as the quantity.[41] One method for evaluating the quality of each piece of evidence is to compare it with other evidence. For example, information obtained through interviews can be compared to observations to assess quality. Additionally, sufficient time must be spent in the field to determine the pervasive characteristics of the setting and to judge the adequacy of evidence used to determine those characteristics.[42]

Second, critics stress that alternative hypotheses should be explored and that the line of reasoning used to reach conclusions should be revealed.[43] The task of the researcher is to collect as much data as possible, from as many sources as possible. The researcher must then evaluate the quality of each piece of evidence, explore alternative interpretations, and then logically present a case to the reader, exposing the line of reasoning at all decision points. The exploration of alternatives should include a search for negative evidence. In this way, the researcher exposes biases, and the reader may judge whether a slanted view has been given.

Through the process of structural corroboration the researcher develops and supports interpretations and appraisals.[44] As a lawyer present a case to a jury, laying out all the assumptions, exposing the evidence, and developing a theory to explain the evidence, so, too, the critic presents a case. Each new fact must support the hypothesis, increasing the consistence and coherence of interpretations. The ability of an interpretation to explain all the facts strengthens the probability that it is true. Additionally, as the critic builds the case, the criteria used for appraisal must be specified and must be appropriate to the particular phenomenon studied.[45]

A third criterion for judging quality is to compare the information presented in the criticism with other knowledge.[46] Critics should discuss the relationship of their findings to appropriate theoretical constructs and to other quantitative and qualitative studies. Additionally, readers can compare

the findings to their own practical knowledge about the nature of educational settings.

A final criterion is the significance and usefulness of the criticism. The criticism should increase the reader's understanding of the phenomenon studied.[47] Essentially, this means the criticism must have sufficient depth to reveal subtle qualities and reveal the underlying complexity of the phenomenon studied. Use of the third criterion, comparison of the information presented to other knowledge, provides clues about the significance and usefulness of the criticism. If the criticism broadens or makes the practical significance of theory more apparent, it has met the criterion of significance.

The Educational Uses of Curriculum Criticism

Criticism can be used as a research or an evaluation method, though the inclusion of appraisal means that it is more frequently used in evaluation. Whether used for research or evaluation, the findings are useful to educators in several ways.

Criticism, like other qualitative methodologies, allows educators to consider and develop understandings about the educational process rather than focusing solely on educational outcomes, as is characteristic of much research. As Barone wrote, criticism "avoids the simplistic notion that test scores, or narrow slices of behavior, supply us with the only valid information about student progress or (even more simplistically) about the worth of a teacher or a program."[48] Thus, criticism helps the reader view educational phenomena from a variety of perspectives and thus increases understanding of their complexity and richness. This increased understanding is important for several reasons. First, the revelation of different interpretations may spark much-needed dialogue among educators.[49] For too long, educators have approached problems as if simple and universal solutions existed. Dialogue about the multiple possible meanings of any educational event would encourage educators to seek more diverse, particularistic solutions to educational problems.

Second, criticism provides examples of teaching which raise questions and issues which teachers might not otherwise consider.[50] Eisner stated that criticism helps teachers learn how to see the subtleties of an educational environment and thus raises issues for deliberation which may have an impact on practice. For example, after reading a criticism about a teacher who allowed others to make many decisions for her, Andrini, also a classroom teacher, reported increased deliberation about influences on her own instructional decisions.[51] Thus, criticism can enable practitioners to increase their consciousness about various educational phenomena.

Third, criticism may help researchers to identify new directions for research.[52] Like other qualitative methodologies, criticism can lead to the

generation of hypotheses and the identification of variables which may indicate important directions for quantitative researchers. Additionally, criticism may help to clarify the meaning of variables and the ways in which variables interact, thereby complementing the findings of quantitative studies and perhaps suggesting new directions for research.

In summary, the principal value of curriculum criticism is similar to the value of many other qualitative methodologies. It increases understanding of particular social phenomena, disclosing a variety of possible meanings and increasing reader insight. Additionally criticism appraises educational phenomena. Education is a goal-oriented discipline. One's values guide the selection of goals and the means to achieve goals. Curriculum criticism opens the issue of values to discussion by including an appraisal of educational events. Such dialogue about values and about the reasons for value choices is essential to the improvement of educational decision-making and practice.

The Broader Application of Criticism

The methods, issues, and application of curriculum criticism to education have been discussed. To date, curriculum critics are educators, yet the methodology seems equally applicable for other social scientists. Most social and behavioral sciences involve human interaction, decisions based on value choices, and a combination of theoretical and practical knowledge. A variety of disciplines might use critical methods in studying and appraising relevant phenomena. For example, attorneys might profit from criticism of their practices while presenting evidence and arguments to juries. Why are some attorneys more likely to be believed? What subtle factors influence the decisions of jurors? Or social workers might use criticism to study such issues as the best ways to approach hostile, cooperative, or apprehensive clients or the factors that help make foster parents more effective. Other examples of areas which might profitably explore the use of criticism include medicine and health-related services, counseling, the ministry, and city planning. Certainly, particularistic problems in methods and issues will need to be explored within each field. However, the broader principles outlined in this article will be applicable across disciplines.

Notes

[1] John S. Mann, "Curriculum Criticism," *Teachers College Record*, 71 (September, 1969), pp. 27–40.

[2] The technical analysis of curriculum involves an evaluation of the match between intended outcomes and conditioned means for achieving outcomes.

[3] See the following by Elliot W. Eisner: "Emerging Models for Educational Evaluation," *School Review*, 80 (August, 1972), pp. 573–590; "On the Uses of Educational Connoisseur-

ship and Criticism for Evaluating Classroom Life," *Teachers College Record*, 78 (February, 1977), pp. 345–358; "Humanistic Trends and the Curriculum Field," *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 10 (September, 1978), pp. 197–204; (ed.), *The Educational Imagination* (Macmillan, 1979), pp. 190–260; and "Toward A Conceptual Revolution in Evaluation," *Educational Forum*, 44 (March, 1980), pp. 373–374.

[4] Thomas E. Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum: Clues from the New Journalism," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 10 (Spring, 1980), pp. 29–53; Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, pp. 190–203; Edward F. Kelly, "Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism: Comments on the Analogy," *Curriculum Theory Network*, 5:2 (1975), pp. 87–106; Diane W. Kyle, "Life As Teacher: The Disclosure of Teacher's Activities and Emergent Problems" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Virginia, 1979), pp. 45–47; Mann, "Curriculum Criticism," pp. 27–40; Gail McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1 (Summer, 1979), pp. 5–31.

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[7] Eisner, "Toward a Conceptual Revolution," pp. 373—374.

[8] Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum," pp. 29–53.

[9] Mann, "Curriculum Criticism," pp. 27–40; McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism," pp. 5–31. A foreshadowed question is a pre-specified question which the researcher uses as a guide for observation, helping to focus the information collection process.

[10] McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism," pp. 5-31.

[11] Dorene D. Ross, "Ms. Shore's Classroom: A Curriculum Criticism" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, 1981).

[12] Eisner, "Uses of Educational Connoisseurship," pp. 345–358; Elliot W. Eisner, "The Perceptive Eye: Toward the Reformation of Educational Evaluation" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C., 1975); Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, pp. 193–197.

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[14] Eisner, "Uses of Educational Connoisseurship," p. 347.

[15] Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum," pp. 29–53; Eisner, "Uses of Educational Connoisseurship," pp. 345–358; Kelly, "Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism," pp. 87–106.

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[29] Michael W. Apple and Nancy King, "What Do Schools Teach?" in Willis (ed.), *Qualitative Evaluation*, pp. 442–470.

[30] McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism," pp. 5–31.

[31] Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum," pp. 29–53; Kelly, "Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism," pp. 87–106.

[32] Apple and King, "What Do Schools Teach?" pp. 442–470.

[33] Kyle, "Curriculum Decisions," pp. 77–85.

[34] Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum," pp. 29–53; Kelly, "Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism," pp. 87–106.

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[36] McCutcheon, "Of Solar Systems," pp. 186–205.

[37] Edward W. Milner, "The Amphibious Musician," in Willis (ed.), *Qualitative Evaluation*, pp. 250–273.

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[39] Readers interested in a thorough discussion of criteria for evaluating qualitative studies are referred to Howard S. Becker, *Sociological Work* (Aldine, 1970); Judith A. Dawson, "Validity in Qualitative Inquiry" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, 1979); McCutcheon, "Interpretation," pp. 5–10; Dorene D. Ross and Diane W. Kyle, "Qualitative Inquiry: A Review and Analysis" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New York, 1982); Kathleen Wilcox, "Ethnography as a Methodology and Its Application to Schooling," in G. Spindler (ed.), *Doing the Ethnography of Schooling* (Holt, 1982); Harry F. Wolcott, "Criteria for an Ethnographic Approach to Research in Schools," *Human Organization*, 34 (Summer, 1975), pp. 111–127.

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[41] Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*, pp. 180–185.

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[45] Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*, pp. 165–184.
[46] Eisner, "The Perceptive Eye"; McCutcheon, "Interpretation," pp. 5–10.
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[48] Barone, "Effectively Critiquing the Experienced Curriculum," p. 30.
[49] Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, pp. 210–211.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] Carol Andrini, "Reaction to a Curriculum Criticism: A Teacher's View" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, 1981).
[52] Eisner, "The Perceptive Eye."

ERRATUM NOTICE

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In Hugh G. Petrie's article, "Ontological and Epistemological Realism," the last four words of the article, on page 62, should read

". . . as fallible human knowers."

We at the Journal regret the error.

Anthroethnography: A Methodological Consideration

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Introduction

In the past decade ethnographic research has gained popularity in education. Until the early 1960s, however, educational researchers considered ethnographic methods to be an instrument of inquiry exclusively employed by cultural anthropologists. A few anthropologists pioneered ethnographic studies of schooling in the 1950s.[1] The anthropology of education became a formally recognized applied discipline in the 1960s, and it came of age in 1968, when the American Anthropological Association established a new division, the Council of Anthropology and Education.

George Spindler has suggested three typical types of ethnographies: anthroethnography, socioethnography, and psychoethnography.[2] The distinction among their methodologies is often obfuscated, though their topical areas and scopes may widely differ. Also, field sociologists have had a sustained interest in qualitative research, although they have rarely called it "ethnography." Sociologists such as Robert and Helen Lynd, William F. Whyte, and Lloyd Warner, among others, have produced outstanding studies of communities and education based on the methodology of participant observation. Probably the best known is August B. Hollingshead's *Elmtown's Youth*.[3]

As ethnography steadily attracted interest among educational researchers, it began to suffer from faddism. Spindler warned:

> It is not surprising that some work called "ethnography" is marked by obscurity of purpose, lax relationships between concepts and observation, indifferent or absent conceptual structure and theory, weak implementation of research method, confusion about . . . hypotheses. . . .[4]

The warning suggests that ethnographers must have proper training in cultural anthropology and familiarity with methodological and theoretical knowledge of the discipline.

The purpose of this paper is to delineate anthroethnography in education (shortened hereafter to ethnography). Its main emphasis is on methodology, in Pelto's sense of methodology as "the 'logic-in-use' involved in selecting

particular observational techniques, assessing their yield of data, and relating these data to theoretical propositions."[5]

Development of Ethnology and Ethnography

Ethnology is generally defined as the comparative study of cultures; it emphasizes the generation of concepts and theories based on crosscultural field data, seeks patterns of cultural regularities,[6] and emphasizes the interpretation of field data.[7] Hence, traditionally it has been the domain of cultural anthropology. The development of anthropology, like other disciplines, was based on a special theory of reality and "causal" explanation, and is dependent on a distinctive methodology.[8] The origin of anthropology as the science of culture is often traced to Edward Tylor, whose *Primitive Culture* (1871) is an effort to make what he called "ethnography" into a science of culture.[9] Tylor identified the objects of ethnographic study in his definition of culture:

> Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind . . . is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action.[10]

The further development of ethnology, however, demanded greater refinement and precision in ethnographic methodology. Ethnologists in the early 20th century began to stress field investigation and emphasize systematically collected field data, instead of relying upon secondary data available in the library. Among these ethnologists, most noted are Franz Boas in the United States and Bronislaw Malinowski in Britain.[11]

One may examine Boas's work to illustrate the dominant concern of ethnologists with methodology.[12] Boas set out to destroy evolutionary ethnology as speculative and unscientific and devoted himself to advancing the "historical method" of controlled investigation to study the complexity of cultural development. He emphasized concrete descriptions of cultural phenomena in particular times and places, contending that only on such a basis was a controlled comparison of different cultures possible. He further argued that the field investigation must yield substantive data that shed light upon "the sociopsychological nexus of form and meaning," and that the validity of such data depended upon the degree to which ethnographers were capable of describing the views of the natives studied.[13]

Having established "historical methods," Boas's research orientation was directed toward a gamut of problems, sincluding cultural dynamics, the integration of culture, and the interaction between the individual and

society.[14] Students trained under his guidance, such as Ruth Benedict, Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Margaret Mead, and Melville Herskovitz, carried forward work in these areas.

Anthroethnography

Historically, anthropologists' ethnographic research consisted of case studies of small-scale societies, such as pastoral tribes, and their primary interest was to compare such societies to gain general knowledge of various cultures. Generally the social sciences have a twofold endeavor: the observation and explanation of human behavior. For anthropologists, the domain of observation is culture as manifested in people's verbal and nonverbal behavior. In the most generic sense, ethnography consists of the process of observing human behavior in a holistic cultural context. An ethnography is expected to offer a detailed and comprehensive description of culture—an account of the behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, and values of the people under study. It is "the science of cultural description," as Wolcott aptly phrased it.[15]

The general scope of ethnography defined by anthropologists is broad and covers major aspects of the culture of a given society or a culture-bound group most relevant to understanding its functions. As Berreman suggested, ". . . the aim of ethnography is to report the culture studied in sufficient depth and breadth to enable one who has not experienced it to understand it."[16]

Ethnography, however, must be understood in terms of not only its products but also its strategy. As a strategy it is an inclusive research endeavor usually involving anthropologists as residents of different societies over an extended period of time, as participant observers interacting with natives in accordance with their customs and communicating with them in their languages. Such inclusive participation in the cultures studied is requisite to obtain first-hand knowledge of their organizations and functions. Anthropologists' main research tools are their own senses, sensitivities, and ability to communicate with native informants. Ethnography requires them to be perceptive observers, sensitive inquirers, and skillful participants.[17]

When ethnography is applied to specific problems and areas in education, such as a given school and a pattern of school desegregation, the scope and focus of ethnography are quite different from those of ethnography in anthropology proper. Anthroethnography in education has come to mean intensive and in-depth studies of relatively limited and specific problems and topics, the scope of which varies considerably, from a school system to an individual school administrator. For example, Ianni's research team studied three high schools simultaneously to examine the social organizations of

schools.[18] In contrast, Wolcott observed the behavioral pattern of a single principal over an extended period of time.[19]

Three selected aspects of an ethnographic paradigm that underlies ethnography in education may be noted. The methodological orientation of ethnography is embedded in what Kuhn called a paradigm, a "model of coherent traditions" followed by a group of adherents.[20] It is not a set of rigid rules shared by all anthropologists, but a research perspective, assumptions about culture, and an epistemological orientation that are adhered to by ethnographers.

(1) Contextual Orientation

One of the insights anthropology has for education is the fact that human behavior is shaped in the context of a sociocultural milieu and that every human event is culture-bound. That context consists of "value premises"—a "configuration" that shapes individual cognitive orientation. Kluckhohn, for example, believes that common value premises, or the configuration of each culture, "unconsciously" guides and sustains the conventional way of life.[21]

In my own study of Japanese society, which reflects Kluckhohn's emphasis on covert cultural context, I noted a remarkable continuity in Japanese social relations over the past two centuries and concluded that central to understanding this continuity is the concept of value premises, which I called "cultural orientations."[22] The core of Japanese cultural orientation is group orientation, which influences formal and informal social relations, the organizational decision-making process, socialization, schooling, and the pattern of social mobility. Although Japan has similar social, educational, and organizational problems as Euro-American societies, it adapts to such problems differently from the ways displayed by Euro-American societies. Japanese adaptation is governed by group orientation.

Culture-and-personality studies begun in the 1930s by Kardiner, Linton, Mead, and Kluckhohn, among others, abundantly demonstrated the linkages between the individual and culture.[23] As Kluckhohn has phrased it, culture is "the mirror for man."[24] Meanwhile, Brameld translated these anthropological insights into a coherent theoretical framework of educational concepts and questions to be investigated.[25]

Studying human behavior and events in a cultural context entails two methodological aspects. The first requires observation not only of events relevant to the framework of an immediate research setting but also of their relationships to a broader sociocultural milieu, which remains the background of the immediate setting. Obgu's study of schools in California,[26] Gans's observation of schooling and socialization of Italian-Americans in

Boston,[27] and Gearing and Epstein's study of classroom interaction in a school in upper New York State[28] aptly illustrate this aspect.

The second aspect was succinctly stated by Spindler:

> Sociocultural knowledge held by social participants makes social behavior and communication sensible to oneself and to others. Therefore a major part of the ethnographic task is to understand what sociocultural knowledge participants bring to and generate in the social setting being studied.[29]

Schofield's investigation of a desegregated middle school illuminates the effect of teachers' sociocultural knowledge on the pattern of social relations between blacks and whites.[30] She observed that teachers consistently took the "ideological stance"—one form of sociocultural knowledge—that reference to race is illegitimate in dealing with children's academic, social, and personal problems, despite the apparent divisiveness prevailing in the school. Likewise, in her own analysis of data, other research participants' sociocultural knowledge was brought to bear upon their behavior.

All ethnographers study events as they evolve in natural settings—the "contexts in process" in which human experience takes place. The aim is to view events holistically. Some events may be anticipated, but others may be totally unexpected. Nevertheless, the ethnographic commitment is to study ongoing realities without affecting their process. An event cannot be isolated from the context in which it originates, for to do so will destroy the full meaning of experience. In contrast, Mischler has pointed out that "context stripping" is a "key feature of our standard methods of experimental design, measurement, and statistical analysis."[31]

(2) Qualitative Orientation

Three paradigmatic premises underlie the qualitative orientation of ethnography. First, anthropologists are interested in sociocultural patterns of human behavior rather than the quantification of human events. Cultural phenomena are more susceptible to qualitative description and analysis than to quantification.[32] According to Kluckhohn, the relevance of anthropological information is found not simply in the account of incidence and distribution, but in the *description of the pattern of behavior* or various ways the pattern is manifested.[33] He believes statistics obscure the qualitative dimensions of pattern and suggests that informants should be viewed not as actors whose behavior must be measured, but as documents that reflect the culture of which they are the bearers.[34]

Ethnographic research emphasizes the integration of particular events into a coherent and qualitatively meaningful pattern where the relationship of events is established. A good example of this approach is Wolcott's study,

The Man in the Principal's Office. What is important in the study is not only the detailed account of principalship, but the culturally governed pattern of the principal's behavior emerging from the description of his behavior in his particular social context. Wolcott says:

> The test of ethnography is whether it enables one to anticipate and interpret what goes on in a society or social group as appropriately as one of its members. To the extent that the account provided here achieves this objective, the reader should feel that if he were suddenly to find himself in an encounter with staff members, pupils, or parents at the school described, or if he were to attend a meeting with other principals from the school district, he would understand how he might act if he were in the role of the principal. Conversely, if he were to assume the role of some other person in an encounter with the principal, he should feel he would know how the principal might act toward him.[35]

The second premise holds that cultural events are understood and categorized in terms of the cultural actor's definition of human events. The epistemological assumption of this approach is that the perspective of people under study is crucial to understanding their behavior. Accordingly, it is assumed that cultural investigation can be accomplished by actively participating in their life. Attention is focused upon how they define their reality, often called "emic": the classification of objects, the definition of the situation in which they act, the assumptions on which activity takes place.[36]

At this point, it is relevant to review the anthropological background leading to the idea of "emic" inquiry. Boas elucidates the emicist orientation: "If it is our serious purpose to understand the thoughts of a people the whole analysis of experience must be based on their concepts, not ours."[37] That paradigm was followed by Boas's students. It was further articulated by anthropological linguists and cognitive anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s.[38] And it led to the development of what has been called the "New Ethnography," directly confronting the "eticist" approach, which stresses the observer's rather than the actor's perspective.

Eticists believe that the conceptual categories of cultural reality must be determined by the researchers, based on their identification of the causes of cultural phenomena. This idea is articulated best by Harris:

> Etic operations have as their hallmark the elevation of observers to the status of ultimate judges of the categories and concepts used in descriptions and analyses. . . . Frequently, etic operations involve the measurement and juxtaposition of activities and events that native informants may find inappropriate or meaningless.[39]

Pelto characterizes the debate between emicists and eticists as "the single most important theoretical disagreement [in anthropology]—one which involves the foundations of all our methodological procedures."[40] Nevertheless, the main stream of ethnography follows the emic approach, though there are sometimes varying degrees of eclecticism that incorporate both approaches.

The third premise involves the ethnographer's focus on ongoing settings in sociocultural contexts, such as communities, educational institutions, and classrooms, where events occur as human interaction takes place. These settings are often characterized as "natural" in the sense that they are not contrived or modified by the observer. The ethnographer attempts to understand holistically the cultural meanings of behavior observed. This approach requires that observers attend to all features of behavior as they constitute a pattern in a given setting. Paramount is their interest in the qualitative character of the setting, involving the coherence and durability of relationships among behavioral features as they are manifested in a multitude of forms. Accordingly, researchers must avoid the use of strategies that may influence the integrity of the entire setting studied.

To appreciate the ethnographer's qualitative orientation, it may be contrasted with conventional quantitative research methods in the social sciences. Quantitative methods aim to formulate general "laws" free of specific sociocultural constraints. Hence, the subjects of research are removed from the natural sociocultural setting either by placing them in a laboratory situation or by manipulating them to respond to questions arbitrarily formulated by the researcher. This is done to eliminate qualitative responses so as to avoid contamination by variables other than those specifically predetermined for research. By comparison, the ethnographer seeks the full meanings of behavior and its patterns shaped in the actual matrix of a given sociocultural environment, rather than causal relationships among predetermined variables subjected to rigid measurement.

(3) Ethnographic Questions and Hypotheses

Questions and hypotheses are formulated to guide the process of inquiry. In quantitative research, the observer's role is defined independent of the observed events. Accordingly, hypotheses are generated prior to data collection. Quantitative social science research employs a linear sequence model of research.[41] It begins with the definition of a problem, followed by the formulation of hypotheses, and proceeds to the designing of instruments to test the hypotheses; subsequently, it involves data collection and analysis, followed by the drawing of conclusions.

In contrast, the ethnographic paradigm defines the role of the observer in relation to the observed. The observer is not able to formulate questions or

hypotheses prior to starting fieldwork. The guiding questions are typically formulated after the orienting phase of fieldwork, and such questions are generally regarded as tentative hypotheses, continuously subjected to refinement as research proceeds. The linear social science approach—quantitative research—not only predetermines what inquiry is to take place, it also forecloses other researchable problems inherent in a natural context. In ethnography, the perspectives of the observer and the observed are intertwined in the generation of questions and hypotheses.

Spadley viewed ethnographic inquiry as cyclical instead of linear.[42] It begins with the selection of an ethnographic project and proceeds to asking ethnographic questions, followed by data collection and analysis. This cycle is repeated as research progresses, but the research questions are modified as the inquiry progresses from "descriptive," to "structural," to contrast questions. Descriptive questions are general and broad, appropriate particularly in the orienting phase, and structural questions are formulated in the phase of focused observation to concentrate on more articulately defined domains of inquiry. Subsequently, contrast questions are generated in the phase of "selective" observation, in which contrasting behavior is studied.

For ethnographers, fieldwork is a context in which questions are generated and modified. In Spindler's words, "Hypotheses and questions for study emerge as the study proceeds in the setting for observation."[43] All ethnographers do not espouse the same views concerning how questions and hypotheses are generated. There are two views, however, which are fundamentally in agreement with the central orientation of ethnography.

Bogdan and Taylor, who define a "phenomenological" approach to fieldwork, suggest that while the observer formulates hypotheses throughout research, the central phase of generating hypotheses comes in the process of data analysis:

> . . . *"Data analysis" refers to a process which entails an effort to formally identify themes and to construct hypotheses (ideas) as they are suggested by data and an attempt to demonstrate support for those themes and hypotheses. By hypotheses* we mean nothing more than propositional statements that are either simple . . . or complex. . . . (italics in the original)[44]

On the other hand, Erickson advocated "focused strategies of primary data collection," which actively and consciously direct inquiry.[45] He urged researchers to develop hypotheses in the field, along a line of theoretical orientation derived from both fieldwork and "substantive theory" in social science. He suggested:

> Research questions come from interaction between experience and some kind of theory, substantive or personal. It is extremely important

> that qualitative researchers make that interaction as explicit as possible to their audience in reporting and to themselves in the field.[46]

I personally favor the Erickson approach and have used it in my own work.[47]

Ethnographic Method

Unlike the linear, quantitative research in social science, ethnography has no standardized procedures of investigation that all ethnographers use.[48] This reflects the fact that ethnographic research is the craft of participant observation. Ethnographers often combine different methodological techniques, some of which are devised personally, in such a way as to facilitate their data collection in particular field situations. For example, Lewis employed methods in his study of a Puerto Rican family[49] quite different from those suggested by Spradley. Similarly, Ogbu's investigation of schooling in Stockton, California, used methods of data collection dissimilar from Brameld's procedures for studying schooling in Japan.[50] Nevertheless, one can discuss methodological components employed by ethnographers in general.

1. *Research Problems*. The problems that ethnographers study emerge from their substantive and theoretical interests. A substantive interest is an awareness of problems that arise in ongoing inquiry. Theoretical interests arise from established theories that constitute researchers' theoretical frames of reference. Thus, the first strategy of inquiry entails a broad examination of the historical, social, and cultural contexts of problems and an identification of the relation of the problems to pertinent theories and literature.

Problems may differ in scope. Anthropological research is often categorized into micro- and macro-ethnographies depending on the scale of the study.[51] Spradley's typology of ethnography involves seven social units studied at differential levels: single and multiple social situations, single and multiple social institutions, single and multiple communities and a complex society.[52] In educational ethnographies, research dealing with the first two or three units is usually viewed as microethnography, and studies encompassing the other units are regarded as macroethnographic.

2. *Choosing Research Settings*. After problems for inquiry are decided, the next task is to determine a research setting. Perhaps this is the most difficult task in research. Gaining access to an organizational site or a community (that is, getting the cooperation of the "gatekeepers" who have the power to grant access) is time consuming and often frustrating. Novice ethnographers should not be disheartened when they are denied access once or twice to the organizations chosen for study. They must be patient and continue to seek cooperation from alternative organizations. Normally, an organization chosen for ethnographic study wants to review the outline of the study. Thus, the

researcher must have a generally framed study proposal before the site is chosen.

3. *Descriptive Observation*. The first observations that researchers do may be called "descriptive observation."[53] The observation is governed by a general question, "What is going on here."[54] The intent of the observation is to gain insight into researchable problems when researchers have little knowledge of the culture to be studied. Researchers make field notes that provide a detailed narrative description of what has been observed with particular attention to activities, actors, space, physical objects, and the sequence of activities and events.

Subsequently, by reviewing their field notes, researchers identify and analyze domains of the phenomena observed. Spradley called this process "domain analysis."[55] The primary purpose of domain analysis is to identify categories—for example, activities and actors—and their relationships, leading to a taxonomy of domains. Categories should be flexible, so that they can be modified as research proceeds. Domain analysis is helpful in outlining the general boundary of a problem and its internal dimensions.

4. *Guiding Questions/Hypotheses*. Guiding questions and hypotheses emerge only after the orienting phase of inquiry. The use of "hypothesis" here indicates a propositional statement—such as "adolescent peer groups influence formal learning in school"—intended to sensitize the researcher to the nature of a social situation under study.[56] Though guiding questions/hypotheses develop continuously, they are especially useful in guiding research in its early stages. They are framed in general terms to allow other questions to evolve later.

5. *Participant Observation*. Participant observation is a major method of ethnographic data collection. The researcher becomes an instrument of inquiry by playing dual roles—by being present in the situation but by standing aside to observe it. The ethnographers' commitment is to immerse themselves in the "host" culture, to strive "to understand and enter into 'the world of morals and meanings' of the hosts."[57] In Berreman's words, participant observation is "the practice of living among the people one studies, coming to know them, their language, and their lifeways through intense and nearly continuous interaction with them in their daily lives."[58] At the same time, researchers remain detached, intense observers inquiring into cultural phenomena. Their role is to observe events at which they are physically present but to refrain from participating in those events so that they will not affect the activity being studied.

The intensity and duration of participant observation varies with research units. It usually involves ethnographic interviews in order to complement data gathered through observation.[59] Participant observation employed by microethnographers is not as comprehensive as that employed in

macroethnographies.[60] Microethnographers conduct participant observation as "scheduled visitors" rather than as participating residents.

6. *Validity and Reliability*. Validity and reliability of research are crucial in all social research regardless of disciplines and the methods employed. Collected data must be accurate and authentic and must represent reality. Also, intersubjective replicability of research enables investigators to produce cumulative findings.

Ethnographic validity refers to the degree to which participant observation achieves what it purports to discover, i.e., the authentic representation of what is happening is a social situation. Ethnographic reliability refers to the repeatability of a given study by researchers other than the original participant observer: the extent to which independent researchers discover the same phenomena in comparable situations.[61] It is the reliability of ethnographic research (and validity to a degree) that more often than not is criticized.[62]

In participant observation, validity indicates the ethnographer's understanding of the meanings of the observed sociocultural experience. Therefore, to attain a high degree of validity, the observer must repeat observation through prolonged involvement in the culture studied. It is because of this that establishing residence among the participants is an essential factor in research. The participant observer must maintain neutrality and have a multidimensional vision for both observing and interacting with research participants. This suggests that the researcher has to focus on the entire group and a wide range of informants (a stratified sample, if possible) representing the group. Also, the observer must guard against ethnocentrism and perceptual biases. Still another strategy is to involve participants in reconstructing the events recorded by the observer. This contributes to reducing the researcher's perceptual biases.

Measures to enhance reliability, on the other hand, involve a complete description of the research process, so that independent researchers may replicate the same procedures in comparable settings. This includes a delineation of the physical, cultural, and social contexts of the study; a statement of the ethnographer's roles in the research setting; an accurate description of the conceptual framework of research; and a complete description of the methods of data collection and analysis. Special attention must be given to what LeCompte and Goetz call "internal reliability,"[63] agreement among descriptions of observed phenomena in the same study. Measures to ensure internal reliability, suggested by LeCompte and Goetz, involve low-inference description and what Spradley terms "the verbatism principle,"[64] stressing verbatim accounts of events; confirmation of findings by informants; team observation, involving multiple researchers; peer examination by researchers working on the same problem in different

settings; and the use of audio-visual instruments. Internal reliability is closely related to validity; hence these measures may also be used to maximize ethnographic validity.

Summary

Ethnographic research has its roots in the tradition of anthropological fieldwork. It is characterized by its qualitative and contextual orientations. It emphasizes the integrity of natural settings and the "emic" approach to studying problems. Participant observation as an ethnographic method integrates these methodological considerations into fieldwork. To elevate participant observation to the level of scientific research, special attention must be given to strategies that maximize ethnographic validity and reliability.

Notes

[1] See George Spindler (ed.), *Education and Anthropology* (Stanford, 1955); Theodore Brameld, *The Remaking of a Culture: Life and Education in Puerto Rico* (Harper, 1959); George Spindler (ed.), *Education and Culture: Anthropological Approaches* (Holt, 1963). Brameld is a philosopher by training, but he did anthropological research extensively in the 1950s and 1960s.

[2] George Spindler, "General Introduction," in George Spindler (ed.), *Doing the Ethnography of Schooling: Educational Anthropology in Action* (Holt, 1963), p. 3.

[3] August B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth* (John Wiley, 1949).

[4] Spindler, "General Introduction," p. 2.

[5] Pertti J. Pelto, *Anthropological Research: The Structure of Inquiry* (Harper, 1970), p. 4.

[6] For a good outline of ethnology and ethnography, see James A. Clifton (ed.), *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology: Essays in the Scope and Methods of the Science of Man* (Houghton Mifflin, 1968).

[7] Dell Hymes, "Educational Ethnology," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 11 (1980): 3–8.

[8] Fred W. Voget, *A History of Ethnology* (Holt, 1975), p. 3.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[10] Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London: J. Murray, 1929), p. 1.

[11] Rosalie H. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice* (Chicago, 1971), pp. 35–38. She refers to Malinowski as the first anthropologist who conducted participant observation.

[12] Franz Boas, *Race, Language and Culture* (Macmillan, 1940), pp. 270–280.

[13] Voget, *History of Ethnology*, p. 333.

[14] Boas, *Race, Language and Culture*, pp. 305–311.

[15] Harry Wolcott, "Criteria for an Ethnographic Approach to Research in Schools," *Human Organization*, 34 (1975): 112.

[16] Gerald D. Berreman, "Ethnography: Method and Product," in James A. Clifton (ed.), *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, p. 338.

[17] A good example is Oscar Lewis, *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied* (Illinois, 1951).

[18] See Horace Mann—Lincoln Institute, *Social Organization of the High School Study*. ERIC Documents ED 129 711, 1975. F. Ianni was director of this project.

[19] Harry Wolcott, *The Man in the Principal's Office: An Ethnography* (Holt, 1973).

[20] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970), p. 22.

[21] Clyde Kluckhohn, "Covert Culture and Administrative Problems," *American Anthropologist*, 45 (1943): 213–227.

[22] Nobuo K. Shimahara, *Adaptation and Education in Japan* (Praeger, 1979).

[23] See the pioneering work of Abraham Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (Columbia, 1939); Clyde Kluckhohn and H. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (Knopf, 1948); Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (Appleton, 1945); and Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (Morrow, 1928).

[24] Clyde Kluckhohn, *The Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life* (McGraw-Hill, 1949).

[25] Theodore Brameld, *Cultural Foundations of Education: An Interdisciplinary Exploration* (Harper, 1957).

[26] John U. Ogbu, *The Next Generation: An Ethnography of Education in an Urban Neighborhood* (Academic Press, 1974).

[27] Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* (Free Press, 1965).

[28] Frederick Gearing and Paul Epstein, "Learning to Wait: An Ethnographic Probe into the Operations of an Item of Hidden Curriculum," in George Spindler (ed.), *Ethnography of Schooling*, pp. 240–267.

[29] Spindler, "General Introduction," p. 7.

[30] Janet W. Schofield, *Black and White in School* (Praeger, 1982).

[31] Elliot G. Mischler, "Meaning in Context: Is There Any Other Kind?" *Harvard Educational Review*, 49 (1979): 2–10.

[32] Voget, *History of Ethnography*, p. 388.

[33] Clyde Kluckhohn, "Common Humanity and Diverse Cultures," in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (Meridian Books, 1959), p. 259.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 259–260.

[35] Wolcott, *Man in the Principal's Office*, p. xi.

[36] The terms "emic" and "etic" (discussed later) were introduced by Kenneth Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior*, Vol. 1 (Glendale, California: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1954).

[37] Franz Boas, "Recent Anthropology," *Science*, 98 (1943): 314.

[38] See Pike, *Language*; Ward Goodenough, "Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning," *Language*, 32 (1956): 195–216; Charles O. Frake, *Language and Cultural Description* (Stanford, 1980).

[39] See Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture* (Random House, 1979), p. 32.

[40] Pelto, *Anthropological Research*, p. 82.

[41] James Spradley, *Participant Observation* (Holt, 1980), p. 27.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

[43] Spindler, "General Introduction," p. 6.

[44] Robert Bogdan and Steven J. Taylor, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Phenomenological Approach to the Social Sciences* (John Wiley, 1975), p. 79.

[45] Frederick Erickson, "Some Approaches to Inquiry in School-Community Ethnography," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 8 (1977): 62.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[47] Nubuo K. Shimahara, *Burakumin: A Japanese Minority and Education* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1969); Nubuo K. Shimahara, *Adaptation and Education in Japan* (Praeger, 1979).

[48] See Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*; Hortense Powdermaker, *Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist* (Norton, 1966); and Pelto, *Anthropological Research*, pp. 18–19, 34–35.

[49] Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty* (Vintage, 1966); Spradley, *Participant Observation*.

[50] Ogbu, *Next Generation*; Theodore Brameld, *Japan: Culture, Education, and Change in Two Communities* (Holt, 1969).

[51] See John Ogbu, "School Ethnography: A Multilevel Approach," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 12 (1981): 3–29.

[52] Spradley, *Participant Observation*, p. 30.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–99. Spradley's concept of domain may be compared with the concept of category used by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Aldine, 1967).

[56] Bogdan and Taylor, *Qualitative Research Methods*, pp. 79–80.

[57] Murray L. Wax and Rosalie H. Wax, "Fieldwork and the Research Process," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 11 (1980): 30.

[58] Berreman, "Ethnography," p. 340.

[59] See James Spradley, *The Ethnographic Interview* (Holt, 1979).

[60] An example is John Singleton, *Nichu: A Japanese School* (Holt, 1967).

[61] Pelto, *Anthropological Research*, pp. 41–45; Margaret D. LeCompte and Judith P. Goetz, "Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research," *Review of Educational Research*, 52 (1982): 31–60.

[62] LeCompte and Goetz, "Problems of Reliability and Validity," p. 32; Ray C. Rist, "On the Relations Among Educational Research Paradigms: From Disdain to Detente," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 9 (1977): 45.

[63] LeCompte and Goetz, "Problems of Reliability and Validity," pp. 41–43.

[64] Spradley, *Participant Observation*, p. 67.

Educational Ethnography in Britain

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Over the past fifteen years there has been an upsurge of ethnographic work in British educational research, making ethnography the most commonly practiced qualitative research method. This interest in ethnography was sparked by the advent of the "new sociology" (M. F. D. Young, 1971), which concentrated on the taken-for-granted categories of everyday life and the social construction of human reality. Though the new sociology employed many theoretical approaches, symbolic interactionism soon dominated the field.

Symbolic interactionism holds that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meaning that things hold for them. The attribution of meaning to objects is a continuous process which takes place in social contexts. Thus, symbolic interactionists focus on the *perspectives* through which people make sense of the world; the *strategies* people employ to achieve their ends; the different contexts and *situations* in which they define their goals; their group *cultures* in which they interact; and their subjective, as opposed to objective, *careers*.

The research technique most favored by symbolic interactionists has been ethnography, with its characteristic emphasis on participant observation. In truth, however, there has been little "participation" in the sense of a researcher taking a recognized role within an institution (Bruyn, 1966). Most researchers have observed in school settings over long periods of time (on the average, one to two years) and have frequently used unstructured interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983).

Rather than attempt to give an exhaustive account of findings, I will focus on what I consider to be the strengths of the approach, illustrating from research studies. This approach retains an emphasis on method while capturing the flavor of British ethnographic research.

Illumination

Much ethnographic work describes and illuminates the fine-grained details of school life. But ethnographic description differs from ordinary description in that the researcher's aim is to penetrate beneath surface appearances and reveal the harder realities there concealed. Such realities are illuminated over time and often contrast sharply with official accounts of the schooling process.

Consider, for example, the matter of teaching methods and teacher strategies. It is popularly thought that schools reward students for their "knowledge" and "ability," but Edwards and Furlong (1978, p. 121) show that often pupils are rewarded for accepting "the teacher's system of meanings, which either confirms or extends or replaces [their] own." Hammersley (1974, 1976, 1977b) demonstrates how teachers enforce their definitions of the school situation by organizing pupil participation in lessons. Teachers arrange classrooms, define rules of conduct, manage pupil turn-taking, and control and develop discussion topics. Teacher control, in fact, is built into the very fabric of classroom language: "O.K., now listen all of you!"; "Colin, what were you going to say?" Stubbs (1976) calls such language "metacommunication" because it not only tells students what the teacher wants them to do but silently carries the more important message that the teacher is in control.

Even "progressive" and "child-centered" teaching contains traditional structures of teacher control. Atkinson and Delamont (1977), for example, show how guided "discovery science" does not entail "discovery" in naturally occurring situations, but is in fact a teacher-dominated and carefully "stage-managed recapitulation of already known 'facts' " (p. 141). Edwards and Furlong (1978) argue that resource-based teaching represents a change in the technology of teaching rather than a shift from the knowledge-transmission role of traditional instruction (see Ball, 1981; Barnes, 1976; Goodson, 1975; A. Hargreaves, 1977; and Corbishley et al., 1981). In another study, Woods (1979) questions whether teachers were really "transmitting knowledge" or merely "surviving" in a difficult job. Teachers in his study appeared caught between irredeemable commitment to the job on the one hand (they had families, mortgages, etc.) and intractable discontent on the other (they suffered from low school morale, poor student motivation, etc.). In such circumstances, teachers developed "survival strategies" which mimicked teaching but did little to enhance learning. Teachers absented themselves mentally, and sometimes physically, from the classroom; mechanically went through the motions of teaching; or devoted themselves to a therapeutic role which passed classroom time agreeably and minimized teacher-student conflict. Studies such as these offer descriptions of teaching that differ fundamentally from the official definitions of the teacher role. Yet when researchers bring their findings back to their subjects, teachers often report that they "ring true."

With pupils, too, things are not always what they seem. For example, apparently straight "conformist" pupils strategically "work the system." Much pupil activity is not devoted to learning but simply to "pleasing the teacher." Six- and seven-year-olds have been observed hiding ignorance behind a knowledgeable mask or searching for answers to teacher questions

through the facial expressions, body language, and behavior of teachers (Tuckwell, 1982). Older pupils become adept at anticipating questions and duping teachers by using "impressive language" that is not backed by knowledge (D. Hargreaves, 1972).

Pupils may "please teachers" only as long as it furthers their own interests. Delamont's (1976) girls, for example, pleased teachers in return for grades, jobs, or peace and quiet. Without such payoffs, disruptive behavior increased (Turner, 1982). Pupils bent on good examination results for career purposes were likely to misbehave in classrooms of incompetent teachers. Classroom disruption was likely in situations when the sanctions of peers were more important to students than the sanctions of teachers (G. Turner, 1982; Birksted, 1975, 1976).

In some instances of such conflicting pressures, youngsters have been observed using "knife-edge strategies" (Measor and Woods, 1984). For example, a deviant boy placed in the bottom ability group worked hard to gain promotion to a middle group because he did not want to appear "really thick." Once there, he did not work to go higher because he did not want to be considered a "goody-goody" by his peers, and in fact presented a more deviant appearance to emphasize the point.

These are some of the ways in which ethnographers have discovered things that one might not have expected to find. In the process, they have been obliged to classify their findings under such headings as "metacommunication," "survival strategies," or "knife-edge strategies" that give currency to their ideas and facilitate further investigation and refinement.

Breadth of View

The ethnographer, within the limits of his or her own perceptions and ability, aims to give a thorough description of the relationship between all the elements characteristic of a single human group. This holistic character is another distinctive feature of the approach.

One example of comprehensive ethnographic knowledge is found in studies of "good teachers" from the perspective of students. A number of studies suggest that pupils use three principles to guide their evaluations of teachers: whether teachers can control the class, whether they can teach, and whether they are human enough to let their personalities extend beyond the boundaries of their official role. "Good teachers" must be skilled in all three areas.

Pupils told Marsh, Rosser, and Harré (1978) that some teachers interpreted their role too literally. Such instructors were defined as "strait-laced" and were criticized for "putting us down . . ." and "not knowing

who pupils were" (p. 36). Woods (1979) found pupil opposition to depersonalized relationships, the growing institutionalization of school, and ultra-rule conscious teachers. Students preferred evidence of humanity from teachers and appreciated classroom humor. Jokes ease situational tensions, make relationships more intimate (Walker and Goodson, 1977), develop common frameworks of meaning (Walker and Adelman, 1976), and relieve the tedium of lessons (Stebbins, 1980).

However, students are seldom satisfied with mere "fun and games" within classrooms. They expect to work in school. In Delamont's (1976) study of an all-girl private school, students respected the good teacher who "makes you learn" (p. 75; see also Furlong, 1977). Davies (1982) found that in junior school "the constant concern of the children is that work should be done"—but not just any work, for good teachers also "explained lessons clearly, made them interesting and helped students understand the material.

Controlling the classroom is also important to students. They disapproved of unthinking authoritarianism but respected quiet strength and teachers who ordered events to keep classes interesting and lessons comprehensible. Marsh, Rosser, and Harré's (1978) pupils felt "insulted by weakness on the part of those in authority who they expected to be strong" (p. 38). Furlong's (1976) pupils harassed "soft" teachers mercilessly. But students also disliked teachers who were "too strict," "unfair," and those who "picked on" students (Marsh, Rosser, and Harré, 1978) or "showed them up" in class (Woods, 1979).

The general principles guiding students' evaluation of teachers are widely distributed across student populations. Another comprehensive property of student culture has to do with pupil identity. Three elements appear to affect identity: friendship, status, and competence. Friendships form the structural basis of pupil life. Without close friends, one is outside the pale of student society. Friends help pupils through awkward moments in status transitions (Bryan, 1980; Galton and Delamont, 1980; Measor and Woods, 1983). Indeed, friendships are so important that some students line up "contingency friends" to support them just in case their main allies are not available or fail them (Davies, 1982). For some, friendships are the best thing about school (Woods, 1979; Meyenn, 1980), and friendship patterns can affect students' career choices after school (Willis, 1977).

Pupils' concern with status manifests itself in several ways. Conformist pupils find status in grades and will compete with others to come out on top. Such competition even exists within "progressive" classrooms (Sharp and Green, 1975; Denscombe, 1980b; Ball, 1981). Pupils with anti-academic values compete for status in other areas. Within "delinquent" groups, status rests on fighting ability, skillful teacher baiting, and courage in the face of

punishment (D. Hargreaves, 1967; Willis, 1977; Grundsell, 1980; Measor and Woods, 1984).

"Competence" has to do with the successful appropriation of one's preferred identity as a "high achiever," "one of the boys," "ace deviant," or whatever. Students act out these parts, sometimes in exaggerated style, sometimes purely experimentally. Appearance is closely tied to identity maintenance. Battles over school uniforms and dress codes, for example, are struggles to see who controls the actual identity of students, teachers, peer groups, or individual pupils (Stone, 1962).

Without claiming that everything is known about pupil perspectives on teachers or pupils' cultural values (an unattainable state, to be sure), I would argue that we have achieved a useful breadth of view of such matters. Ethnographers continue to seek to expand such views.

Balance

In the early 1970s, at the beginning of the new sociology movement, it was customary to do ethnographies within individual institutions. There was so much to discover that it mattered little where one began. There was concern, too, not to "take but to make problems," that is to say, not to pre-define a problem to be studied but rather allow interesting problems to emerge from within the social setting. In time, however, it became clear that some areas of school life were receiving more attention than others. As ethnographies accumulated, it became possible to spot lacunae and imbalances. Armed with this knowledge, ethnographers addressed neglected areas and redressed imbalances, ensuring fuller descriptions of school life and enabling theory construction to begin.

For example, Lacey (1977) became concerned that there was within the literature an implication that teacher behavior was largely determined by external structures and situational forces. He found in Becker's (1977) work, for example, little sign of individual volition. Lacey wondered if teachers were really hapless puppets or were just being made to appear so because of the direction of studies. Lacey therefore proposed a three-part model of teacher adaptation, which included elements of teacher volition, that he hoped would stimulate research on a broader front. Further studies of teacher socialization will allow a refinement of Lacey's model, thus ensuring a healthy interaction between data analysis and model construction.

Another example of how ethnography is attempting to find its own balance and maintain an interaction between data analysis and model construction is found in the area of pupil adaptation. Here we are customarily faced with broad dichotomies such as "conformists" versus "nonconformists" or "deviants." Detailed work within schools has revealed the inadequacy of such categories. One attempt to broaden the range of pupil

adaptation choices drew on the work of Merton (1957), who proposed five major models of adaptation to the social order based on combinations of acceptance and rejection of official goals and means for achieving those goals. These ranged from conformity (accepting both means and goals), through innovation (acceptance of goals, rejection of means), ritualism (rejection of goals, acceptance of means), retreatism (rejection of both goals and means), and finally to rebellion (rejection of goals and means but with the replacement of both).

Merton's functionalist model was given an interactionist twist by Wakeford (1969) and was further extended by Woods (1979). The latter linked adaptation to the personal goals of teachers and pupils and to the means available to them. As a result, Merton's categories were broadened and new attention was given to the volition of teachers and pupils in school situations.

The development of interactionist models, based in part on empirical studies and in part on hypotheses, has drawn researchers' attention to a wide range of previously ignored possibilities. Such models will inform other ethnographic work and promote theory development. It is to the latter topic that I now turn.

Theory

Critics contend that ethnographic findings are insubstantial and trivial and provide only an "endless description and a sequence of plausible stories" (Eldridge, 1981, p. 131). Of course, the ethnographers' interest in their subjects' perceptions necessitates the descriptive emphasis of qualitative work. However, as Denzin (1978, p. 58) warns, ethnographers must not stop at description because "the major goal of their discipline is the development of theory."

While it may be true that much early ethnography stopped at the level of description, it is not an inevitable consequence of the approach. Of necessity British ethnographers gave primacy to first order, rather than second order, constructs (Schutz 1967), and worked largely on their own in discrete case studies. This last point was partly a product of the belief that all situations are unique and we can only work towards understanding each one better, as opposed to constructing generalizations that cover a number of cases—though eventually most came to be more interested in the latter. There was pressure, too, in the early stages for detailed descriptions of school process simply because they had been so neglected.

There are signs, however, that qualitative researchers are now coming to grips with the full theoretical potential of the ethnographic approach. (A. Hargreaves, 1980; Hammersley, 1980; Delamont, 1981; D. Hargreaves, 1981; Woods, 1984b, 1984c). Certain areas of inquiry such as "negotiation" and "deviance" (Woods, 1984b) have already reached the "satura-

tion'' point that Glaser and Strauss (1967) have shown is necessary for successful theory development. We might note that much of the work already discussed in this article is theoretical in orientation. For example, the models discussed in the previous section do not constitute full-blown explanations in themselves, but certainly facilitate explanation by providing heuristic frameworks.

Opportunities to move from what Glaser and Strauss (1967) call ''substantive'' to ''formal theory'' abound. For example, relationships, status, and competence are major features of teacher and pupil life (D. Hargreaves, 1980). These substantive categories have formal properties and thus applicability beyond the roles of teachers and pupils alone. They illuminate many aspects of human adaptation to institutional roles. Such adaptations have implications for identity formation and maintenance. Such insights increase the potential for a useful interplay of theory and data collection at both the substantive and formal levels.

Occasionally ethnography contributes to a theoretical tradition or line of study in both cumulative and competitive ways. An instructive example is found in the study of pupil cultures. In two early studies, D. Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey (1970) posited models of two different conflicting pupil subcultures, one pro and one anti school. Furlong (1976) later criticized these models for overestimating the power of sub-cultural norms and underestimating individual pupils' ability to define and redefine what happens in their schools. Furlong observed that pupil groups were often unstable, and those he observed he termed ''interaction sets'' to emphasize their transient nature. Groups formed when pupils agreed on a particular definition of a situation and could communicate their agreement. ''The fact that different pupils take part in [different] interaction sets at different times,'' says Furlong (1976, p. 169), ''simply illustrates . . . that they do not always agree about what they know. Teachers, subjects and methods of teaching mean different things to different pupils. . . .'' Furlong, in turn, has been criticized for not investigating the reasons why pupils define things differently and for not relating pupils' perspectives to their goals or values or to the structure of the school (Hammersley and Turner, 1980).

Some see the work of D. Hargreaves, Lacey, and Furlong as having contributed competing explanations to the prolonged debate over determinism and volition in sociology. But if we deny this polarity and see determinism and volition as different ends of a single dimension, the work of these three ethnographers may be regarded as cumulative and as an encouraging reach for balance. Studies of pupil culture may not all be concerned with the same aspect, or pitched at the same level. The fact that pupils participate in variably constituted ''interaction sets'' for a multitude of different purposes does not preclude the possibility of more firmly based and durable groups

associated with the internal organization of the school or social structural factors (such as social class, gender, ethnicity) without.

Ethnography is implicated in another sociological debate, namely that over the relationship between macro and micro spheres and approaches. Some critics of ethnography have claimed that it is hopelessly mired in situationalism and idealism. Again this may be true of some studies, but by no means all. An important contribution here has come from the awakening of interest in Marxism. Marxists claimed that ethnography and interactionism did not offer satisfactory explanations on their own, but would have to take into account forces external to the school. While some Marxists abandoned ethnography altogether, others attempted to incorporate the method with dialectical theory. For example, Sharp and Green (1975), in contrasting the progressive doctrine of child-centeredness with the anti-progressive reality of much classroom life, argued that progressivism had become a rhetoric that justified the perpetuation of inequality through schooling. Well-intentioned teachers, they maintained, were deeply, and often unconsciously, influenced by the wider system of control and differential opportunities endemic to capitalist society. Interactionists in their turn have criticized Sharp and Green for inadequate exploration of teachers' own constructions of meaning (D. Hargreaves, 1978; Hammersley, 1977a).

An ingenious attempt to marry ethnography and Marxism was made by Willis (1977). He portrayed the atmosphere and cultural detail of a group of twelve working-class "lads" in an urban secondary school. Why, he wondered, do they think and behave as they do? And why do they and other working-class boys choose working-class jobs? The answer, he argued, lies in their social-class culture. Cultural forces operate as an external influence, often through families, but are actually re-created and substantially transformed by the boys themselves in response to a school situation which has structural similarities to the world of work. This is no pale acquiescence to economic determinism on the part of teen-age males, as implied by Bowles and Gintis (1976). These boys, Willis maintained, actively created their own culture in a way that met the requirements of the capitalist system.

While this is generally regarded as one of the more promising attempts to link the micro and macro levels of analysis, it still leaves several teasing questions. For example, no explanation is offered for why *these* twelve boys adopted the attitudes they did, when many students of similar backgrounds chose other paths. We might note, too, that Marxism is not the only macro alternative, though it is the one that has received most attention hitherto.

No doubt the problem of linking micro and macro levels of analysis, society and the individual, structure and process will continue to exercise the minds of sociologists for some time. But as Willis's work has shown, such a linkage enriches ethnographic description and enlivens sociological theory.

Teacher Practice

Ethnography can also lessen the distance between theory and practice in education. Sociology for many teachers is a rather abstruse, jargon-laden, theory-heavy, debunking discipline that offers little to professional educators. Some sociologists are not too concerned with such criticism and argue that the sociological task is solely to contribute knowledge at a theoretical level. They are satisfied if others apply or choose to ignore that knowledge. But other sociologists, especially those interested in changing schools, are anxious to disseminate their findings to school personnel. Ethnography could help them do this, and thus contribute to teacher professionalism because it: (a) is concerned with substantive issues that teachers recognize as their own; (b) deals with *their* problems; (c) attaches importance to their views, values, and motives; (d) takes the implications of their actions in different situations into account; and (e) even employs the concepts and language of school culture in drawing descriptions and spelling out theories. Thus, ethnography can help educators glean new insights, expand their views of reality, and balance their perspectives. Most importantly, through the emphasis on the self in the approach, as well as through any increased understanding, it can provide teachers with greater control over everyday events and hence increase their capacity to alter their own practice and instigate educational change if they wish to do so.

The practicality of ethnography for teachers is perhaps best illustrated by studies of pupil deviance. Three basic questions have been illuminated by this research: Who defines pupil behavior as deviant, who does the deviating, and from what do they deviate (Woods, 1984d)?

Insights into the first question are found in studies that focus on teacher definitions of reality. This research has found teacher differences of opinion on such matters as the nature of childhood and what constitutes "good" and "bad" pupils, warranted knowledge, and acceptable teaching. Teacher views on these matters have implications for their perceptions of deviance. Esland (1971), for example, draws a distinction between "psychometric" and "phenomenological" views of deviance. The former are underwritten by social Darwinist conceptions of childhood and learning, which define disruption as a natural evil that must be contained by rules and punishments. According to this view, good pupils are docile and deferential. The phenomenological approach, by contrast, sees the child as "a candle to be lit" rather than "a vessel to be filled." Here, students are expected to be active, and passive pupils are defined as deviant. Hammersley (1977a) presented a considerably extended typology.

For the purposes of some research, it is useful to define pupil deviance merely as non-compliance with teacher expectations. Several studies have

shown that teachers with certain views are more likely to encounter pupil non-compliance than teachers with other views. D. Hargreaves et al. (1975), for example, identified two categories of teachers: "deviance-provocative" and "deviance-insulative." The former group held social Darwinistic visions of childhood and pessimistic views of human nature. Such teachers issued ultimatums, took "provocative" actions, caused classroom confrontations and punished students inconsistently. The latter group, by contrast, believed that conditions produced deviance, and when deviance occurred they attempted to change the conditions under which students worked but did not try and change the students themselves. A similar dichotomy at the school level has been noticed by Reynolds and Sullivan (1979) in two broad areas they label "coercion" and "incorporation." Reynolds (1976a and b) argues that school ethos (the predominant teacher group perspective) is more responsible for deviance and compliance than any other external force (see also Rutter et al., 1979). Perhaps it is here where the use of dichotomies is best justified—where constellations of teachers' viewpoints come to form a school ethos.

On the question of which pupils deviate and why, we have seen the kinds of individual perspectives pupils hold regarding teachers, and the kinds of student cultures induced by school organization. A feature of such cultures is "group perspectives," the common views or modes of interpreting the world that group members come to hold as they face common problems (Becker et al., 1961). Several studies have found that group perspectives influence student choices at crucial periods in their careers, for example, in their choice of subjects and occupations. The research suggests that the group perspectives that influence these choices are linked to students' social class backgrounds (Ashton, 1973; Woods, 1979; Ball, 1981; Taylor, 1980). Such studies lend support to those of Sharp and Green (1975), Willis (1977), Anyon (1981a and b) and Connell et al. (1982), which are more pointedly concerned with social class and its effects.

More recently, attention has turned to gender differences, and it has been discovered that, contrary to expected beliefs, girls deviate from school norms just as often as boys, though not so ostentatiously. The research also shows that the demands of a feminine gender code influence girls' academic performance. For example, girls are socialized toward certain subjects (the arts, home economics, needle crafts, typing and commerce) and away from others (the sciences, other than biology; woodwork and metal work. See Kelly, 1981). And in general, girls are encouraged to underachieve because academic success does not accord with the popular image of femininity (Sharpe, 1976; Deem, 1978; Byrne, 1978; Measor and Woods, 1984). These values are promulgated by family, media, pop culture (McRobbie and Garber, 1976; McRobbie, 1980; Ball, 1981), peer group (Meyenn, 1980;

Llewellyn, 1980), and teachers (Llewellyn, 1980; Spender and Sarah, 1980; Stanworth, 1983).

What is it that disruptive students disrupt? More than official codes or rules imposed from above, they appear to disrupt the peaceful equilibrium that students and teachers mutually define and maintain. This equilibrium has been variously represented as "truce" (Reynolds, 1976a), "aided colonization" (Woods, 1979), "negotiation" (Delamont, 1976; Martin, 1976; Woods, 1978; Ball, 1980; G. Turner, 1982), "working consensus" (D. Hargreaves, 1972; Pollard, 1979), "bargaining" (Werthman, 1963), "avoidance of provocation" (Stebbins, 1970) and "confrontation avoidance" (A. Hargreaves, 1979). The last two labels are of a different order from the others because they are associated with teacher control techniques that can lead to deviance amplification (R. Lemert, 1967; J. Young, 1971; Cohen, 1972; Bird et al., 1981). Negotiative equilibrium is about the construction of order in which both sides participate, though they may do so subconsciously. It will be seen that if teachers deviate from this delicately balanced, jointly accepted, heavily implicit structure of social relations which has been worked out over time through practice, it will in itself invite pupil retaliation (Werthman, 1963; Marsh, Rosser, and Harré, 1978; Tattum, 1982).

Equilibrium might have been negotiated after a considerable period of disorder. For example, pupils may systematically "test out" new or inexperienced teachers to gain leverage in the negotiation process (Ball, 1980; Beynon, 1984; Measor and Woods, 1984). A negotiated equilibrium is continually threatened by external cultural forces operating on pupils and situational constraints pressing on teachers. With regard to the latter, Chessum (1980), for example, has shown how teachers can take a reflective stance regarding student disruption, but in particular instances may resort to a "personal and family pathology of disaffection" or a "hard core" theory of deviance, both of which deny any rationality or legitimacy to pupil deviance (see also Keddie, 1971).

Bringing these underlying realities to the surface is potentially of great assistance to teacher practice, since is aids diagnosis. And, as in medicine, with the correct diagnosis one is half way toward a cure.

Reflectivity

Ethnography can also contribute to educational practice and teacher satisfaction through its reflective possibilities. Interactionists employ Mead's (1934) conception of selfhood that emphasizes the importance of a continual dialogue between the "I" and the "me" and between the "self" and the "other." So as well as improved purchase on one's own views, interactionism carries considerable democratic advantage through its en-

hanced appreciation of others' points of view. For example, pupils' perceptions of being "shown up" or "picked on," "having a laugh," "dossing," "blagging and wagging," "bunking off" and even "doing nothing" are presented in ethnography not as examples of anarchism, but as having priority, deep meaning, and rationality in the lives of pupils (Willis, 1977; Furlong, 1976; Woods, 1979; Corrigan, 1976; G. Turner, 1982).

With regard to the teacher self, recent ethnography has emphasized the "making" rather than "taking" of roles (R. Turner, 1962; Woods, 1981). This recognition of an element of volition is both optimistic and realistic. It recognizes the difficulties confronting teachers but holds out the prospect of their negotiating their way through their difficulties, though, admittedly, the passage may be tortuous. In consequence, ethnographers have become much interested in teacher interests, and their strategies for furthering them. Pollard (1980), for example, discussed the importance of self-image (maintaining a desired image of self as one pragmatically adapts to situational necessities); work load (monitoring one's effort and the need to conserve energy); health and stress (job hazards to be avoided); enjoyment (teachers also appreciate "a laugh"); autonomy, order and instruction (maintaining personal independence, order and the freedom to teach). Pollard argues that teacher survival depends on achieving a balance of interest satisfaction and that they will "juggle" their interests in order to maintain such an equilibrium. This strategy is similar to the "trade-off" decisions teachers make when confronted by situational dilemmas (Berlak and Berlak, 1981). Elsewhere, ethnographers have become greatly interested in "coping strategies" (Lacey, 1977; A. Hargreaves, 1978; Woods, 1979 and 1981; and Pollard, 1982), for they allow a consideration of the constraints operating on teachers; the teacher's own biography, interests and personal resources; and how teachers go about constructing action.

There are inevitably varieties of adaptation to the teacher role and different forms and levels of commitment to the job. Three main types of commitment have been noted in the research: vocational (involving a set of ideals about education and society that have little to do with teaching as such), professional (involving a career in a school and subject-based teaching), and career-continuance (a more utilitarian stance that seeks money, prestige or fringe benefits). The exposition of these types might encourage teachers to examine their own motives for teaching (Lacey, 1977; Woods, 1979, 1981; Nias, 1981). Life history research (Woods, 1984a) might encourage teachers to consider the bearing their own biographies have had on their teaching practices and career choices.

Ethnographers are more interested in subjective than in objective careers (Hughes, 1937; Becker, 1976). Again, teachers can identify personally with such investigations. They will certainly recall the trauma of initial socializa-

tion into the teacher role (Fuchs, 1969; Hannam et al., 1971; Hanson and Herrington, 1976), the pressure to keep down classroom "noise" regardless of its relationship to learning if they wished to be regarded as "proper teachers" (Denscombe, 1980a), and the need to take on extra activities to facilitate advancement (Lacey, 1970). They will recognize the "career maps," "time tables," "bench marks," and "gatekeepers" of careers identified in the traditional interactionist literature (Lyons, 1981). But they will also feel the upheaval in these areas caused by the reorganization of the secondary school system, falling student enrollments, and the economic crisis.

While the first of these may have enhanced some teachers' careers, offering opportunities that were not there formerly, for others it has spoiled careers (Goffman, 1961). Riseborough (1981) gives the example of a group of ex-secondary modern school teachers who were demoted in status in a new comprehensive school in favor of younger teachers who were much less experienced but more highly qualified. These displaced teachers now gained little satisfaction from their work and formed an isolated clique that gained its psychological rewards by opposing the head master at every opportunity.

The general contraction of the education system is beginning to squeeze teachers' careers in other ways. Some face redundancy (layoffs) or forced early retirement. Some, who saw far horizons when they joined the profession in the 1960s, now find their careers stuck at a particular point. Current work employing life history techniques is mapping out teachers' responses to this situation (Sikes, 1984a and b; Measor, 1984a; Measor, Sikes, and Woods, 1984). One might argue that this kind of ethnography has a therapeutic value (indeed, many teachers say they enjoy talking freely and frankly to researchers). Life history research certainly has a broadcasting function, disseminating news about other individuals and the profession in general, in terms that teachers can understand and identify with personally. Perhaps it may also reveal some solutions.

Some Problems in Ethnography

I have concentrated on the strengths and achievements of ethnographic work in Britain as I see them, but the ethnographic approach is not without its problems. I have touched on one or two of these, such as the micro-macro problem (a common issue in sociology) and the over, though not inevitable, concern with empiricism. One aspect of the latter is its alleged exclusive concentration on the present, or at least on the period covering the ethnographer's study, so that one might argue that the report is not a life-like image at all, but a snapshot frozen in time. Again, this is not inevitable. Indeed, some studies, though they are all too few, have shown the benefits of a wider contextualization (Lacey, 1970).

The snapshot problem arises from the nature of the method, with its traditional approach of one researcher doing one case study at a time. There are limits to what one person can achieve. As it is, most case study ethnographies seem marked, not by relaxed and systematic data gatherings, but by a muddling through and a frustrating sense that the really important action is happening elsewhere. One solution to this problem is some form of coordinated team work (Hammersley, 1980; Woods, 1984b). Not only would team work enable a division of labor, it would also allow many-sided issues to be put in better perspective and would thus improve validity. For though ethnographic methodology has undoubtedly been made more rigorous (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), it is very difficult for researchers not to indulge in selective perception. If two or more ethnographers are to work in the same area, they can check and balance one another's research (Measor, 1984a). However, while this may sound fine in theory, it militates against the highly personalized nature of ethnography.

Another recent development, in part inspired by the ahistorical nature of most ethnographies, is the use of life histories (Goodson, 1980; Woods, 1984e). Goodson argues that these "set against the background of evolutionary patterns of schooling and teaching should provide an antidote to the depersonalized, ahistorical accounts of schooling to which we have become accustomed" (p. 74). Woods (1984e) argues that life histories are at their strongest when combined with ethnography or when they develop out of it. There are, after all, so many similarities between the two methods (for example, their forms of validation, use of key informants, and methods of analysis) that they might be considered as one. They then begin from strength, from a grounding in the present, whereas a constant danger in these follow-your-nose techniques is a continual attenuation of data. Life histories offer the added advantage of deep teacher involvement, thus increasing the potential for teacher reflection and offering opportunities for closing the traditional gap teachers perceive between theory and practice. At a time when "action research" (research which teachers themselves do within their own schools in response to their own problems) is becoming more and more popular (perhaps not only through a desire for increased professionalism but also as a kind of alternative career in view of the growing blockage discussed above), the increased use of life histories could contain many benefits for teachers and an improved methodology for ethnographers. The growing popularity of life history research was made evident when a recent conference at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, was devoted to its consideration (Ball and Goodson, 1984).

An abiding problem in the ethnographic "movement" is the coordination of studies. Again, the nature of the approach, with its emphasis in the individual case study, militates against coordination of findings. But there is

little point in continually discovering the same thing or adding endlessly to the long line of examples of a well grounded concept. I have distinguished here between Stage 1 and Stage 2 studies (Woods, 1984b). The former are empirical studies, which do not usually proceed beyond the substantive theory. The latter are coordinating and analytical studies which examine a range of ethnographies on similar substantive issues, aim to produce a formal theory, and thus establish a firm theoretical base for a new wave of ethnographies. As we showed earlier, Stage 2 studies are under way, but more work in this area needs to be done.

Like their theoretical forbears in the Chicago school, current ethnographers in Britain have been accused of concentrating almost exclusively upon people in low power positions and of championing and sometimes romanticizing the underdog. Ethnographers seemed preoccupied for a long time with groups of deviant pupils, ignoring large masses of presumably "conformist" students (G. Turner, 1982). Nor are there any ethnographies, for example, of head teachers and their deputies, or of administrators' offices, or of governing bodies; yet these are areas where many important decisions are made and upon which the whole fate of the school depends. This neglect is partly due, no doubt, to the ease of researcher access to people in low power situations and the comparative difficulty they have gaining access to the more powerful, and perhaps also due to an inbuilt sympathy for and identification with the underdog. However, even if researchers choose to take the underdog's side, perhaps more especially if they do, they must work to penetrate the corridors of power.

Ethnographers have also been accused of neglecting the power variable. The charge is not entirely true. As we have seen, some researchers are at pains to link their work to a wider systems perspective which embraces the impact of broad social forces. And at the situational level, much negotiation in interpersonal relationships is about the exercise of power. Ethnography is not necessarily a bland, apolitical study, or one which implicitly supports the status quo. This will be more evident, however, as ethnographers address their work more directly to formal theory, macro events and the politically powerful.

Much remains to be done, therefore. Ethnography in itself is not a complete program, nor is it a perfect one. Further ethnographers will continue to refine methodology, map out hidden areas, work at developing theory, examine the micro-macro interface, and seek alliance with other related methodologies. However, we can justly claim, I believe, that a start has been made.

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Susanne Langer: The Arts and Education

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> "Art education is the education of feeling, and a society that neglects it gives itself up to formless emotion. Bad art is corruption of feeling. This is a large factor in the irrationalism which dictators and demagogues exploit."[1]

Susanne K. Langer achieved in mid-life what few women before had done—world recognition in a field traditionally held by men. A college professor of philosophy and the author of numerous scholarly works, Langer made her mark in aesthetics, the branch of philosophy concerned with the fine arts. Breaking with traditional thinking, she developed a systematic theory that became the springboard for subsequent acceptance of aesthetics as a legitimate and logical philosophy worthy of study. She demonstrated not only the desirability of using the arts as an intellectual activity, but also the need for artistic expression in any culture. Both of these, she believed, can and should be promoted in our public and private schools.

In 1942 Langer's *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art*[2] was published. This work established her as an authority on aesthetic theory. In contrast to philosophers who had relegated the arts to the realm of mysticism and irrationality, Langer applied her method of conceptual definitions to the fine arts and produced a unique, systematic, rational, and comprehensive theory that brought her prominent recognition. *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art*[3] was published in 1953. In this book she applied her ideas about the role of symbolism as an abstract representation of inner emotions to each of the arts individually.

As Langer watched society advance further into technological expertise, she grieved for what she felt was a loss of liberty in both mind and body. A lack of understanding of symbolic formulation was making this world a poorer place in which to live. " . . . It is remarkable," she stated, "how close to the brink of destruction we let evils take us, and how much suffering society will tolerate before it moves to free itself from an incubus—pest, famine, anarchy, superstition, degeneracy, mass warfare."[4] In her opinion,

technical progress, which causes people to pay more attention to signs than to symbols, leads inevitably to an "impoverishment of mental life."[5]

Importance and Purpose of the Arts

Public education has traditionally centered around the subject-matter disciplines of language, mathematics, science, and history. Gradually schools accumulated a large number of "extras," courses important for life-adjustment or for leisure-time enjoyment, but not considered by many to be essential to a well-educated person. Under "life-adjustment" are courses such as home economics, driver's training, and sex education. Under "leisure-time" activities are art, music, and dance. The latter, especially, are viewed as "frills" that children can do without, especially in times of budget constraints.

According to Langer, nothing could be farther from the truth. The arts are not leisure activities or luxuries, but rather constitute the heart of any culture, the base from which all else springs. Long before there was mathematics or science, the arts were cultivated. They were, she claimed, the earliest and most essential form of symbolic communication. The arts reached a highly sophisticated level of development even in prehistoric times.

Today, art is as important to people as in early times; it is the "spearhead of human development, social and individual."[6] Furthermore, in Langer's view, an expansion of the arts marks a society that is vigorous and alive. What is acceptable and understandable today was often considered abhorrent yesterday. The wave of the future is frequently considered outrageous when first presented. Painters and musicians like El Greco and Beethoven were first greeted with disdain, for their styles challenged the standards of their day. When there is a growth period in the arts, an expansion of rules and the creation of different forms, the culture of a society moves to a new era of insight and feeling, a change that to Langer is indispensable to a vital society.

In order to understand more fully why the arts are an essential subject for education, we must first understand the role they play in human lives. In her books, Langer explained her ideas about the definition, principles, and purpose of art; the meaning of symbols; and the role of intuition. Not all scholars, of course, concur with Langer's theories, but most agree that, as the first person to deal with aesthetics in such a systematic way, she is among the foremost authorities on that subject.

First of all, Langer discussed how art differs from discursive language, the other essential form of communication. In addition to the creative arts, every culture has developed very early a particular symbolic device called language. "People who have not invented textiles, who live under roofs of

pleated branches, need no privacy and mind no filth and roast their enemies for dinner, will yet converse over their bestial feasts in a tongue as grammatical as Greek, and as fluent as French."[7] This communication system is amazingly complex, useful, and powerful, but has its limitations. Language consists of a system of symbols that are governed by convention. Though these rules differ markedly from culture to culture, every language has a precise set. Without them, there could be no understanding, no way for meaning to be conveyed from person to person through the symbols we call words. Humans are extremely dependent on words. Many people cannot conceive of anything without the use of language.

However, there is a whole realm of experience that cannot be transmitted in this manner—the realm we call "feelings." Emotions, or feelings, can be described in general terms, but words lack the means to make them explicit. We can talk about joy, sorrow, or fear, but we cannot express their true natures. We have no names for specific kinds of fear, for instance. The fear of falling is different from the fear of speaking in public, yet our language has no precise words to depict the difference. Discursive language helps us to become aware of the *objective* world and our relation to it, but fails to make the *subjective* world known. However, emotions can be understood even though they can be talked about only very generally. They are subjective, but they are not amorphous. They simply need another vehicle for conveying their meaning, and that is the goal of art. What discourse does for the objective world, the arts do for the subjective. Each makes us aware of the form, gives structure to the implicit reality, and makes it conceivable.

A Definition of Art and the Meaning of Symbolism

The arts, said Langer, can be defined as "the practice of creating perceptible forms expressive of human feeling."[8] Through the use of senses, intuition, and imagination, everything that can be felt—"physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose . . . intellectual tensions"[9]—can be expressed and perceived by another. Where discourse fails, art takes over and presents us with "a direct vision of vitality, emotion, subjective reality."[10]

Every work of art, whether good or bad, whether a dance, painting, or short story, expresses the feelings, the emotions of the artist. However, it is not what he or she *feels* that is important, but what is *known* about those feelings. The artist creates an objective form to convey the inner emotions, to give insight into the sentient world of experience. The artist's aim is to present "a feeling for our contemplation."[11] In other words, the artist does not create just for the sake of expressing or doing, but in order that an audience contemplate and comprehend the creation. Art may serve a cathartic function for the artist, but that is incidental and not its purpose.

Though a work of art is called a "symbol," it is not symbolic in the conventional sense. There are no meaningful units that comprise the symbol. When we speak of a "flag," for instance, the word conjures up innumerable items that could be listed under that category—the British flag, the roadworker's flag, the school flag. The symbol is not a unitary object, but one that stands for many. In art, however, each building, musical composition, picture, dance, or novel is a single entity that stands alone in interpreting reality. A work of art is always unique and specific; it is not a class or kind. "Art does not generalize," said Langer. The concrete entity becomes "the sole symbol of its import."[12] Art, unlike crafts, is exemplified only once, not repeated again and again. Nor does it point beyond itself to something else as most symbols do.

Yet art, continued Langer, is symbolic in that the feeling portrayed cannot be conceived or imagined without the objective form. It cannot be understood through discourse. A piece of art, then, is a symbol for an element of life that is not readily conceivable, for a particular emotion. Artistic expression is a device for making tangible and comprehensible that which otherwise would be unknown to others. Whatever form the expression takes, it is a manipulated representation that is chosen and molded by the artist. It is a symbol, and not a direct copy, of the inner life the artist wishes to portray.

The attempt to convey the meaning of one thing through another seems to be an intuitive process, a very natural function of human thinking, according to Langer. It is neither abnormal nor a low form of intellectual activity, as many think. In fact, she said, intuition is the basis of all insight, that which produces logical understanding. Its major function is the formulation of abstractions upon which all rationality depends.

In our culture, Langer noted, abstract thinking is treated as incompatible with emotional response. "Cold reason and warm feeling (meaning emotion) are supposed to be antagonistic tendencies in the human mind . . ."[13] Because reason (abstract thinking) is essential to intellectual discourse, people trust and admire it highly, and distrust and disparage their feelings. Those who consider themselves to be most enlightened—the scientists, the philosophers, the statesmen—"hold abstract thought and cold reason—indeed the colder the better—to be the safest guide to action and the arbiter of truth about a world of hard facts."[14] Yet intuition and emotions, she argued, precede discursive language and are essential to the formulation of abstractions. " . . . Only a highly emotional creature could have developed the talent of abstract thought."[15]

Since as humans we cannot transmit inner reality in pure form, we have contrived for practical purposes a way to represent it so that it can be better comprehended. We determine those elements we wish to make known and present them to the senses rather than to our "word-bound consciousness."

In art, said Langer, "form and color, tone and tension and rhythm, contrast and softness and rest and motion,"[16] are all elements that can symbolically convey meaning that would otherwise not be understood. All genuine art is thus an abstraction, yet it is not a process of cold reasoning. Rather, abstractions arise from a merging of perceptions and emotions, a combination of logic and intuition. The artist must draw on his or her feelings to select a project and to communicate a meaning, yet the work is developed and shaped into symbolic form by intellectual, conscious means.

Art deals with the world of feeling, but that world is not irrational, maintained Langer. Its logical forms are merely different from those of discursive language: " . . . it has a structure . . . can be conceptually known, reflected on, imagined and symbolically expressed in detail and to a great depth."[17] A point she made over and over is that the arts "objectify subjective reality." The laws of art differ from those of language and science, but laws do exist. Each of the arts objectifies inward reality by creating an outward image. Though they are flexible and changeable, each of the arts has rules that govern the acceptability and value of a work—further evidence of the objectification of subjective reality. A work is charged with feeling because it is a symbol of feeling, but the image itself is very structured.

Thus, though art is subjective, it is not illogical. It only seems that way to some people because words cannot explain clearly what a work is trying to say. The meaning is there and understood by the artist and the viewer, but cannot be explicated fully by discourse. That is because language is limited, not because the felt emotions or the symbolic image are irrational.

The Principles of Art

When we perceive a work of art, "we see it not as *having* an expressive form, but as *being* one,"[18] observed Langer. There are three aspects, she said, that are essential for a work to be considered art. First of all, like all living substances, it must have organic unity. A piece of art is a whole. No part can be modified without altering the entire structure. Though the work is actually an inanimate object and not a real organism, it appears to have a life of its own, an individual reality. "A work of art is a composition of tensions and resolutions, balance and unbalance, rhythm coherence, a precarious yet continuous unity."[19] All the rational elements of a life are symbolically shown, yet put together to give a clear representation of the underlying feelings. When a work of art is broken apart—a Shakespeare play is bowdlerized, for instance—the total structure is violated and the image of life is gone. The separate elements are not independent of each, but are intricately interrelated. To remove or change a part is to damage the whole.

Secondly, the form must be dynamic. The work must take on a logical

resemblance to life, to *be* life, not just a copy of what is seen. It must be a "conception of *what life feels like*,"[20] and the audience must perceive this "felt life" when they see or hear or read the work. Though the work is crafted with high technical skill, it must also have what Langer called a "living form."

Thirdly, artistic expression is held together by "rhythmic processes," which are characteristic of life's unity. "If its major rhythms are greatly disturbed, or suspended for more than a few moments, the organism collapses, life stops."[21] If a created work is to symbolize sentient life, it must be a projection of the living process. It must be representative expression and not a duplicate of life, yet it must contain the rhythms and unity and dynamic form that are inherent in life itself.

Another important principle in all the arts, Langer noted, is "illusion." Since the symbols of life in art are not generalized as in science and other areas, the artist needs a way to achieve artistic abstraction that is specific and does not point to anything else. That device is known as illusion. It has nothing to do with make-believe or deception or disbelief. Rather, it serves the serious purpose of making subjective experience, the life of feeling, known to others. In art, the normal way of seeing is suspended. When we see a painting of sunflowers or attend a play, we know each to be an apparition and not the real thing, yet we do not worry about this flight from reality. We cancel our usual way of looking at space. We see only what is before us, that part of life the work represents, and rule out all other elements of reality at that moment. Thus, as Langer pointed out, illusion is the basis of all art. Each of the arts has its own method for creating illusion, but the principle remains the same for all. The artist abstracts from the subjective world of emotion and creates an expressive, objective form, which the audience knows to be an illusion of life, yet one with important insight.

The Arts and Education

Often downplayed in American school systems is education in aesthetic theory and in creative expression. Such a neglect has serious ramifications for society. A lack of understanding of artistic symbolism leads to a disparagement of the inner world of feeling and emotion and an unnatural esteem for the "cold world" of logic and machines. Though a work of art is a rational, objective manipulation of clay or physical movements or words, the purpose is to transmit subjective personal meaning by way of a single, unique creation. Art preserves the worth and dignity of individuals, said Susanne Langer, by explaining the inner psychological world of human beings. When schools neglect the arts, they neglect that which is most important to a vital society—freedom of expression, individual uniqueness, creation of new forms, dynamic life. Without these, there is a lack of liberty and a lack of desire for personal and societal growth.

"The ancient ubiquitous character of art," wrote Langer, "contrasts sharply with the prevalent idea that art is a luxury product of civilization, a cultural frill, a piece of social veneer."[22] In the history of human culture the arts came first, she claimed. Before there were reasoned essays, there were beautiful dances. Before science, was imaginative literature. Before advanced technology, was intricate architecture. A yearning exists in each society for creative imaging that conveys to others the hidden world of feelings and emotions. This will no doubt persist whether encouraged or not, but a society that ignores or obstructs vital artistic expression in its children is one that has lost touch with basic human needs. "The vulgarization of art," said Langer, "is the surest symptom of ethnic decline."[23]

Because schools reflect societal values, a lack of education in the arts accentuates the void in society as a whole and perpetuates it. For Langer, aesthetic education is not a "frill," but an absolute necessity. Without the education of feelings which comes from the teaching of art, she believed, a culture is in danger of the corruption that accompanies demagoguery of all types. The aim of art is insight into the inner life of the emotions and imagination. As Langer said, it is "imagination that frames and supports and guides our thinking, not only about the practicalities of the day, but also about much greater things—good and evil, love, life and death, past and future, and human destiny."[24]

Art is not practical, it does not serve an immediate use, but it is necessary. What it contributes to culture is older than science and mathematics and philosophy. " . . . Art," wrote Langer, "is the epitome of human life, the truest record of insight and feeling," and the education of feeling is the "very heart of personal education."[25]

Education is of crucial importance to the survival of a humanistic, democratic society. Crucial within that education is the cultivation of the arts. According to philosopher Susanne Langer, only through the arts, which educate people's feelings, can we instill in our children a love of freedom, an appreciation for the world of emotions and caring, and a desire to communicate with others in ways deeper than language allows.

Notes

[1] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophical Sketches* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 94.

[2] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 103.

[3] Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953).

[4] Susanne K. Langer, "Why Philosophy?" *Saturday Evening Post*, May 13, 1961, p. 34.

[5] Winthrop Sargeant, "Philosopher in a New Key," *The New Yorker*, December 3, 1960, p. 68.

[6] Langer, *Sketches*, pp. 83–4.

[7] Langer, *New Key*.

[8] Langer, *Sketches*, p. 84.
[9] Susanne K. Langer, *Problems of Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 15.
[10] Langer, *Sketches*, p. 90.
[11] Langer, *Problems*, p. 95.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[13] Langer, *Sketches*, p. 66.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[16] Langer, *Problems*, p. 95.
[17] *Ibid*, pp. 7–8.
[18] *Ibid*, p. 30.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[22] Langer, *Sketches*, p. 83.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 94.

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Education and the Right Hemisphere of the Brain: Thinking in Patterns for a Computer World

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In recent years much has been made of the relevance of research on the hemispheres of the brain to education.[1] Usually the message is that education has neglected the intellectual abilities of the right hemisphere of the brain and that educators should focus more on "creative," "holistic," "cyclical-metaphoric," or "appositional" thinking. The argument typically has a basic weakness—just because the brain can perform certain functions does not mean we should teach them, and the explanation of what intellectual processes should be taught is so unclear that it is not very helpful—witness the above labels.[2] This article will explore how our changing culture may increasingly need the development of the intellectual functions of the right hemisphere, and it will attempt to show how educators can think of those intellectual functions in terms of the discovering, creating, and understanding of patterns in the visual and abstract world.

Decade by decade research on the brain is helping us understand a little more about what our thinking processes are, even though the physical processes of the brain may not be all there is to our mind and the research progress on these processes has certainly been frustratingly slow and imperfect.[3] A fascinating aspect of this research over the past few decades has been the exploration of the discoveries that the literacy we have focused on so much in our educational system is mainly the province of the left hemisphere of the brain and that the functions of the right hemisphere are little understood and perhaps neglected in our educational system.

There seems to be a cultural reason for this. Ours has been a literate culture, focusing on the written or printed word as the means of communication on which modern civilization has been built. It has been a powerful tool in creating a world society and enormous technological development. It is arguable that preliterate societies focused more on right-hemisphere brain

functions in their cultures and education, but with literacy it seems plausible that our cultures have often focused not only on the reading and writing skills that are centered in the left hemisphere of the brain but also on the sequential, analytic, comparative mode of thinking that appears to be closely related. Perhaps even a literate culture uses the right-hemisphere functions more than it realizes and should focus on teaching the development of those functions more than it has, but in our emerging electronic world it is becoming clear that we will need the fullest possible development of those right-hemisphere functions more than ever.

Our Changing Culture

With the development of the computer and the electronic media, our culture is changing basically and significantly from one built on and centered around the printed page to one being built around the electronic media. The new media have characteristics that seem associated with right hemisphere of the brain functions as the printed page has characteristics that seem associated with left hemisphere of the brain functions. Rather than being linear and sequential, as print is, the new media create complex visual images as well as words and can juxtapose images in a parallel and almost simultaneous fashion. They deal more in patterns and complex sets of relationships than in a logical line slowly building a larger intellectual structure.

On television today, advertisements often seem to exploit this characteristic more than other programming. In comtemporary computer work, designing industrial products using computer-generated videoscreen images and investigating patterns of relationships through complex structures such as cross-impact matrices exemplify such characteristics. The process of designing and developing a new world civilization built on the powers and around the special characteristics of electronic technology will be a long and complex one, but it seems obvious that it will take abilities not traditionally nourished in our educational systems.

That these abilities seem intrinsic, even if not traditionally taught, is becoming obvious, not only from brain research that hints at such abilities centered in the right hemisphere of the brain, but also from the observation that younger people nurtured in the new environment are often better at manipulating it than their older, more experienced and educated compatriots. The computer wizards and criminals are not only young but often even teenagers, not yet finished with educational training that is supposed to be so essential to taking a place in our culture and society.

It is possible that the intellectual processes associated with the right hemisphere of the brain, which may become more important in the coming electronic age, may also be intellectual processes more developed in pre-

literate societies with written languages using pictographs, logographs, or ideograms rather than focusing on linear trails to develop ideas.[4] If so, in our contemporary world, societies that have a closer connection with such cultures, such as Africa and Asia may have the ability to guide the rest of us in important ways. Without such luck and benevolence, however, we linearly literate societies will have to struggle to develop our mental abilities for the new age.

Hemispheric Specialization in the Brain

Although much of our thinking is in terms of simple dichotomies, it is probably best not to reduce the left and right hemispheres of the brain to a simple dichotomy with each hemisphere specializing in only one operation neatly contrasted to an opposite operation in the other hemisphere. Reality is probably much more complex than that. Besides, individuals are found to vary somewhat in their hemispheric specialization, and the normal human brain has a corpus callosum and other elements connecting the two hemispheres, integrating whatever complex sets of intellectual functions take place in them.[5] Terms that we use to attempt to characterize the intellectual functions should be seen as only simplified approximations to suggest possible specialized abilities and to contrast possible differences in the two hemispheres. The struggle at this embryonic point in the development of our knowledge about the brain is to make such simplified approximations as close to reality and as useful to our purposes as possible.

Perhaps because we are a literate culture more familiar with the intellectual processes of the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere has often been characterized as the negative or opposite of what we know in the left hemisphere, for example, verbal (left), non-verbal (right). Even worse, the right hemisphere has been characterized by what our sometimes simple-minded dichotomies have supposed to be opposite to left hemispheric functions. Two common examples of this characterize the right hemisphere as the seat of creativity[6] and of emotions, when brain research clearly shows that both hemispheres are involved in both creative thinking and the emotions, though it may be in different ways.[7]

Keeping such caveats and pitfalls in mind, the following comparisons suggest the different processes the two hemispheres seem to focus on.[8]

Left Hemisphere	*Right Hemisphere*
Abstracting essentials from a field (Analytic)	Fitting parts into a whole (Synthetic)
Direct relationships (Comparative)	Patterns of relationships (Integrative)
Sequential ordering (Linear)	Simultaneous patterning (Parallel)

The left hemisphere seems better at sequential ordering, analyzing essentials, and making direct relationships. It is dominant in speaking, reading, writing, and simple calculation—though the right hemisphere plays a role in these processes, perhaps when we become more involved in patterning, as in literary creation or mathematical theorizing.[9] The left hemisphere's predilection for linear ordering seems related to the ordering of thought through a linear concept of time—or a linear progression of printed symbols. Obviously, the left hemisphere's abilities go beyond these simple skills. For example, it seems to excel at the recognition of a direct relationship or an association with previous experience.[10] However, these basic characteristics suggest how and why early formal education and time/print ordered logical thought in Western cultures may be so closely associated with left hemispheric thinking.[11]

The right hemisphere seems better at simultaneous patterned thinking and integrating parts into wholes. Often this has been associated with the visual world, perhaps largely because the visual is obviously not easily reduced to simple ordering or direct relationships.[12] It is easy to see the pattern of a face but difficult to describe it. The patterning of the right hemisphere is in the abstract, tactile, kinesthetic, and auditory worlds as well, however. These intellectual processes are important in our culture, but in a world focused on literacy they seem to be neglected in much of formal education. In the emerging electronic culture, these processes may come to be considered important to be developed through education, perhaps as they always should have been.[13]

Patterned Thinking in Our Culture

As our culture becomes more dominated by the electronic media and the computer, right-hemisphere abilities may become more obviously important, but in many areas of our life such thinking in patterns[14] has long been important. We have neglected teaching them generally in education because we have seen literacy skills as central to the literate society we have been, and literacy in our linear system of writing has probably further emphasized left-hemisphere thinking patterns focusing on sequential ordering and direct two-way relationships such as cause and effect. Many professional fields and everyday experiences, however, presently require the patterning abilities of the right hemisphere.

Perhaps the most noteworthy in our technological society is the field of engineering and related technical crafts. Visual and abstract patterning abilities are essential and basic to engineering theory, design, and practice; to technical drafting and testing; and to machining, production, and assembly. Whether one is designing automobiles, communicating through graphs, working with the complexities of materials or of heat transfer, developing

electronic circuits, machining tools and dies, or drafting and reading orthographic projections, it is the ability to understand, manipulate, and create visual and abstract patterns that is demanded.[15] Linear relationships, simple cause and effect, and words are typically inadequate to the job. It is a different world from the literary one of formal education, yet how fundamental it is to the technological part, if not the literate part, of our culture.[16]

Scientific theorizing and understanding, as well, depend on patterning abilities, though much more of science than technology seems to be communicated through the written word—perhaps inadequately. The possibility that words are a poor means of communicating scientific theory may be one reason it takes so long for much of scientific theory, Einstein's theories for example, to be widely understood. Perhaps the computer/electronic age will be better able to communicate and teach the technological workings and scientific understandings of our culture.

Architecture, art, music, drama, and dance all require an ability to understand and manipulate complex patterns, for their design or production as well as for their appreciation. Design of all sorts, whether fashion, industrial, advertising, interior, or city, deals in the realm of patterns, as do the crafts of woodworking, technical maintenance and repair, sewing, and cooking. The patterns are often visual, auditory, or tactile, but abstract patterning is also included in what seems to be right hemisphere of the brain functions, and this includes complex problem solving that goes beyond linear logic or direct cause-effect relationships to encompass, for example, cross-impact matrices, cross-cultural studies, language translation, or scientific theorizing. Understanding patterned thinking as also abstract rather than simply visual, a common narrow misunderstanding, helps us realize how patterned thinking is a part of such fields as psychotherapy, personnel management, and business administration.

Patterned thinking is also a part of our everyday life, in recognizing faces, for example, though perhaps not as well developed a part as education should have helped us make it. A good example is map reading. Finding one's way by following linear directions—down three blocks, turn right, etc.—or by reading a map are two different intellectual processes roughly related to the left and right hemispheres of the brain. Both may be useful, but in a two- and three-dimensional world, map reading is often the more useful skill. Perhaps a measure of our patterning "illiteracy" is the number of people who must turn a map upside down to find their way traveling south, thereby attempting to substitute linear thought for the patterned thought that is more appropriate.

Cooking abilities can be enhanced by reading recipes, but until the cook begins to understand the patterns of ingredients and processes that produce

various combinations of results, the abilities will be only rudimentary and blindly duplicative. Home design, technological maintenance, use of time, human relationships, and personal health all demand abilities to think in and to create patterns.

All this is not to say that the patterning abilities of the right hemisphere of the brain are the only important abilities. The ordering, literate, analytic, comparative left brain is also, and will remain, important. The conclusion seems rather that education should not focus on verbal literacy and logical thought as the preeminent basic skills in our society, but should also consider the ability to think in patterns equally basic. We should give emphasis to both hemispheres of the brain in our intellectual development and not focus so single-mindedly in education of a limited part of our brain's abilities, so that our students can read maps, graphs, and orthographic projections as well as verbal messages.[17] Perhaps this would provide a closer relationship between school success and later success outside school, a relationship found more elusive than hoped in our sociological studies of education.

Educating the Right Hemisphere of the Brain

Patterned thinking becomes quickly complex, as does, of course, linear verbal thinking, but even relatively simple intellectual processes appropriate to earlier formal education can be clearly patterned. To exemplify the kinds of processes the right hemisphere of the brain seems to specialize in and to show how we could develop an education that enhances skill in such processes, perhaps it is best to focus on relatively simple patterning processes that seem more appropriate to elementary schooling but relate to more complex pattern recognition and creation appropriate to higher levels of education. Focusing on the earliest levels of education might make the processes more widely understandable and also help show how basic and fundamental patterned thinking is.

Patterned thinking involves such intellectual processes as generating mental and visual maps; recognizing, visualizing, creating, and rotating images; arranging and recognizing designs and sets of relationships; and conceptualizing mechanical contraptions or complex processes. That we, and especially our children, have some skill and interest in these areas is witnessed by some of the fads of the age, such as computer games and Dungeons and Dragons type games. Even schools are involved, in a rudimentary fashion at least, in many types of patterned thinking. The problem is that formal education does not focus on developing such skills, or worse, considers such processes merely "play."

A common component of early elementary education is "block play." What is missing is further development using more complex construction materials teaching principles of construction, balance, and design and skills

in the recognition, use, and creation of patterns.[18] Nor do we make especially good use of block play beyond allowing the experimentation with and use of block patterns.

One educational use of blocks beyond creative and exploratory construction would be the development of patterned thinking through orthographic projections. Arrangements of blocks could be depicted in orthographic projections for the students to construct by visualizing the complete structure, using a perspective view of the complete structure afterwards to check the accuracy of construction (see example in figure 1). Variations on this theme could involve students creating, depicting, varying, and visualizing increasingly complex patterns. Students can progress to drawing orthographic projections of real objects or even to drawing in perspective objects depicted in orthographic projection. Orthographic projection is a basic means of depicting and communicating designs in the technological world—basic literacy in our culture, yet a foreign language to most educated people. Architectural drawings, "exploded" diagrams of machines, electrical diagrams, and other illustrations in instructions for maintenance and repair are basic communications media in everyday life, yet to the general population they remain all too often unintelligible.

Map reading is a basic patterned thinking skill in our culture, yet it is developed only to a rudimentary level in formal education for the general population. Even the basic ability to read road maps fluently—without turning them upside down, for example—is poorly developed in the general population, let alone more complex patterning involved in other maps. Creating simple maps of neighborhoods has been a sometime kindergarten exercise, but it is only a good beginning to creating, reading, and exploring contour maps, nautical charts, infrared maps, computer-created maps, globes, and the various patterns used to represent three-dimensional, multivariant, and spherical reality on two-dimensional paper and screen. From there it is a short step to reading CAT scans, X-rays, photomicrographs, and other visual patterns generated to help us better understand the reality in and around us. It is also a short step to creating methods for developing abstract as well as visual patterns to explore the world of process and structure that we live in—of moving cells, urban life, forces in a bridge, world trade patterns, multiple causation, and historical flow of complex interactions.

Creating, exploring, and reading graphs is another basic skill in our culture. Yet popular news magazines, for example, show how little it is generally developed in our society when they continually create graphs that do not begin their axes at zero. By doing so they lose one of the most basic characteristics of a good graph—a sense of proportion—and lose in the process accurate representation of relationship, rate of increase or decrease, and rate of acceleration or deceleration when these are often important to the

issue at hand. Fluent reading of graphs is certainly a basic skill in our scientific and technological world. Graphs can represent patterns that words cannot, and computers promise to generate even more graphs, as well as maps, illustrations, and diagrams, to help us explore, understand, and develop our world and culture—or to confound us if we cannot think fluently in patterns.

Patterned thinking, and its education, of course goes far beyond these examples, as the previous section on the right brain in our culture suggests. The various forms of art, design, crafts, problem solving, theorizing, model making, planning, policy making, administration, and production all create and use patterns, both visual and abstract. Whether the field is biology, architecture, electronics, business administration, politics, physics, history, metallurgy, anthropology, engineering, or sculpture, the reading of designs and of graphs is just the more elementary of the many complex patterns of thought one must explore—patterns that words cannot represent well. Even the process of education is a complex of patterns difficult to understand and even more difficult to explain through words. Help in recognizing and manipulating such patterns should be a product of education. For this, educators need to focus on developing ways of teaching a better understanding of our patterned world.

Notes

[1] For a collection of essays on the application to education of research on the brain in general, including reference to hemispheres of the brain, see Jeanne S. Chall and Allan F. Mirsky, eds., *Education and the Brain: The Seventy-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). For a collection of articles on the application to education of research on the hemispheric processes of the brain in particular, see the special issue of the *UCLA Educator*, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1975. However, for a better indication of how much has been made of hemispheric research in education—and how far from research itself applications have been "speculated," especially in the past decade, see the listings under "Cerebral Dominance" in *Current Index to Journals in Education* and *Resources in Education*.

[2] Creativity has many aspects not necessarily associated with right-hemispheric thinking. Holistic thinking needs to be explained before it is useful—and it is explained in many, often somewhat contradictory, ways. Cyclical-metaphoric thought is a concept Bob Samples has used and explained (See, for example, Bob Samples, "Mind Cycles and Learning," *Phi Delta Kappan*, vol. 58, no. 9, May 1977, pp. 688–692.). His explanation is a beginning stab at right-hemispheric intellectual processes, but his four modes of metaphoric thinking are only a small part of the right hemisphere's capabilities and are both too specific and confusingly explained to be useful. Appositional thought is the term preferred by Joseph Bogen (See, for example, J. E. Bogen, "The Other Side of the Brain, II: An Appositional Mind," *Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Society*, vol. 34, 1969, pp. 135–162.). His explanations of the abilities of the two hemispheres are carefully related to brain research and are helpful, but the term he has chosen is not self-explanatory or precise enough to prevent misdefinition and misapplication.

[3] For an extensive summary and analysis of this research, see Sally P. Springer and Georg

Deutsch, *Left Brain, Right Brain* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981). For more concise presentations of this research, see Robert D. Nebes, "Direct Examination of Cognitive Function in the Right and Left Hemispheres," in Marcel Kinsbourne, ed., *Asymmetrical Function of the Brain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 99–137; Doreen Kimura, "The Asymmetry of the Human Brain," *Scientific American*, vol. 228, no. 3, March 1973, pp. 70–78; and Joseph B. Hellige, "Cerebral Hemisphere Asymmetry: Methods, Issues, and Implications," *Educational Communications and Technology*, vol. 28, no. 2, Summer 1980, pp. 83–98. Hellige's article also has an extensive bibliography. For a readable general discussion of hemispheric specialization, see Norman Geschwind, "Specializations of the Human Brain," in *Scientific American*, ed., *The Brain* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), pp. 108–117, which comes from a special 1979 issue of *Scientific American*. For a good warning on the tentativeness with which we must make our conclusions and applications based on research on the hemispheres of the brain, see Howard Gardner, "What We Know (and Don't Know) About the Two Halves of the Brain," *Harvard Magazine*, vol. 80, no. 4, March–April 1978, pp. 24–27.

[4] For a summary of evidence on the possible superiority of the right hemisphere in the Kanji ideographic written Japanese, as opposed to left hemisphere superiority in the Kana phonetic written Japanese, see Jeffrey L. Elman, Kunitoshi Takahashi, and Yasu-Hiko Tohsaku, "Asymmetries for the Categorization of Kanji Nouns, Adjectives, and Verbs Presented to the Left and Right Visual Fields," *Brain and Language*, vol. 13, no. 2, July 1981, pp. 290–300. For a summary of evidence that the right hemisphere reads Chinese logographs better than the left hemisphere, see Yao-Chung Tsao Ming-Fung Wu, and Timothy Faustel, "Stroop Interference: Hemispheric Difference in Chinese Speakers," *Brain and Language*, vol. 13, no. 2, July 1981, pp. 372–378.

[5] For a discussion of individual differences in hemispheric functioning, such as related to handedness, and of the importance of considering interhemispheric cooperation and not just the specialization of the two hemispheres in the working of the brain, see Curtis Hardyck, "A Model of Individual Differences in Hemispheric Functioning," in Haiganoosh Whitaker and Harry A. Whitaker, eds., *Studies in Neurolinguistics: Volume 3* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 223–255.

[6] For a typical example of how far from research results "appliers" take their suggestions—and here repackage magic steps toward more "creative" thinking as developing right hemisphere of the brain abilities, see George Price, "Putting the Other Half of the Brain to Work," *Training: The Magazine of Human Resources Development*, vol. 15, no. 11, November 1978, pp. 57–61.

[7] Both hemispheres can create new thoughts, though, for example, the left hemisphere seems more involved in relating thoughts to past experience and the right more involved in synthetic thinking. There is evidence for such claims as "in the process of acquisition of a new descriptive system, the right hemisphere plays a critical role in initial stages of acquisition, whereas the left hemisphere is superior at utilizing well-routinized codes" (Elkhonon Goldberg and Louis D. Costa, "Hemisphere Differences in the Acquisition and Use of Descriptive Systems," *Brain and Language*, vol. 14, no. 1, September 1981, pp. 144–173, quote p. 144), but it is too far to leap from such statements to the notion that "creativity" is the province of the right hemisphere and not of the left. We probably must describe what kind of creative thought we are talking about before we can ascribe it to one hemisphere or another. Similarly, emotions or affective states are associated with both hemispheres, though, it seems, differently. See, for example, P. D. MacLean, "The Triune Brain, Emotion, and Scientific Bias," in F. O. Schmitt, ed., *The Neurosciences: Second Study Program* (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1970), and Robert D. Nebes, "Direct Examination of Cognitive Function in the Right and Left Hemispheres," in Marcel Kinsbourne, ed., *Asymmetrical Function of the Brain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 99–137.

[8] For an excellent summary of much of what is known about the intellectual processes of the two hemispheres of the brain—and what is mistakenly identified as the differences, see J. E. Bogen, "Some Educational Aspects of Hemispheric Specialization," *UCLA Educator*, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1975, pp. 24–32.

[9] Much research has investigated the role of the right hemisphere in language. Generally the results seem consistent with the notion that the right hemisphere is involved in "patterning." For example, more complex linguistic materials seem to involve more of the right hemisphere (Wendy Wapner, Suzanne Hamby, and Howard Gardner, "The Role of the Right Hemisphere in the Apprehension of Complex Linguistic Materials," *Brain and Language*, vol. 14, no. 1, September 1981, pp. 15–33); "ideographic" reading of "words directly as visual gestalts" seems to involve the right hemisphere (Eran Zaidel and Ann M. Peters, "Phonological Encoding and Ideographic Reading by the Disconnected Right Hemisphere: Two Case Studies," *Brain and Language*, vol. 14, no. 2, November 1981, pp. 205–234); and the right hemisphere seems to be used more than the left hemisphere by the deaf in processing American Sign Language (See Howard Poizner and Harlan Lane, "Cerebral Asymmetry in the Perception of American Sign Language," *Brain and Language*, vol. 7, no. 2, March 1979, pp. 210–226, and Robert J. Scholes and Ira Fischler, "Hemispheric Function and Linguistic Skill in the Deaf," *Brain and Language*, vol. 7, no. 3, May 1979, pp. 336–350.). For summaries of evidence and discussions of possible roles of the right hemisphere in linguistic abilities, see Stephen O. Krashan, "Cerebral Asymmetry," in Haiganoosh Whitaker and Harry A. Whitaker, eds., *Studies in Neurolinguistics: Volume 2* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), pp. 157–191; Robert D. Nebes, "Direct Examination of Cognitive Function in the Right and Left Hemispheres," in Marcel Kinsbourne, ed., *Asymmetrical Function of the Brain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 99–137; and John L. Bradshaw, "Right Hemisphere Language: Familial and Nonfamilial Sinistrals, Cognitive Deficits and Writing Hand Positioning Sinistrals, and Cognitive-Abstract, Imaginable-Nonimaginable Dimensions in Word Recognition: A Review of Interrelated Issues," *Brain and Language*, vol. 10, no. 1, May 1980, pp. 172–188.

[10] See, for example, the summary of the research of Wada and Davis in "Left, Right Brain Differences Are More Fundamental Than Verbal, Non-Verbal," *Brain/Mind Bulletin*, vol. 2, no. 22, October 3, 1977, pp. 1–2, or their original report, J. A. Wada and A. E. Davis, "Fundamental Nature of Human Infant's Brain Asymmetry," *Canadian Journal of Neurological Sciences*, vol. 4, no. 3, August 1977, pp. 203–207.

[11] See Robert E. Ornstein, *The Psychology of Consciousness* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1972), for an often-cited example of the argument that Western culture has focused on the exercise of the left hemisphere of the brain to the neglect of the abilities of the right hemisphere. Ornstein identified, I believe a little simplistically and too completely, the left hemisphere with the thought of the technological, rational West and the right hemisphere with the thought of the mystical, intuitive East. Ornstein's quick jump to such overwrought conclusions neglects, for example, the importance of the patterned thinking of the right hemisphere of the brain in our technological and scientific culture, though schools and many intellectuals may have shared that neglect.

[12] One example in educational application of focusing on the visual aspects of patterning as the essence of right brain functioning is Betty Edwards' book *Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain: A Course in Enhancing Creativity and Artistic Confidence* (Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, Inc., 1979). To be fair, since she is focusing on art education, she is concerned with the visual. However, her typing the processes in the right brain as "visualizing" and "imaging" tend to suggest *only* the visual world, as certainly her art education examples do. In addition she extrapolates, as appliers of hemisphere of the brain research often do, characteristics to the two hemispheres not substantiated by brain research—in her case upright and foursquare to the left hemisphere; flexible, playful, and fanciful to the right hemisphere. And there is the common

suggestion that creativity and artistry are in the right hemisphere, an assertion a creative writer, for example, would and should find naive, if not insulting. Edwards' application of hemisphere of the brain research to education is somewhat typical in focusing only on a narrow aspect of right hemisphere processing, twisting it slightly, and suggesting one approach as somehow a panacea.

[13] While the choice of the term "patterned thinking" to summarize and represent best the many and complex intellectual processes of the right hemisphere of the brain as suggested by contemporary brain research is the author's, others have previously used this term. Carl Sagan, for example, represents the right brain as a searcher for patterns in his book *The Dragons of Eden* (New York: Random House, 1977). He theorizes a further collaborative intellectual process between the "search for patterns" (right hemisphere thinking) and "critical analysis" (left hemisphere thinking) through the corpus callosum, which seems plausible but is not based on as much evidence from brain research as is the term "pattern" for representing the right-hemisphere thinking. Joseph Bogen has used the term "simultaneous patterns" to typify right-hemisphere thinking as opposed to "sequential ordering" to typify left-hemisphere thinking (See J. E. Bogen, "Some Educational Aspects of Hemispheric Specialization," *UCLA Educator*, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1975, o. 27).

[14] The term "pattern," while it seems to this author the best to typify right hemisphere of the brain processes as clarified so far by brain research, is not a perfect term. Left-hemisphere linear, sequential ordering and analyzing could be thought of as a form of patterning. The "patterns" meant in referring to the right hemisphere are multifaceted and simultaneous. Jerison, for example, talks about the brain "clumping" bits of information to handle and make use of it (Harry J. Jerison, "Evolution of the Brain," *UCLA Educator*, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1975, p. 7). Such "clumping" is done by both hemispheres, though, it seems, in different ways.

[15] For an excellent treatise on the centrality of patterned "nonverbal" thought historically in technology, see Eugene S. Ferguson, "The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technology," *Science*, vol. 197, no. 4306, August 26, 1977, pp. 827–836.

[16] The understanding of the importance of patterned thinking to engineering and technology, as well as to science and other fields, comes mainly from the author's experience studying for bachelor's and master's degrees in mechanical engineering, though an understanding of how different this thinking was from thinking communicated through words did not become clear until further study in social sciences and the humanities toward a doctorate in comparative education. Professional work since these experiences has tended to emphasize and clarify the differences and the complexities available in our thinking abilities.

[17] Working across disciplines, the author has been continually struck by the fact that literacy in words and graphs are two different abilities held in varying combinations by people in different disciplines.

[18] As "toys" we have developed materials that are very useful for enhancing patterning abilities, though we have yet to take advantage of teaching with them in our formal educational system. Examples are the Lego, Fischer Technik, Fastech, Capsela, Loc Blocs, and Erector sets in the area of contruction and mechanics. Other toys deal in more abstract patterning, such as Dungeons and Dragons and the Rubik's Cube. All sorts of model making, whether of rockets, houses, or railroads, also typically involves patterning, as does creating radio, electronic, and, now, computer systems.

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Book Review Essay*

Education: Power and Freedom
A Critical Review of David Nyberg's Power Over Power

Reviewed by:

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David Nyberg's *Power over Power*[1] is a very arresting book. For, in the course of attempting what he calls "a prolegomenon to a revised ethics of education" (p. 149), Nyberg has provided us with a new understanding of what he thinks is one of the least attractive concepts in our political vocabulary, namely, "power." In addition, Nyberg has also constructed a new interpretation of "freedom" as a set of skills which, when taken together with his understanding of "power," Nyberg feels can be the basis for what he calls a "redintegration" (p. 70) of educational philosophy about curriculum in general and moral education in particular. By "redintegration" Nyberg means to indicate a reconciliation of power and freedom with the process of education, so that this process may "return to a condition of soundness, wholeness and integrity" (p. 70). Now, skeptics will think that there is nothing necessarily interesting in this prescription of a new curriculum. Anyone may ride her or his own hobbyhorse, after all. What prevents this particular effort from being consigned to the perishable pile of curriculum prescriptions is Nyberg's substantive conclusions about "power" and "freedom," particularly their interrelatedness and their necessity in a new vision of education, and the crisp elegance of style in which these conclusions are presented. *Power over Power* is not simply persuasive in its argument; it is a well-fashioned, literate, and, above all, interesting essay.

In my review of the book, I propose to attempt a summary of the book's main arguments. Thereafter, I want to consider three general issues which

* A version of this review was first presented as part of the thirty-eighth annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society in Baltimore, MD, on March 27, 1982.

the book raised for me: (1) how to characterize the nature of Nyberg's exercise—I think the book a rather novel exercise for a philosopher of education; (2) how, precisely, Nyberg uses his notions of "power" and "freedom" in the book's main argument—I suspect I have no cavil with what he makes of "power," but I am not always clear on which concept of "freedom" Nyberg is relying; and (3) what qualities an individual might acquire as a result of Nyberg's prescriptions—I want to know what Nyberg's educated person would look like. In the process of my consideration of these issues I want to offer some critical remarks based on what I take Nyberg's response to these issues to be.

The major thrust of Nyberg's argument about "power" and "freedom" are that they are for him at any rate "inherently social concepts" (p. 25). As a result, so far from being reified concepts, denoting abstract entities, are they, that power and freedom are, for Nyberg, formulaic so that he stipulates that their proper usage is case-specific, requiring that for each case we must fill in *who* has power or *who* is free to do *what* with respect to *whom*.[2] Thus each concept is relational—perhaps inter-relational would be a better characterization—in nature. These concepts of "power" and "freedom" are, therefore, inherently social, for they mediate personal relations; psychological, for they explain the ways individuals act in these relations; and instrumental, for they are means to chosen ends. For Nyberg, "freedom" is a corollary of "power" rather than its polarity, so that Nyberg's "freedom" is the natural result of his understanding of power. Finally, because "both power and freedom are fundamental categories of human experience" (p. 172) and because formal education in modern society must, according to Nyberg, "focus on the world through the politics of social and personal experience" (p. 150), education must emphasize "knowledge about power and the skills of freedom" (p. 152) if an individual is "to be taught [what] is basic and indispensable for getting on as decent persons in our modern social milieux." (p. 152)

Nyberg is not prescribing a curriculum for political education here, with its attendant implications for authority relations between government and society. Rather, Nyberg is prescribing a curriculum which will better allow individuals to deal with each other and the organizations which structure their lives. For Nyberg is advocating constructions of power and freedom which lend themselves to being taught as subject matter directed toward these ends. When linked with imagination, which for Nyberg is "very like the basic ability to plan" (p. 174)—at least when it is put to use to conceive of a world that does not presently exist—learning about his version of "power" and "freedom" will necessarily eventuate in those who do so becoming autonomous. On Nyberg's view, "autonomy is an achievement that requires hierarchy, both internally in the organization of wants and

commitments and externally in the organization of social relations" (p. 129). As a result of being autonomous, individuals are able to imagine plausible circumstances that are presently nonexistent, and more importantly, possess the skills to realize these circumstances as a result of their having acquired knowledge of "power" and the skills of "freedom." Such individuals are equipped to face "the Polar expedition" (p. 169) which is modern social life. But what are the main arguments which support this alluring view of the purpose of education?

With regard to his understanding the concept of "power," Nyberg's main contention appears to be that those who hold it do so at the behest of those over whom they hold it. Thus, "power" on this reading seems mainly an instrumental conception, designed to mediate relations voluntarily entered upon with some mutually agreed-to plan in mind. In fact, without the consent which Nyberg's view of "power" entails, the triadic relationship created by one individual acquiescing in the wishes of another with respect to their plan would collapse.[3] Indeed, it is the realization that "power" is based upon consent that provides Nyberg's autonomous individuals with their "power over power." But what exactly is the nature of this kind of "power" and how is it related to education?

In the opening pages of his discussion of "power," Nyberg squarely faces the fact that we are averse to thinking about the concept. Americans do not like to think about the power of individuals in social relations "because doing so confronts one with one's own powerlessness" (p. 32). This "power" appears to signify the ability to exercise control, even illegitimately, and so is incompatible with freedom in particular and moral treatment in general. As a result, Americans "feel repugnance for any sort of power" (p. 33). The antidote to this situation is a broad distribution of knowledge about power so that we can cease to feel powerless regardless of the form power takes in society. By broadening society's access to knowledge about power through the process of education, Nyberg seems to say we diminish the possibility for a concentration of control in the hands of the few and their organizations. By reconciling the Nybergian concept of power and education—Nyberg's process of "redintegration"—we can accomplish the task of broadening access to power. This process of reconciliation between power and education can best be understood if we consider the four most typical forms of "power" in society and how these are to be legitimately employed in the process of education.

In brief, these four forms of power prevalent in society are "force" (p. 70), either actual or threatened physical abuse; "fiction" (p. 71), used by Nyberg to indicate the invention and delineation of a set of assumptions; "finance" (p. 75), in the sense of providing a reward of some kind for services; and "fealty" (p. 80), which is mutual trust and links "power"

somewhat unexpectedly to love. For Nyberg, "fiction," "finance," and "fealty" are central to the process of education, while "force" appears inappropriate to the process, since educators wish to gain as much consent to their demands as their charges are capable of giving. Educators can develop more defensible educational plans for their charges by recognizing the uses to which they put these forms of "power" in the manner of education. For example, by understanding that "power" and finance can be interpreted in educational terms as the educators' manipulation of rewards to gain the attention of students and enlist their consent, or by understanding that a relation of fealty develops as a result of the exercise of power, so that educators can achieve as far as is possible "a condition of balanced trust, shared understanding, and a mutual plan for action" (p. 81). By facing the fact that much of what the manner of education entails is directly related to "power," educators can provide a more honest rendition to society at large and more importantly, perhaps, to students of what they are about. Thus, to motivate students is, in Nyberg's view, to enlist their consent for carrying out the educator's plan of action (c.f. p. 86) while talk of the educator's authority is simply talk of "power" legitimated by its delegation and its being consented to. On this view, then, "power" is essential to a proper understanding of the process of education.

If we have suffered from a fear of power, then, according to Nyberg, we have made a fetish of "freedom" (p. 20), despite its essentially contestable character (p. 131). "Freedom" has come to stand for "a jumble of qualities and values that yield not a clear definition but only an elusive state of mind" (p. 100). Eschewing only a metaphysical sense of freedom,[4] Nyberg seems to understand freedom in terms of liberty, and political liberty at that. For he wants to argue that we must think of "freedom" in terms of my freedom, your freedom and our freedom (p. 118), following his idea that "freedom," like "power," is interrelational. Thus, there is no longer "a magnificent singular Freedom" (p. 118) which might amount to a generalized sense of liberation from the strictures living in today's society imposes, or to a kind of inner feeling which will remain unaffected by the circumstances of one's life, but only particularized "freedoms." The achievement of these "freedoms" is the result of how constraints against their exercise are dealt with. One's "freedoms," therefore, amount to a set of skills for the realization of one's intentions, so that once more, like "power," "freedom" may have social, psychological and instrumental features. What appears most to differentiate freedom from power is the necessity to define it in relation to social values (p. 126), such as equality. What appears to make freedom and power most alike is that both are teachable (p. 121). That freedom is teachable for Nyberg is the result of his insistence that it eventuates from our dealing with the constraints which interfere with our proposed plans of

action. In order to effect our freedom we must learn to manipulate a "template" for constraint-resolution (p. 133). The need for this "template" arises from both the presence and the absence of circumstances—circumstances that generate three categories of constraint, namely, "psychobiological, societal and equivocal" (pp. 132–141). Examples of these different kinds of constraint include, under the psychobiological category, illiteracy on the part of students (a constraint of the absent variety); under the societal category, habits, customs or morals (constraints of the present variety); and under the equivocal category—perhaps the most difficult to understand, as its name suggests—the imagined presence of fate, or the real presence of red tape, or even the absence of a sense of the absurd may constitute constraints. Now, by learning to utilize the constraint template to identify constraints, Nyberg believes individuals can alleviate the force of the constraints on their plans.

But lest we conclude that to identify a constraint is to alleviate it—clearly false in many cases—Nyberg concludes his thinking about freedom by insisting that "the activity of freedom . . . is not pure cognition. It is a sort of practical mastery made possible by increments in knowledge and the application of this knowledge" (pp. 145–146). Thus, the role of education in the development of students' freedoms becomes crucial, and nowhere is this more so than in moral education. For, in learning the technique of the template, students are learning what it is to make rational, responsible choices for themselves, balancing the pursuit of their freedoms against the constraints of others and the world around them. Thus, the major requirements of those manipulating the template become "imagination, foresight, planning, respect for evidence, control of information and some understanding of organization" (p. 175). Nybergian template manipulation, then, seems to depend crucially on rational abilities, despite his hinting to the contrary.

The hallmarks of an educated person in Nyberg's view may now be described. She or he is one who has understood the rudiments of "power" and has mastered the skills of "freedom." For Nyberg such persons are capable of leading decent (which appears to mean educated, for Nyberg) lives in the present social milieux, and thus the purpose of education is fulfilled. What makes them so well equipped to face the Polar expedition that is modern life is the autonomy they possess as a result of their understanding and mastery. That they are autonomous indicates their ability to make appropriate choices about their lives in an imaginative and personally meaningful way based on their rational ability. Students will be able, if Nyberg's prescriptions are accepted, to plan and direct their own lives such that they can cope with others and organizations which embody power and can resist the constraints imposed by both. For "clever teachers can use the

forms of power . . . in their methods of teaching . . . [and may teach the form] in teaching power itself" (p. 173). Additionally, clever teachers will presumably teach the skills of freedom as the central moment in whatever moral education they provide. Thus Nyberg's "redintegration" of power and freedom in his renovated conception of education affects both the manner and matter of education from a moral point of view. What we must now attempt is some assessment of these prescriptions and their efficacy in the development of the educated person.

Nyberg is clearly doing philosophy of education. But by working on the psychological and social aspects of his chosen concepts, I suspect he has elaborated his philosophical arguments in a remarkably interdisciplinary way so that as he rethinks the radical educational literature of the sixties (pp. 104ff.) from these additional perspectives he can say that "the question is not whether education should constrain individual freedoms (it must), but what exactly is the relation between institutional constraint and individual freedom which renders education *just*"—a question which surely is to be faced by policy-planners as much as by philosophers of education. Or again, in the opening paragraphs of his concluding chapter, Nyberg seems to be addressing not simply philosophers of education but also teachers and perhaps administrators and the public in general when he asks "What needs to be learned, by whom and for what reasons" (p. 149). And yet the book is surely designed for planners and teachers of a philosophical bent. Who else would understand Nyberg's characterization of his work as "no more than a prolegomenon to a revised ethics of education" (p. 169)?

Nyberg has wanted to vouchsafe the future well-being of students (and thereby society in general) so that they are not trapped into merely learning to survive in society but are able to gain the ability to flourish. By working out what will enable them to flourish in an interdisciplinary fashion, Nyberg has invited the aid of a much greater range of individuals to the students' cause than the more typical of his professional colleagues.

Before discussing what I suppose most intrigued me about Nyberg's book, namely, the nature of the individual that might eventuate from a Nybergian education, I want to raise one question about the substance of Nyberg's argument, the answer to which will be germane to my concluding discussion of the educated person. While I have no doubt that Nyberg has done us a great service by making us confront the need to understand power in the process of education—in fact *I* find this the most novel aspect of his work—I am at times frustrated by his discussion of the concept of freedom—what *he* takes to be the most novel aspect of his work (p. 172). For I am not always clear which notion of freedom Nyberg has in mind.

Nyberg is at pains to persuade us that "there is no general issue of freedom" (p. 118) and that as a result we should talk only of particular

freedoms—mine, yours or ours. Now, I take it that this amounts to the ceding of freedom as an aspiration for society in general and the espousal of freedom as a personal, perhaps psychological *desideratum*. But Nyberg never really sorts out the metaphysical and political issues involved in favour of such a construction, so that we are left merely with a characterization of freedom as "a rational operation by which people devise and implement plans" (p. 21) as a summary of his views. It is, in essence, the ability to problem solve, rationally, in a social context. And while I accept this as a valid construction of freedom, construed metaphysically—a sense of freedom Nyberg denies—I wonder if Nyberg has not confused this with the political (broadly construed) sense of freedom which is typically dependent on the aspiration to Freedom with a capital F, which, again, Nyberg denigrates. In fact, does not Nyberg have to make some reference to both these notions of freedom in order to develop his notion of freedom which appears to amount to the ability (or perhaps the developing ability) to live as unfettered a political life as possible so that one might achieve "happiness," where the latter term is construed as the English translation of the Greek *eudaemonia*. Without such a reference to the ideal of Freedom the more "diminutive freedoms" (p. 118) of individuals cannot have as full a social meaning as Nyberg's freedom requires. If Nyberg's principal *desideratum* is the ability to live decently, which I take to be the ability to balance one's self-interest and one's political obligations from a moral perspective, then surely such an intuitively communitarian ideal as decency requires some sense of Freedom as a political aspiration—an aspiration which it is the purpose of education to attempt to realize in individuals. It is to an assessment of Nybergian individuals that we now turn as the last part of our review.

For Nyberg, the educated person is the autonomous person. Now such a characterization is what we might expect from an author who believes that life is a Polar expedition for which one must organize one's wants, values and social relations. In essence, such a life demands self-governance. I suspect this results from Nyberg's elevation of the ability to make and realize rational choices for oneself to the forefront of the educational enterprise in order to avoid anomie and gain authenticity of personhood. But I wonder whether autonomy is the best shield for life, even if life is construed as a Polar expedition.

Certainly if we substitute for autonomy what Nyberg has characterized as "acting freely," namely, "the ability to transform a future reference into the mechanics of possiblity," (p. 169) in a rational manner, then we can readily understand that a conception of self as autonomous may eventuate. But is a sense of self so dependent on autonomous action as Nyberg's so desirable? It is Richard Sennett who has recently characterized autonomous individuals as "self-possessers"[5] and the aim of autonomy as "the repression of

nurturance altogether."[6] It is precisely this lack of nurturance on the part of each of us towards each other that leads to our conceiving of life as a Polar expedition for which we then only require autonomy.

In fact it is John Wilson, whom Nyberg quotes so enthusiastically as a champion of individuality (p. 160 ff.) who reminds us that while "we want children . . . to learn to think for themselves, we also want them to learn to be obedient and properly submissive.[7] Why? Because "authority [is] required by human co-operation[8]—co-operation which presumably is dependent on human nurturance. Let us not mistake Wilson, however. The use of the adverb "properly" suggests that there are times when it is morally *improper* to be submissive—precisely the behavior Nyberg's notion of power is designed to avoid. But those occasions for Nyberg seem to be construed only in individualistic rather than in communitarian terms—a result which follows, I believe, from the interpretation of freedom he has offered.

In conclusion, then, I believe *Power over Power* to be a provocative book. It confronts difficult issues with an earnestness and breadth that I believe are rare in philosophy of education. I hope I have quoted enough to enable some glimmer of the elegance of style the book possesses, especially in its economy of language and apposite choice of vocabulary. Nyberg's is not a long book, but the arguments, because time is taken to set them in their intellectual context (I fear I have hardly dealt with this aspect of the book) take a while to unfold. My musings on these arguments should not be taken as detractions from the book. Rather, I intend them as a compliment to Professor Nyberg, for I hope they show that he has made me think—and what else is a philosopher supposed to elicit from her or his readers?

Notes

[1] Nyberg, David; *Power over Power* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981). Page references to all quotations from the book are included in the text.

[2] Oppenheim, Felix E.; *Political Concepts: A Reconstruction* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 6.

[3] Barbara Houston has suggested to me that when dealing with questions of power that are very general in nature—the subjection of women in present U.S. society, for example—delineating the triadic relation of power may become very difficult and thus compound the problem at hand. Who actually has power over women to do what precisely, is not easy to decide so that understanding power in the way Nyberg does may not always lead to an obvious solution to questions involving power relations.

[4] c.f. Taylor, Richard; *Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 42 ff.

[5] Sennett, Richard, *Authority* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 118–120.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[7] Wilson, John, *Philosophy and Practical Education* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 110.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

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

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

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